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PREFACE 
 
“It is important to note that commercial banks and other deposit taking 
financial institutions have special governance risks and complexities since: (i) 
banks take large amounts or risk bearing (and thus forward looking) 
obligations on their books, and hence weak internal controls and 
accountability can cause urgent and rapid crisis; (ii) the collapse of bank will 
usually destroy value for its public depositors, not just shareholders, and may 
even require a costly bail out by the fiscal authorities; and (iii) there is the 
systematic risk that the collapse of a single bank can undermine the entire 
banking system. Because of these special governance risks, banks are usually 
required by law or regulation to have certain specific governance structures 
and reporting standards.” 
- Luncheon address by Dr Y V Reddy, Governor of the Reserve Bank of 
India, at the Seminar on Corporate Governance for Bank Directors 
organised by the Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore; International 
Institute of Finance, Washington and the Indian Banks’ Association, 
Mumbai, 16 December 2005. 
The last decade has seen many positive developments in the Indian Banking 
sector. The policy makers, which comprise the Reserve Bank of India, Ministry of 
Finance and related government and financial sector regulatory entities have made 
several notable efforts to improve regulation in the sector. But apart from this, the 
sector could not kept itself free from the global trends and its effects.  
The most recent and acute evidence of the effects of globalization can be 
exemplified by the issue of the global financial crisis and its spill over effect on the 
economy of almost all countries. Globalized or connected economies left no country 
untouched from the consequences of the crisis. The sources of the crisis may be 
limited to some developed economies, but developing economies are not also free 
from having potential risks in this regard, though in slightly different form and of a 
varied degree. 
 
 
  II 
 
A large number of reforms have been proposed and initiated by both various 
multilateral and country specific government and regulatory bodies especially after 
the financial crisis to improve the global corporate governance principles and 
standards. Risk management, executive compensation, capital requirements, and 
financial sector tax (i.e. banking tax) are some of the aspects where both 
developments and debate are continuing. 
This study focuses the quality of corporate governance in Indian Banking 
sector in this regard. The present study is based on analysis of corporate governance 
practices of selected top Indian Banks which possess significant share in Indian 
Banking sector as well as in market capitalization. To evaluate the corporate 
governance practices of the banks, researcher has considered the papers prepared by 
the UN secretariat for the nineteenth session of ISAR (International Standards of 
Accounting and Reporting), entitled “Transparency and disclosure requirements for 
corporate governance” and the twenty second session of ISAR, entitled “Guidance on 
Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure”. 
Accordingly researcher has prepared the corporate governance disclosure 
index divided in two categories of financial disclosures and non financial disclosures 
and same way banks also divided as public sector banks and private sector banks. 
After deciding the corporate governance disclosure index for all the selected banks, 
the researcher has applied different statistical tools to test the hypothesis of the study. 
To know the effects of different factors on corporate governance disclosure index, the 
researcher has used multiple correlation and regression analysis and for testing of 
hypothesis, run test, t test, f test and ANOVA. 
 Last chapter provides the detailed discussion regarding the summary of the 
study, major findings by the researcher and suggestions to overcome the major 
limitations of the banks in the area of corporate governance practices. Thus this study 
is a relook in the governance practices followed by the Indian Banks and to evaluate 
the same with international standards of good governance.  
 
        
Mr.  Bhavik M. Panchasara 
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1. Introduction:  
The Indian financial sector comprises a large network of commercial banks, 
financial institutions, stock exchanges and a wide range of financial instruments. It 
has undergone a significant structural transformation since the initiation of financial 
liberalization in 1990s. Before financial liberalization, since mid 1960’s till the early 
1990’, the Indian financial system was considered as an instrument of public financei. 
The evolution of Indian financial sector in the post independent period can be divided 
in to three distinct periods. During the first period (1947-68), the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI) consolidated its role as the agency in charge of supervision and banking 
control. Till 1960’s the neo-Keynesian perspective dominated, argued interest rates 
should be kept low in order to promote capital accumulation
ii
. During this period 
Indian financial sector was characterized by nationalization of banks, directed credit 
and administered interest rates
iii
. The second period (1969 - mid 1980’s), known as 
the period of financial repression. The financial repression started with the 
nationalization of 14 commercial banks
iv
 in 1969. As a result interest rate controls, 
directed credit programmes, etc. increased in magnitude during this period
v
. The third 
period, mid 1980’s onwards, is characterized by consolidation, diversification and 
liberalization.  
However a more comprehensive liberalization programme was initiated by the 
government of India during early 1990’s.The impetus to financial sector reforms came 
with the submission of three influential reports by the Chakravarty Committee in 
1985, the Vaghul in 1987 and the Narasimham Committee in 1991. But the 
recommendations of the Narasimham Committee provided the blueprint of the 
reforms, especially with regard to banks and other financial institutions. In 1991, the 
government of India initiated a comprehensive financial sector liberalization 
programme. The liberalization programme includes de-controlled interest rates, 
reduced reserve ratios and slowly reduced government control of banking operations 
while establishing a market regulatory framework
vi
. 
The major objectives of the financial liberalization were to improve the overall 
performance of the Indian financial sector, to make the financial institutions more 
competent and more efficient. As mentioned earlier, the financial sector comprises 
commercial banks, stock exchanges and other financial institutions. However, Indian 
financial system continues to be a bank based financial system and the banking sector 
plays an important role as a resource mobiliser. It remains the principal source of 
resources for many households, small and medium enterprises and also caters the 
large industries. And also provides many other financial services. Underlining the 
importance of the banking sector, several banking sector specific reforms as a part of 
financial reforms were introduced to improve the performance of the Indian banking 
sector and to make the Indian banks more competent and efficient. Against this 
backdrop, the present paper intends to study the corporate governance of the Indian 
banking sector. 
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1.1 Background of the Research: 
“It is now widely agreed that corporate governance failings were not only the 
cause of the crisis but they were highly significant, above all because board 
failed to understand and manage risk and tolerated perverse incentives. In 
turn, shareholders lacked information and at times, motivation to address the 
gathering problems. Whilst it is clear that there were regulatory failures, it is 
also evident that enhanced governance practices should therefore be integral 
to overall solution aimed at reforming the confidence to markets and helping 
us to protect us from future crisis.”  
- Second ICGN statement on the global 
financial crisis, 23 March 2009. 
 
The most recent and acute evidence of effects of globalization can be 
exemplified by the issue of Global Financial Crisis and its spill over effect on the 
economy of almost all countries. Globalised or connected economies left no country 
untouched from the consequences of the crisis. The sources of the crisis may be 
limited to some developed economies, but developing economies are not also free 
from having potential risks in this regard, though in slightly different form and of a 
varied degree. The crisis is indeed to a great extent attributed to the failures in 
ensuring good corporate governance practices. Various research and policy papers has 
identified absence of a strong risk management framework in the financial 
institutions, lack of sufficient disclosures of both financial and nonfinancial 
information, inefficient accounting standards and regulatory requirement, and 
remuneration system of the executives etc as some of the CG failures that resulted in 
the worst financial crisis the world have seen since great depression of 1930. The 
current crisis has also questioned the government and regulatory bodies, the board, 
and the credit rating agencies for their inefficient role in ensuring good corporate 
governance. 
According to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
vii
, 702 banks 
were considered as troubled banks and problem assets totalled $402.8bn at the end of 
2009. The FDIC took over 140 banks in 2009 and FDIC also expected total bank 
failure to cost $100 from 2008 to 2013. Therefore, the current financial crisis has 
provided a lesson on how the collapse in the global banking sector impacts the entire 
world economy e.g. shrink in world Gross Domestic Product (GDP), huge number of 
bankruptcy, massive bailout from tax payers money (Table 1.1 provides the fiscal 
growth of world GDP and decline in GDP per capital), losses of millions of jobs, 
large decline in trade flow, and foreign direct investment and also credibility of the 
global financial system is questioned among others. Table 1.2 highlights the rate of 
growth of world GDP and number of countries who’s GDP has declined due to 
current global financial crisis. 
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TABLE 1.1: Fiscal Stimulus to address the global financial and economic crisis* 
 
Countries 
Share of 
GDP 
(Percentage) 
Fiscal 
Stimulus 
(Billions 
of US $) 
Countries 
Share of 
GDP 
(Percentage) 
Fiscal 
Stimulus 
(Billions 
of US $) 
Argentina 1.2 3.9 Luxembourg 3.6 2.0 
Australia 4.7 47.0 Malaysia 5.5 12.1 
Austria 4.5 18.8 Mexico 2.1 22.7 
Bangladesh 0.6 0.5 Netherlands 1.0 8.4 
Belgium 1.0 4.9 New Zealand 4.2 5.4 
Brazil 0.2 3.6 Nigeria 0.7 1.6 
Canada 2.8 42.2 Norway 0.6 2.9 
Chile 2.4 4.0 Peru 2.6 3.3 
China 13.3 585.3 Philippines 4.1 7.0 
Czech Republic 1.8 3.9 Poland 2.0 10.6 
Denmark 2.5 8.7 Portugal 1.2 3.0 
Egypt 1.7 2.7 Russian 
Federation 
1.2 20 
Finland 3.5 9.5 Saudi Arabia 12.5 60.0 
France 1.3 36.2 Singapore 5.8 10.6 
Georgia 10.3 1.3 Slovenia 1.0 0.5 
Germany 2.2 80.5 South Africa 1.5 4.2 
Honduras 10.6 1.5 Spain 0.9 15.3 
Hong Kong 
 SAR** 
5.2 11.3 Sri Lanka 0.2 0.1 
Hungary 10.9 17.0 Sweden 2.8 13.4 
India 3.2 38.4 Switzerland 0.5 2.5 
Indonesia 1.4 7.1 Taiwan Province 
of China 
3.9 15.3 
Israel 1.4 2.8 Thailand 14.3 39 
Italy 0.7 16.8 Turkey 5.2 38.0 
Japan 6.0 297.5 United Kingdom 1.4 38 
Kazakhstan 13.8 18.2 United Republic 
of Tanzania 
6.4 1.3 
Kenya 0.9 0.3 United States 6.8 969.0 
Korea 5.6 53.4 Viet Nam 9.4 8.4 
Lithuania 1.9 0.9    
   All 55 economies 4.7 2,633 
   World 4.3 
Based on UN/DESA information from various sources. Note that the definition and 
contents of the policy measures vary from country to country and that the size of the 
packages may not be fully comparable across countries. 
* This list of countries and economies is not exhaustive. 
** Special Administrative Region of China. 
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Source: World Economic Situation and Prospects: Global Outlook 2010, United 
Nations, New York 2009 
TABLE 1.2 World Gross Domestic Products (GDP Growth) 
Year 
Growth of World 
Output 
Decline in GDP per capita 
(Number of countries) 
2007 3.9 11 
2008 1.9 30 
  2009* -2.2 107 
    2010** 2.4 25 
Source: World Economic Situation and Prospects: Global Outlook 2010, United 
Nations, New York 2009 (* Partly Estimated, ** Forecasts) 
 
Banks, being the most important vertebrae of a country's economic backbone, 
requires sound CG practice and proper monitoring of their compliance. Steps to do 
this will vary from country to country but there must be a standard regulation and 
practice. In addition to the role played by the government and regulatory bodies and 
respective industries in different jurisdictions, a number of multilateral organizations 
have long been advocating to promote best CG practices across the world. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECDs)viii principles on 
CG has been using as a benchmark for almost all the countries in the World. In 
addition, Basel committee’s guideline on enhancing CG for banking organization is 
also a reference point for improving the CG practices in the banking sector.  
In India, the role of banking sector is worth mentioning. Being the largest 
source of finance, banking sector is also one of the major sources for employment. In 
addition, Indian banks, the dominant financial intermediaries in India, have made 
good progress over the last five years, as is evident from several parameters, including 
annual credit growth, profitability, and trend in gross non-performing assets (NPAs). 
While the annual rate of credit growth clocked 23% during the last five years, 
profitability (average Return on Net Worth) was maintained at around 15% during the 
same period, and gross NPAs fell from 3.3% as on March 31, 2006 to 2.3% as on 
March 31, 2011. Though India have not seen any major collapse in the banking sector 
due to current global financial crisis, however, currently, Indian banks face several 
challenges, such as increase in interest rates on saving deposits, possible deregulation 
of interest rates on saving deposits, a tighter monetary policy, a large government 
deficit, increased stress in some sectors (such as, state utilities, airlines, and 
microfinance), restructured loan accounts, unamortised pension/gratuity liabilities, 
increasing infrastructure loans, and implementation of Basel III. 
Therefore, a study on CG practices in the banking sector of India will be 
helpful for knowing the current status of the CG in the banking sector and also be 
helpful to identify the areas where actions are necessary to improve the governance in 
the banking sector. This research work tried to capture the latent demand of various 
stakeholders in India by conducting a comprehensive study to determine the corporate 
governance practices in the banking sector of India.  
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2. Corporate Governance: Definition and Importance 
 
“Happy companies have robust growth in revenues, strong balance sheets and healthy 
profits that reflect genuine business success, not phony book keeping. And they share 
other important traits as well. They abide by high ethical standards, which is a key to 
their solid success. They don’t obstruct the flow of information to shareholders, but 
rather view the shareholder as the ultimate owner and the ultimate boss. They choose 
directors on the strength of their abilities, character and capacity for independent 
judgment. And their internal controls work well, so that the company’s executives can 
take immediate corrective action when something goes wrong.” 
-- Chairman Christopher Cox, 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Washington D.C., March 21, 2006. 
(Remarks before the Committee for Economic Development.)
ix
 
 
Corporate Governance is about commitment to values and ethical business 
conduct. It is related with how an organization is managed, which includes its 
corporate and other structures, its culture, policies and the manner in which it deals 
with various stakeholders. Timely and accurate discloser of information regarding the 
financial situation, performance, ownership and Governance of the company is an 
important part of Corporate Governance. It improves public understanding of the 
structure, activities and policies of the organization. Consequently, the organization is 
able to attract investors and enhance the trust and confidence of the stakeholders. 
The genesis of Corporate Governance lies in business scams and failures. The 
Watergate scandal, the junk bond fiasco in USA and the failure of Maxwell, BCCI 
and Polypeck in UK resulted into setting up of the Treadway committee in USA and 
the Cadbury committee in UK on Corporate Governance. The guiding principle being 
“transparency and ethics” should govern corporate world. Increasing strategic 
importance of professional management probably constitutes the most important 
aspect of changing profile of Corporate Governance. Growing importance of 
profession, which never figured predominantly in the ideological thinking in the 
nineteenth century has dominated public discussion in twentieth century and will 
continue to dominate in times to come. Given the global challenges, the only choice 
left with business and economic enterprises is to follow the Corporate Governance 
practices – the path for living, working, surviving, successing and the excelling in the 
future. 
 
2.1 Governance and Management: 
 
By and large the terms ‘governance’ and ‘management’ are used 
interchangeably though conceptual difference exits between the two. The basic 
difference lies in activity orientation – the governance is “strategy oriented” whereas 
management is “task oriented”. The management concerns itself with ‘execution of 
tasks’ in order to achieve pre-determined goals and objectives. The focus under 
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governance is wider than management; it encompasses framing of policy and ensuring 
disclosure and transparency. The focus under ‘management’ is internal – to control, 
direct and monitor the activities of the management personnel and executives and to 
make them accountable for proper implementation of pre-determined polices. 
On the other hand, the focus under governance is external – it involves 
accountability of promoters and directors to the outside world, namely, the 
stakeholders. Though the concepts are distinctive, there is a common thread, which 
establishes irrefutable inter-relation between the two – 
 
“Better governance leads to better management”. 
 
2.2 Who are Stakeholders? 
 
The focus under Corporate Governance is shifted from ‘shareholders’ to 
‘stakeholders’. Nobel Prize winner in Economics, Milton Friedmanx linked Corporate 
Governance to the conduct of business in accordance with the shareholders’ desires, 
which primarily meant to create wealth for shareholders/owners but at the same time 
conforming to the laws, rules, regulations and customs established by the society. The 
Corporate Governance is no longer restricted to creation of wealth for the 
shareholders. The concept now encompasses interest of stakeholders. But who really 
are the stakeholders?  
The stakeholders include, besides the shareholders, other participants in the 
corporation such as the Board of Directors, managers, employees, workers, 
customers, vendors, lenders, and community goals can’t be overlooked under the 
Corporate Governance. 
 
2.3 Corporate Governance: Definitions 
 
“Corporate Governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled” 
Sir Adrian Cadbury                                                                                                   
Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance   
(London: Gee and Co. Ltd., 1992), p. 14.
xi
 
 
“Corporate Governance refers to that blend of law, regulation and appropriate 
voluntary private sector practices which enables the corporation to attract financial 
and human capital, perform efficiently and thereby perpetuate itself by generating 
long term economic value for its shareholders, while respecting the interests of 
stakeholders and society as a whole” 
Ira M. Millstein, 2003                                                                                                        
(Adapted from Developing Corporate Governance Codes of Best Practices, Volume I, 
Global Corporate Governance Toolkit 2)
xii
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Corporate governance is a wide subject and like any other field, definition and 
effective practices of good corporate governance is largely affected by the size of the 
economy, differences in the legal, regulatory, institutional, financial and political 
framework, status of the capital market, and stakeholder’s perception etc. If we 
analyze the words, “Governance’, derived from the word ‘Gubernare’, means to rule 
or steer. Though originally meant to be a normative framework for exercise of power 
and acceptance of accountability thereof in the running of kingdoms, regions and 
towns over the years, it has found significant relevance in the corporate world. 
However, irrespective of the differences, the importance and the inherent meaning 
remains same across the world.  
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD’s) 
definition and principles on corporate governance has been accepted by most of the 
countries in the world including the multilateral organizations like the World Bank 
Group, the United nations, the Basel committee for banking Supervision, the 
International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO), the Asian 
Development Bank, the Islamic Financial Services. Like many other international 
researches, this study is also focused on OECD’s definition of CG; 
 
“Corporate governance is defined as the system by which business corporations are 
directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution 
of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as, 
the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules 
and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also 
provides the structure through which the company objectives are set and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance",  
(OECD 2004)
xiii
 
 
A balanced board with proper educations, skills and competency, experiences, 
independent judgement and effective oversight Strong commitment from the board 
and the senior management, effective control environment and process, high level of 
transparency and disclosure of financial and non-financial information, well defined 
shareholders rights including the mechanism for the protection of shareholders rights, 
effective monitoring of the client’s corporate governance practices and long term 
commitment to good corporate governance practice rather than a single action or 
“box-ticking” exercises are some of the essential criteria against which we can judge 
the level of commitment to ensure good corporate governance in any of the company 
in the world.  
Above discussed definitions are very useful to understand the meaning of 
corporate governance and after analysis that we can highlights the essential criterion 
for good corporate governance, which are essential for any organization. Table 3 
explains the elements of good corporate governance. 
 
 
 
Overview of Corporate Governance and Conceptual Framework Chapter 1 
 
An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector 8 
 
TABLE 1.3: Elements of Good Corporate Governance 
Good Board Practices 
Clearly defined roles and authorities 
Duties and responsibilities of directors 
understood 
Board is well structured 
Appropriate composition and mix of 
skills 
Appropriate board procedures 
Director remuneration in line with best 
practice 
Board self – evaluation and training 
conducted 
Control Environment 
Independent audit committee established 
Risk management framework present 
Internal control procedures 
Internal audit function 
Independent external auditor conducts 
audits 
Management information system 
established 
Compliance function established 
Transparent Disclosures 
Financial information disclosed 
Non financial information disclosed 
Financials prepared according to IFRS 
High quality annual report published  
Web based disclosures 
Well defined shareholder rights 
Minority shareholders rights are 
formalized 
Well organized general assembly 
conducted 
Policy on related party transactions 
Policy on extra ordinary transactions 
Clearly defined and explicit dividend 
policy 
Board Commitment 
The board discusses corporate governance issues and has created corporate 
governance committee 
The company has a corporate governance champion 
A corporate governance improvement plans has been created 
Appropriate resources are committed 
Policies and procedures have been formalized and distributed to relevant staff 
A corporate governance code has been developed 
The company is publicly recognize as a corporate governance leader 
 
Source: Introduction to Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance Board 
Leadership Training Resources Kit (2008), Global Corporate Governance Forum 
(GCGF) and International Finance Corporation (IFC), p. 16
xiv
 
 
2.4 Importance of Corporate Governance 
 
“Global Institutional investors are prepared to pay a premium of up to 40 percent for 
shares in companies with superior corporate governance practices.” 
Mc Kinsey, Global Investor Opinion Survey,  
New York: Mc Kinsey, 2002
xv
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 “If a country does not have a reputation for strong corporate governance practices, 
capital will flow elsewhere. If investors are not confident with the level of disclosure, 
capital will flow elsewhere. If a country opts for lax accounting and reporting 
standards, capital will flow elsewhere. All enterprises within that country – regardless 
of how steadfast a particular company’s practice may be – suffer the consequences. 
Markets must now honor what they perhaps, too often, have failed to recognize. 
Markets exist by grace of investors. And it is today’s more empowered investors that 
will determine which companies and which markets will stand the test of time and 
endure the weight of greater competition. It serves us well to remember that no 
market has a divine right to investor’s capital.” 
Arthur Levitt, Jr., 
Speech by SEC Chairman: Remarks before the Conference of the “Rise and 
Effectiveness of New Corporate Governance Standards,” Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York. (December 12, 2000). 
xvi
 
 
Various research findings recommended that companies with good governance 
practices perform better in commercial terms across the world. Adopting corporate 
governances best practices improve access to external financing, lower the cost of 
capital, improve operational performance, increase firm valuation, improve share 
performance, and reduce the risk of corporate crises and scandals1. Good corporate 
governance will ensure the interest of every stakeholder including the investors by 
offering premium price, companies with higher access to finance and reduction of 
risks resulting improved profitability, the public sector through the development of 
stronger capital market, increased investment, and high economic growth, and a 
business relationship among the stakeholders which is based on the pillars of good 
corporate governance i.e. transparency, accountability, fairness and responsibility. 
 
2.5 Corporate Governance in India: Historical Background: 
 
The historical development of Indian corporate laws has been marked by 
many interesting contrasts. At independence, India inherited one of the world’s 
poorest economies but one which had a factory sector accounting for a tenth of the 
national product. The country also inherited four functioning stock markets (predating 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange) with clearly defined rules governing listing, trading and 
settlements, a well-developed equity culture (if only among the urban rich), and a 
banking system replete with well-developed lending norms and recovery 
procedures.
xvii
 In terms of corporate laws and financial system, therefore, India 
emerged far better endowed than most other colonies. The 1956 Companies Act built 
on this foundation, as did other laws governing the functioning of joint-stock 
companies and protecting the investors’ rights. Early corporate developments in India 
were marked by the managing agency system. This contributed to the birth of 
dispersed equity ownership but also gave rise to the practice of management enjoying 
control rights disproportionately greater than their stock ownership. The turn towards 
socialism in the decades after independence, marked by the 1951 Industries 
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(Development and Regulation) Act and the 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution, put in 
place a regime and culture of licensing, protection, and widespread red-tape that bred 
corruption and stilted the growth of the corporate sector. The situation worsened in 
subsequent decades and corruption, nepotism, and inefficiency became the hallmarks 
of the Indian corporate sector. Exorbitant tax rates encouraged creative accounting 
practices and gave firms incentives to develop complicated emolument structures. 
In the absence of a stock market capable of raising equity capital efficiently, 
the three all-India development finance institutions (the Industrial Finance 
Corporation of India, the Industrial Development Bank of India and the Industrial 
Credit and Investment Corporation of India), became the main providers of long-term 
credit to companies together with the state financial corporations. Along with the 
government-owned mutual fund, the Unit Trust of India, these institutions also held 
(and still hold) large blocks of shares in the companies to which they lend and 
invariably have representations on their boards - though they traditionally play very 
passive roles in the boardroom. 
The corporate bankruptcy and reorganization system has also faced serious 
problems. India’s system is driven by the 1985 Sick Industrial Companies Act 
(SICA), which considers a company “sick” only after its entire net worth has been 
eroded and it has been referred to the Board for Industrial and Financial 
Reconstruction (BIFR). As soon as a company is registered with the BIFR, it wins 
immediate protection from the creditors’ claims for at least four years. Between 1987 
and 1992, the BIFR took well over two years on average to reach a decision, after 
which the delay to resolution roughly doubled. Very few companies emerge 
successfully from the BIFR and even for those that need to be liquidated the legal 
process takes over 10 years on average, by which time the assets of the company are 
usually almost worthless. Protection of creditors’ rights has therefore existed only on 
paper in India, and its bankruptcy process has featured among the worst in World 
Bank surveys on business climate. This may well explain why Indian banks under-
lend and invest primarily in government securities. Though financial disclosure norms 
in India have traditionally been superior to most Asian countries, noncompliance with 
disclosure norms is rampant and even the failure of auditors’ reports to conform to the 
law attracts nominal fines and little punitive action. The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in India almost never takes action against erring auditors. While the 
Companies Act provides clear instructions for maintaining and updating share 
registers, in reality minority shareholders have often suffered from irregularities in 
share transfers and registrations. Sometimes non-voting preferential shares have been 
used by promoters to channel funds and expropriate minority shareholders. The rights 
of minority shareholders have also been compromised by management’s private deals 
in the relatively infrequent event of corporate takeovers. Boards of directors have 
been largely ineffective in India in their monitoring role, and their independence is 
more often than not highly questionable. 
For most of the post-Independence era the Indian equity markets were not 
liquid or sophisticated enough to exert effective control over the companies. Listing 
requirements of exchanges enforced some transparency, but non-compliance was 
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neither rare nor punished. All in all, therefore, minority shareholders and creditors in 
India remained effectively unprotected despite the laws on the books. 
 
2.6 Framework of Corporate Governance in India: 
 
“The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights.” 
- OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004.
xviii
 
 
The years since liberalization began in 1991 have witnessed wide-ranging 
changes in both laws and regulations, driving corporate governance as well as the 
general consciousness about it. Perhaps the single most important development in the 
field of corporate governance and investor protection in India has been the 
establishment of the Securities and Exchange Board of India in 1992 and its gradual 
empowerment since then. Established primarily to regulate and monitor stock trading, 
it has played a crucial role in establishing the basic minimum ground rules of 
corporate conduct in the country. Concerns about corporate governance in India were, 
however, largely triggered by a spate of crises in the early 1990’s—particularly the 
Harshad Mehta stock market scam of 1992--followed by incidents of companies 
allotting preferential shares to their promoters at deeply discounted prices, as well as 
those of companies simply disappearing with investors’ moneyxix. 
These concerns about corporate governance stemming from the corporate 
scandals, coupled with a perceived need to opening up to the forces of competition 
and globalization, gave rise to several investigations into ways to fix the corporate 
governance situation in India. One of the first such endeavours was the Confederation 
of Indian Industry Code for Desirable Corporate Governance, developed by a 
committee chaired by Rahul Bajaj. The committee was formed in 1996 and submitted 
its code in April 1998. Later the SEBI constituted two committees to look into the 
issue of corporate governance--the first chaired by Kumar Mangalam Birla, which 
submitted its report in early 2000, and the second by Narayana Murthy, which 
submitted its report three years later. These two committees have been instrumental in 
bringing about far reaching changes in corporate governance in India through the 
formulation of Clause 49 of Listing Agreements (described below). Concurrent with 
these initiatives by the SEBI, the Department of Company Affairs, the Ministry of 
Finance of the Government of India also began contemplating improvements in 
corporate governance. 
These efforts include the establishment of a study group to operationalize the 
Birla Committee recommendations in 2000, the Naresh Chandra Committee on 
Corporate Audit and Governance in 2002, and the Expert Committee on Corporate 
Law (the J.J. Irani Committee) in late 2004. All of these efforts were aimed at 
reforming the existing Companies Act of 1956 that still forms the backbone of 
corporate law in India. 
(A) Organizational Framework: The organizational framework for corporate 
governance initiatives in India consists of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA), 
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the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the Securities and Exchange Board of 
India (SEBI). 
In 1998, the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), "India's premier business 
association," unveiled India's first code of corporate governance
xx
. However, since the 
Code's adoption was voluntary, few firms embraced it. Soon after, SEBI appointed the 
Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee to fashion a code of corporate governance. In 
2000, SEBI accepted the recommendations of the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee 
and introduced Clause 49 into the Listing Agreement of Stock Exchanges. Clause 49 
outlines requirements vis-a-vis corporate governance in exchange-traded companies. 
In 2003, SEBI instituted the N.R. Narayan Murthy Committee to scrutinize India's 
corporate-governance framework further and to make additional recommendations to 
enhance its effectiveness. SEBI has since incorporated the recommendations of the 
N.R. Narayan Murthy Committee, and the latest revisions to Clause 49 became law on 
January 1, 2006 (SEBI, vide circular SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/1/2006/13/1 dated 13
th
 
January, 2006).  
 
(B) Clause 49 of the Listing Agreements: The SEBI implemented the 
recommendations of the Birla Committee through the enactment of Clause 49 of the 
Listing Agreements. Clause 49 may well be viewed as a milestone in the evolution of 
corporate governance practices in India. The terms were applied to companies in the 
BSE 200 and S&P C&X Nifty indices, and all newly listed companies, on March 31, 
2001. These rules were applied to companies with a paid up capital of Rs. 10 crore or 
with a net worth of Rs. 25 crore at any time in the past five years on March 31, 2002, 
and to other listed companies with a paid up capital of over Rs. 3 crore on March 31, 
2003. The Narayana Murthy Committee worked on further refining the rules, and 
Clause 49 was amended in 2004. The main provisions of Clause 49 as inserted vide 
SEBI F. No. SMDRP/Policy Cir 10/2000 dated 21.02.2000 in the Listing Agreement 
of Stock Exchange are: 
 
I.  Board of Directors;   II.  Audit Committee; 
III.  Remuneration of Directors;  IV. Board Procedure; 
V.  Management;    VI.  Shareholders; 
VII.  Report on Corporate Governance;  VIII.  Compliance Certification 
 
The composition and proper functioning of the board of directors emerges as 
the key area of focus for Clause 49. It stipulates that non-executive members should 
comprise at least half of a board of directors. It defines an “independent” director and 
requires that independent directors comprise at least half of a board of directors if the 
chairperson is an executive director and at least a third if the chairperson is a non-
executive director. It also lays down rules regarding compensation of board members, 
sets caps on committee memberships and chairmanships, lays down the minimum 
number and frequency of board meetings, and mandates certain disclosures for board 
members. 
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Clause 49 pays special attention to the composition and functioning of the 
audit committee, requiring at least three members on it, with an independent chair and 
with two-thirds made up of independent directors--and having at least one “financially 
literate” person serving. The Clause spells out the role and powers of the audit 
committee and stipulates minimum number and frequency of and the quorum at the 
committee meetings. With regard to “material” non-listed subsidiary companies 
(those with turnover/net worth exceeding 20% of a holding company’s turnover/net 
worth), Clause 49 stipulates that at least one independent director of the holding 
company must serve on the board of the subsidiary. The audit committee of the 
holding company should review the subsidiary’s financial statements, particularly its 
investment plans. The minutes of the subsidiary’s board meetings should be presented 
at the board meeting of the holding company, and the board members of the latter 
should be made aware of all “significant” (likely to exceed in value 10% of total 
revenues/expenses/assets/liabilities of the subsidiary) transactions entered into by the 
subsidiary. 
The areas where Clause 49 stipulates specific corporate disclosures are:  
 
 Related party transactions;  
 Accounting treatment;  
 Risk management procedures;  
 Proceeds from various kinds of share issues; 
 Remuneration of directors;  
 A Management Discussion and Analysis section in the annual report discussing 
general business conditions and outlook; and  
 Background and committee memberships of new directors as well as presentations 
to analysts.  
 
In addition, a board committee with a non-executive chair should address 
shareholder/investor grievances. Finally, the process of share transfer, a long-standing 
problem in India, should be expedited by delegating authority to an officer or 
committee or to the registrar and share transfer agents. The CEO and CFO or their 
equivalents need to sign off on the company’s financial statements and disclosures 
and accept responsibility for establishing and maintaining effective internal control 
systems. The company is also required to provide a separate section of corporate 
governance in its annual report, with a detailed compliance report on corporate 
governance. It should also submit a quarterly compliance report to the stock exchange 
where it is listed. Finally, it needs to get its compliance with the mandatory 
specifications of Clause 49 certified by auditors or by practicing company secretaries. 
In addition to these mandatory requirements, Clause 49 also mentions non-mandatory 
requirements concerning the facilities for a non-executive chairman, the remuneration 
committee, half-yearly reporting of financial performance to shareholders, moving 
towards unqualified financial statements, training and performance evaluation of 
board members, and perhaps most notably a clear “whistle blower” policy. 
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By and large, the provisions of Clause 49 closely mirror those of the Sarbanes-
Oxley measures in the United States. In some areas, like certification compliance, the 
Indian requirements are even stricter. There are, however, areas of uniqueness as well. 
The distinction drawn between boards headed by executive and non-executive 
chairmen and the lower required share of independent directors is special to India—
and is also somewhat intriguing, given the prevalence of family-run business groups. 
The market reaction to the corporate governance improvements sought by Clause 49 
seems to have been quite positive, somewhat in contrast to the mixed response to 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s adoption. 
Tarun Khanna and Yishay Yafeh use an event-study approach to measure the 
stock price impact of the adoption of Clause 49 by Indian firms
xxi
. Focusing on the 
May 7, 1999 announcement by SEBI about the formation of the Kumar Mangalam 
Birla committee, when a earlier application to large companies was expected, they 
report that large firms that adopted these measures first witnessed a 4% (7%) positive 
price-jump in a two day (five-day) event-window beginning with the announcement 
day compared to smaller firms that were required to implement the reforms at the 
same time. 
The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) had appointed a Naresh Chandra 
Committee
xxii
 on Corporate Audit and Governance in 2002 in order to examine 
various corporate governance issues. It made recommendations in two key aspects of 
corporate governance: financial and nonfinancial disclosures: and independent 
auditing and board oversight of management. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs 
(MCA) had also set up a National Foundation for Corporate Governance (NFCG)
xxiii
 
in association with the CII, ICAI and ICSI as a not-for-profit trust to provide a 
platform to deliberate on issues relating to good corporate governance, to sensitize 
corporate leaders on the importance of good corporate governance practices as well as 
to facilitate exchange of experiences and ideas amongst corporate leaders, policy 
makers, regulators, law enforcing agencies and nongovernment organizations. The 
foundation has been set up with the mission to: 
 
1. Foster a culture for promoting good governance, voluntary compliance and 
facilitate effective participation of different stakeholders; 
2. Create a framework of best practices, structure, processes and ethics; and  
3. Make significant difference to Indian corporate sector by raising the standard of 
corporate governance in India towards achieving stability and growth. 
 
(C) Legal Framework
xxiv
: An effective legal framework is indispensable for the proper 
and sustained growth of the company. In rapidly changing national and global 
business environment, it has become necessary that regulation of corporate entities is 
in tune with the emerging economic trends, encourage good corporate governance and 
enable protection of the interests of the investors and other stakeholders. The Legal 
framework for corporate governance consists of the Company Laws and the SEBI 
Laws. 
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FIGURE 1.1: Framework of Corporate Governance in India 
 
 
 
 
           
    
  
 
      
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company Laws: The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) is the main authority for 
regulating and promoting efficient, transparent and accountable form of corporate 
governance in the Indian corporate sector. The important legislations governed by 
MCA for regulating the entire corporate structure and for dealing with various aspects 
of governance in companies are Companies Act, 1956 and Companies Bill, 2004. 
These laws have been introduced and amended, from time to time, to bring more 
transparency and accountability in the provisions of corporate governance. That is, 
corporate laws have been simplified so that they are amenable to clear interpretation 
and provide a framework that would facilitate faster economic growth. 
The Companies Act, 1956 is the central legislation in India that empowers the 
Central Government to regulate the formation, financing, functioning and winding up 
of companies. The Companies Act, 1956 has elaborate provisions relating to the 
Governance of Companies, which deals with management and administration of 
companies. It contains special provisions with respect to the accounts and audit, 
directors’ remuneration, other financial and non-financial disclosures, corporate 
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democracy, prevention of mismanagement, etc. The main two Sections of this Act 
related to the corporate governance are Section 292A and Section 211. 
• Section 292Axxv: The concept of Corporate Governance receives statutory 
recognition, with the insertion of Section 292A in the Companies Act, 1956 with an 
amendment made to it through the Companies (Amendment) Act 2000. The New 
Section 292A made it obligatory upon a public company having a paid-up capital of 
Rs. 5 crores or more to have an audit committee comprising at least three directors as 
members. Two-thirds of the total number shall be nonexecutive directors. 
• Section 211xxvi: As per this Section, every Profit and loss account and Balance sheet 
of the company shall comply with the Accounting Standards, issued by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of India as may be prescribed by the Central Government in 
consultation with National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards, and the 
Statutory auditors of every company are required to report whether the Accounting 
Standards have been complied with or not. The Securities Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI) has added a new clause in the Listing Agreement to provide that listed 
enterprises shall compulsory comply with all the Accounting Standards issued by 
ICAI from time to time. 
The Companies Bill 2004
xxvii
 has been introduced to provide the 
comprehensive review of the company law. It contained important provisions relating 
to corporate governance, like, independence of auditors, relationship of auditors with 
the management of company, independent directors with a view to improve the 
corporate governance practices in the corporate sector. It is subjected to greater 
flexibility and self-regulation by companies, better financial and non-financial 
disclosures, more efficient enforcement of law, etc. This amendment to the 
Companies Act 1956 mainly focused on reforming the audit process and the board of 
directors. It mainly aimed at :- (i) laying down the process of appointment and 
qualification of auditors, (ii) prohibiting non-audit services by the auditors; (iii) 
prescribing compulsory rotation, at least of the Audit Partner; (iv) requiring 
certification of annual audited accounts by both CEO and CFO; etc. For reforming the 
boards, the bill included that remuneration of non-executive directors can be fixed 
only by shareholders and must be disclosed. A limit on the amount which can be paid 
would also be laid down. It is also envisaged that the directors should be imparted 
suitable training. However, among others, an independent director should not have 
substantial pecuniary interest in the company’s shares. 
SEBI Laws
xxviii
: Improved corporate governance is the key objective of the regulatory 
framework in the securities market. Accordingly, Securities and Exchange Board of 
India (SEBI) has made several efforts with a view to evaluate the adequacy of existing 
corporate governance practices in the country and further improve these practices. It 
is implementing and maintaining the standards of corporate governance through the 
use of its legal and regulatory framework, namely, The Securities Contracts 
(Regulation) Act, 1956, Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 and the 
Depositories Act, 1996. 
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2.7 Recent Findings about Corporate Governance in India 
 
Of late, a burgeoning empirical literature has begun to document important 
features of corporate governance in India. Researcher has summarized some of the 
major findings in this section, beginning with research examining corporate board 
composition. 
Jayati Sarkar and Subrata Sarkar show that corporate boards of large 
companies in India in 2003 were slightly smaller than those in the United States (in 
1991), with 9.46 members on average in India compared to 11.45 in America
xxix
. 
While the percentage of inside directors was roughly comparable (25.38% compared 
to 26% in the U.S.), Indian boards had relatively fewer independent directors, (just 
over 54% compared to 60% in the U.S.) and relatively more affiliated outside 
directors (over 20% versus 14% in the U.S.). 41% of Indian companies had a 
promoter on the board, and in over 30% of cases a promoter served as an Executive 
Director. There is evidence that larger boards lead to poorer performance (market-
based as well as in accounting terms), both in India and in the United States
xxx
. 
The median director in large Indian companies held 4.28 directorships in 
2003, and this number is considerably (and statistically significantly) higher for 
directors in group-affiliated companies (4.85 versus 3.09 for non-affiliated 
companies)
xxxi
. The figures were similar for inside directors, being 4.34, 4.95 and 3.06 
for large companies, group affiliates, and non-affiliated companies, respectively. As 
for independent directors, however, the median number of positions held was 4.59, 
with no major differences between group and stand-alone companies. Interestingly, 
independent directors with multiple directorships are associated with higher firm 
value in India while busier inside directors are correlated negatively with firm 
performance. Busier independent directors are also more conscientious in terms of 
attending board meetings than their counterparts with fewer positions. As for inside 
directors, it seems that the pressure of serving on multiple boards (due largely to the 
prevalence of family owned business groups) does take a toll on the directors’ 
performance. 
However, busy independent directors also appear to be correlated with a 
greater degree of earnings management as measured by discretionary accruals
xxxii
. 
Multiple positions and non-attendance of board meetings by independent directors 
seem to be associated with higher discretionary accruals in firms. After controlling for 
these characteristics of independent directors, board independence (measured by the 
proportion of independent directors) does not seem to affect the degree of earnings 
management. However, CEO-duality, where the top executive also chairs the board, 
and the presence of controlling shareholders as inside directors are related, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, to greater earnings management.  
Shareholding patterns in India reveal a marked level of concentration in the 
hands of the promoters. In 2002-03, for instance, Jayati Sarkar and Subrata Sankar 
find that promoters held 47.74% of the shares in a sample of almost 2500 listed 
manufacturing companies, and held 50.78% of the shares of group companies and 
45.94% of stand-alone firms
xxxiii
. In comparison, the Indian public’s share amounted 
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to 34.60%, 28% and 38.51%, respectively. As for the impact of concentrated 
shareholding on firm performance, an earlier study by these same authors finds that in 
the mid-90’s (1995-96) holdings above 25% by directors and their relatives was 
associated with higher valuation of companies while there was no clear effect below 
that threshold
xxxiv
. More recently, based on 2001 data that distinguishes between 
“controlling” insiders and non-controlling groups, Ekta Selarka reports a U-shaped 
relationship between insider ownership (with insiders being defined as promoters and 
“persons acting in concert with promoters”) and firm value, with the point of 
inflection lying at a much higher level, between 45% and 63%
xxxv
 
Institutional investors--comprising government sponsored mutual funds and 
insurance companies, banks and development financial institutions (DFIs) that are 
also long-term creditors, and foreign institutional investors--hold over 22% shares of 
the average large company in India, of which the share of mutual funds, banks and 
DFIs, insurance companies, and foreign institutional investors are about 5%, 1.5%, 
3% and 11%, respectively. Analyzing cross-sectional data from the mid-1990’s, Jayati 
Sarkar and Subrata Sarkar find that company value actually declines with a rise in the 
holding of mutual funds and insurance companies in the range 0-25% holding, after 
which there is no clear effect
xxxvi
. On the other hand, for DFIs’ holdings, there is no 
clear effect on valuation below 25%, but a significant positive effect above 25%, 
suggesting better monitoring when stakes are higher. 
Executive compensation in India, which was freed from the strict regulation 
by the Companies Act in 1994, is another area of corporate governance that has 
received attention among researchers. Managerial compensation in India often has 
two components--salary and performance-based commission—as well as retirement 
and other benefits and perquisites. Based on an analysis of unbalanced panel data for 
roughly 300 firms each year, Sonja Fagernäs reports that the average total 
compensation (salary plus commission) of Indian CEOs has risen almost three-fold 
between 1998 and 2004 (from Rs. 2.1 million (approximately USD 48,500) to Rs. 6.4 
million (approximately USD 143,000) in real terms
xxxvii
. 
During this period, the proportion of profit-based commission has risen 
steadily, from 13.4% to 25.6%, and the proportion of CEOs with commission as part 
of their pay package has risen from 0.34 to 0.51. CEO pay has thus clearly become 
more performance based over the past decade. There is also some evidence that this 
increasing performance-pay linkage is associated with the introduction of the 
corporate governance code or Clause 49. Meanwhile, executive compensation as a 
fraction of profits has also almost doubled from 0.55% to 1.06%. Fagernäs also finds 
that CEOs related to the founding family or directors are paid more than other CEOs. 
In a firm fixed effects model, she finds being related to the founding family can raise 
CEO pay by as much as 30% while being related to a director can cause an increase of 
about 10%. There is some evidence that the presence of directors from lending 
institutions lowers pay while the share of non-executive directors on the board 
connects pay more closely to performance. 
A recent study finds that, during 1997-2002, the average (of a sample of 462 
manufacturing firms) board compensation in India has been around Rs. 5.3 million 
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(approximately USD 120,000), with wide variation across firm size
xxxviii
. The average 
board compensation is Rs. 7.6 million (USD 171,000) for large firms and Rs. 2.5 
million (USD 56,000) for small firms. The board compensation also appears to be 
higher, on average, at Rs. 6.9 million (USD 155,500) if the CEO is related to the 
founding family. Both board and CEO compensation depend on current performance, 
and CEO pay depends on past-year performance as well. Diversified companies also 
pay their boards more. 
Given that almost two-thirds of the top 500 Indian companies are group-
affiliated, issues relating to corporate governance in business groups are naturally 
very important. Tunneling, or “the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the 
benefit of those who control them” is a major concern in business groups with 
pyramidal ownership structure and inter-firm cash flows
xxxix
. Marianne Bertrand and 
her co-authors estimate that an industry shock leads to a 30% lower earnings increase 
for business group firms compared to stand-alone firms in the same industry
xl
. They 
find that firms farther down the pyramidal structure are less affected by industry-
specific shocks than those nearer the top, suggesting that positive shocks in the former 
are siphoned off to the latter, benefiting the controlling shareholders but hurting the 
minority shareholders. However, Bernard Black and Vikramaditya Khanna question 
how this logic would make them less sensitive to negative shocks
xli
. There is also 
some evidence that firms associated with business groups have superior performance 
than stand-alone firms
xlii
. 
More recently Raja Kali and Jayati Sarkar argue that diversified business 
groups help increase the opacity of within-group fund flows driving a wider wedge 
between control and cash flow rights. A greater degree of diversification also aids 
tunnelling
xliii
. Using data for Indian firms in 385 business groups in 2002- 03 and 384 
groups in 2003-04, Kali and Sarkar find that firms with greater ownership opacity and 
a lower wedge between cash flow rights and control than those in a group’s core 
activity are likely to be located farther away from the core activity. This incentive for 
tunnelling explains, according to them, the persistence of value destroying groups in 
India and occasional heavy investment by Indian groups in businesses with low 
contribution to group profitability. 
Using a sample of over 600 of the 1000 largest (by revenues) Indian firms in 
2004, Jayashree Saha finds that, after controlling for other corporate governance 
characteristics, firm performance is negatively associated with the extent of related 
party transactions for group firms but positively so for stand-alone companies. This 
further strengthens the circumstantial evidence of tunneling and its adverse 
effects
xliv
.The same study also reveals that, using a sample of over 5000 firms for the 
period 2003-2005, most related party transactions in India occur between the firm and 
“parties with control,” as opposed to management personnel as in the United States. 
Also, group companies consistently report higher levels of related party transactions 
than stand-alone companies. 
Transparency and corporate governance levels are very closely related. Cross-
country studies have repeatedly put India among the worst nations in terms of 
earnings opacity and management
xlv
. Indian accounting standards provide 
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considerable flexibility to firms in their financial reporting and differ from the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) in several ways that often make interpreting 
Indian financial statements a challenging task. These deviations, however, need to be 
viewed in the right perspective. India still falls short of the median number of 
deviations from IAS in the 49 country sample of Kee-Hong Bae and co-authors
xlvi
. 
The nature of corporate governance can affect the capital structure of a 
company. In the presence of well functioning financial institutions, debt can be a 
disciplining mechanism in the hands of shareholders or an expropriating mechanism 
in the hands of controlling insiders. Studying the relationship between leverage and 
Tobin’s Q in 1996, 2000, and 2003, Jayati Sarkar and Subrata Sarkar conclude that 
the disciplinary effect has been more marked in recent years as institutions have 
adopted greater market orientations
xlvii
. They also find limited evidence of the use of 
debt as an expropriating mechanism in group companies. 
The market for corporate control was relatively limited in India until the mid-
1990’s, when the average number of mergers per year leapt from 30 between 1973-74 
and 1987-88, and 63 between 1987- 88 and 1994-95, to 171 between 1994-95 and 
2002-03
xlviii
. Merger activity appears to occur in waves and is split roughly evenly 
between inter-industry and intra-industry mergers. The share of group-affiliated 
mergers has increased significantly in the post 1994-95 period. 
With regard to public sector governance, Nandini Gupta finds that even when 
control stays in government hands, partial privatization has a positive impact on 
profitability, productivity, and investment of the PSEs concerned
xlix
. She argues that 
the monitoring role of the markets has been responsible for this. Another study argues 
that the effect of partial privatization may have been confounded with the application 
of MoUs to these cases before the partial privatizations, finding that the application of 
MoUs or performance contracts has had a positive impact on profitability as well as 
operational performance of PSEs
l
. 
If we discuss the progress of corporate governance practices in Asia, there are 
measurably changes nowadays we can find. Like in many of the Asian countries, 
corporate governance reform in South Asian nations is also seen in larger extent than 
before. For example, the rate of development of CG code or guideline, 
implementation of the capital adequacy framework (Basel II), compliance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), level of disclosure of financial 
and non-financial information, regulatory development of protection of the 
shareholders rights including the minority shareholders has been remarkable. Table 
1.4 highlights the status of CG in South Asia. Table shows the improvements [second 
column] in corporate governance practices in different areas [first column] especially 
in Financial Reporting, Board Compositions and Functions, Shareholder Rights, 
Accounting/ Auditing Practices and Regulatory Enforcement. So from these evidence 
and findings, we can say that in India, corporate governance practices are becoming 
more sound than ever before and as per the current demand and current scenario, if 
the Indian corporate have to survive, they have to improve their corporate governance 
practices and prove themselves and to improve the trust in stakeholders. 
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TABLE 1.4: Progress in Corporate Governance in South Asia 
Area Improvements 
Financial  
Reporting 
More detailed disclosure rules; faster reporting; quarterly 
reporting; disclosure of “material” events, director pay, and 
director dealings. 
Board 
Composition  
and Function 
Introduction of independent directors, board committees, director 
training; higher expectations placed on directors; higher fees paid 
to directors. 
Shareholder  
Rights 
Formal rights strengthened; retail activist group formed; 
institutional investors started voting their shares and taking 
engagement more seriously. 
Accounting/  
Auditing 
Local accounting standards brought more into line with 
international standards (ditto accounting standards); independent 
regulation of audit profession in some markets. 
Regulatory 
 Enforcement 
Financial regulators still under equipped, but there has been more 
focus on enforcing listing rules and key securities laws (e.g. 
insider training) 
Source: Jamie Allen, Secretary General, Asian Corporate Governance Association 
(ACGA), “Assessing Corporate Governance in Asia, 1999-2009: What’s in Store for 
the Next Decade?” Presentation at the Chubb APEC Seminar, Singapore, October 7, 
2009
li
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3. Indian Banking System: An Overview 
 
The banking system in India is significantly different from that of other Asian 
nations because of the country’s unique geographic, social, and economic 
characteristics. India has a large population and land size, a diverse culture, and 
extreme disparities in income, which are marked among its regions. There are high 
levels of illiteracy among a large percentage of its population but, at the same time, 
the country has a large reservoir of managerial and technologically advanced talents. 
Between about 30 and 35 percent of the population resides in metro and urban cities 
and the rest is spread in several semi-urban and rural centres. The country’s economic 
policy framework combines socialistic and capitalistic features with a heavy bias 
towards public sector investment. India has followed the path of growth-led exports 
rather than the “exported growth” of other Asian economies, with emphasis on self-
reliance through import substitution. 
 
3.1 A Brief History of Indian Banking Sector: 
 
The word ‘Bank’ has said to be derived from the French word “Bancus” or 
“Banque”, i.e. bench. It is believed that the early bankers, the Jews of Lombardy, 
transacted their business on benches in the marketplace. Other believes it is derived 
from the German word “Back” meaning a joint stock fund. The modern banking 
system began with the opening of Bank of England in 1694. Bank of Hindustan was 
the first bank to be established in India, in 1770. The earliest institutions that 
undertook banking business under the British Regime were agency houses which 
carried on banking business in addition to their trading activities. Most of these 
agency houses were closed during 1929-32. Three Presidency banks known as Bank 
of Bengal, Bank of Bombay and Bank of Madras were open in 1809, 1840 and 1843 
respectively at Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. There were later merged into the 
Imperial Bank of India in 1919 following a bank crisis. 
The first bank of limited liability managed by Indians was the Oudh 
Commercial Bank started in 1881. Earlier between 1865 and 1870, only one bank, the 
Allahbad Bank Ltd., was established. Subsequently the Punjab National Bank began 
in 1894 with its office at Anarkali Market in Lahore (now in Pakistan). The Swadeshi 
movement, which began in 1906, prompted formation of a number of commercial 
banks such as the Peoples Bank of India Ltd., the Central Bank of India, the Indian 
Bank Ltd. and the Bank of Baroda Ltd. A series of banking crises between 1913-1917 
witnessed the failure of 588 banks. The banking companies (Inspection Ordinance) 
came in January, 1946 and the Banking Companies (Restriction of Branches) Act was 
passed in February, 1946. The Banking Companies Act was passed in February 1946, 
which was later amended to be known as the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. 
Meanwhile the RBI Act 1934 was passed and the Reserve Bank of India became the 
first central bank of the country w.e.f. April 1, 1935, it took over the central banking 
activities from the Imperial Bank of India. The RBI was nationalized on January 1, 
1949. The Imperial Bank of India was partially nationalized to form a State Bank of 
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India in 1955. In 1959, subsidiaries of SBI namely, State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur, 
State Bank of Hyderabad, State Bank of Indore, State Bank of Mysore, State Bank of 
Patiala, State Bank of Saurashtra and State Bank of Travancore were established. 
The nationalization of 14 privately owned banks in India took place on 19
th
 of 
July 1969 by Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, with another installment of 
nationalization of 6 banks on 15
th
 April, 1980. The major objective of nationalization 
was to ensure mass banking as against class banking with banking infrastructure 
aimed at hilly tracts and terrains of the country. Prior to 1969, State Bank of India 
(SBI) was the only public sector bank in India. SBI was nationalized in 1955 under 
the SBI Act of 1955. In 1993, one of the nationalized bank namely, New Bank of 
India, was merged with another nationalized bank i.e. Punjab National Bank. 
 
3.2 Indian Banking Structure: 
 
Various features of Indian Banking Sector are reflected through structure, size 
and diversity of the country’s banking and financial sector. The banking system has 
had to serve the goals of economic policies enunciated in successive five year 
development plans, particularly concerning equitable income distribution, balanced 
regional economic growth, and the reduction and elimination of private sector 
monopolies in trade and industry. In order for the banking industry to serve as an 
instrument of state policy, it was subjected to various nationalization schemes in 
different phases (1955, 1969, and 1980).  
 
FIGURE: 1.2 Indian Financial Structures 
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FIGURE 1.3: Indian Banking Structure 
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As a result, banking remained internationally isolated (few Indian banks had 
presence abroad in international financial centers) because of preoccupations with 
domestic priorities, especially massive branch expansion and attracting more people 
to the system. Moreover, the sector has been assigned the role of providing support to 
other economic sectors such as agriculture, small-scale industries, exports, and 
banking activities in the developed commercial centers (i.e., metro, urban, and a 
limited number of semi-urban centers). On these bases we can explain the Indian 
financial structure and Indian Banking Structure separately. This is explained in 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2.  
Indian banking structure in mainly divided as Scheduled Banks and 
Unscheduled Banks. Scheduled Banks expressed as Scheduled Commercial Banks 
(SCBs) which can be further grouped as State Banks Group and other Nationalized 
Banks, Foreign Banks, Regional Rural Banks and other Scheduled Commercial 
Banks.  SBI Group consists of the State Bank of India (SBI) and Associate Banks of 
SBI. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) owns the majority share of SBI and some 
Associate Banks of SBI.1 SBI has 13 head offices governed each by a board of 
directors under the supervision of a central board. The boards of directors and their 
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committees hold monthly meetings while the executive committee of each central 
board meets every week. 
In 1969, the Government arranged the nationalization of 14 scheduled 
commercial banks in order to expand the branch network, followed by six more in 
1980. A merger reduced the number from 20 to 19. Nationalized banks are wholly 
owned by the Government, although some of them have made public issues. In 
contrast to the state bank group, nationalized banks are centrally governed, i.e., by 
their respective head offices. Thus, there is only one board for each nationalized bank 
and meetings are less frequent (generally, once a month). The state bank group and 
nationalized banks are together referred to as the public sector banks (PSBs). In 1975, 
the state bank group and nationalized banks were required to sponsor and set up RRBs 
in partnership with individual states to provide low-cost financing and credit facilities 
to the rural masses. 
 
3.3 Reserve Bank of India and Banking and Financial Institutions: 
 
RBI is the banker to banks—whether commercial, cooperative, or rural. The 
relationship is established once the name of a bank is included in the Second Schedule 
to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. Such bank, called a scheduled bank, is 
entitled to facilities of refinance from RBI, subject to fulfilment of the following 
conditions laid down in Section 42 (6) of the Act, as follows: 
• it must have paid-up capital and reserves of an aggregate value of not less than an 
amount specified from time to time; and 
• it must satisfy RBI that its affairs are not being conducted in a manner detrimental to 
the interests of its depositors. 
The classification of commercial banks into scheduled and non scheduled 
categories that was introduced at the time of establishment of RBI in 1935 has been 
extended during the last two or three decades to include state cooperative banks, 
primary urban cooperative banks, and RRBs. RBI is authorized to exclude the name 
of any bank from the Second Schedule if the bank, having been given suitable 
opportunity to increase the value of paid-up capital and improve deficiencies, goes 
into liquidation or ceases to carry on banking activities. 
Specialized development financial institutions (DFIs) were established to 
resolve market failures in developing economies and shortage of long-term 
investments. The first DFI to be established was the Industrial Finance Corporation of 
India (IFCI) in 1948, and was followed by SFCs at state level set up under a special 
statute. In 1955, Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) was set 
up in the private sector with foreign equity participation. This was followed in 1964 
by Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) set up as a subsidiary of RBI. The 
same year saw the founding of the first mutual fund in the country, the Unit Trust of 
India (UTI). A wide variety of financial institutions (FIs) has been established. 
Examples include the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(NABARD), Export Import Bank of India (Exim Bank), National Housing Bank 
(NHB), and Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI), which serve as 
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apex banks in their specified areas of responsibility and concern. The three 
institutions that dominate the term-lending market in providing financial assistance to 
the corporate sector are IDBI, IFCI, and ICICI. The Government owns insurance 
companies, including Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) and General 
Insurance Corporation (GIC). Subsidiaries of GIC also provide substantial equity and 
loan assistance to the industrial sector, while UTI, though a mutual fund, conducts 
similar operations. RBI also set up in April 1988 the Discount and Finance House of 
India Ltd. (DFHI) in partnership with SBI and other banks to deal with money market 
instruments and to provide liquidity to money markets by creating a secondary market 
for each instrument. Major shares of DFHI are held by SBI. 
Liberalization of economic policy since 1991 has highlighted the urgent need 
to improve infrastructure in order to provide services of international standards. 
Infrastructure is woefully inadequate for the efficient handling of the foreign trade 
sector, power generation, communication, etc. For meeting specialized financing 
needs, the Infrastructure Development Finance Company Ltd. (IDFC) was set up in 
1997. To nurture growth of private capital flows, IDFC will seek to unbundle and 
mitigate the risks that investors face in infrastructure and to create an efficient 
financial structure at institutional and project levels. IDFC will work on commercial 
orientation, innovations in financial products, rationalizing the legal and regular 
framework, creation of a long-term debt market, and best global practices on 
governance and risk management in infrastructure projects. 
 
3.4 Private Banks in India: 
 
Prior to nationalization, Banks in India with the sole exception of SBI were in 
private hands with community and trade orientation. Nationalization of 14 banks in 
the year 1969 and another set of 6 banks in the year 1980 reduced the importance of 
private sector banks and public sector banks started playing a major role in extending 
the horizon of banking services to the nook and corner of the country. 
With history repeating itself, private sector banking got a fillip with the 
Government of India relaxing the conditions for opening of private sector banks in the 
year 1994, as a part of their liberalization program. Housing Development Finance 
Corporation Limited (HDFC) was amongst the first to receive an ‘in principle’ 
approval from the RBI to set up a bank in the private sector. As on 31
st
 March, 2005, 
there are 30 private banks operating in the country. Private Banks have been playing a 
crucial role in enhancing customer oriented products with no choice left with the 
public sector banks except to innovate and compete in the process. Reserve Bank of 
India has come out on clear cut terms their guidelines on ownership and governance 
in private sector banks. 
On the issue of aggregate foreign investment in private banks from all sources 
(FDI, FII, NRI), the guideline stipulate that it cannot exceed 74% of the paid up 
capital of a bank. If FDI (other than by foreign banks or foreign bank groups) in 
private banks exceeds 5%, the entity acquiring such stake would have to meet the “fit 
and proper” criteria indicated in the share transfer guidelines and get the RBI’s 
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acknowledgement for transfer of the shares. The aggregate limit for all FII 
investments is restricted to 24% of which can be raised to 49% with the approval of 
the board/ shareholders. The current aggregate limit for all NRI investment is 24%, 
with the individual NRI limit being five percent, subject to the approval of the board/ 
shareholders. 
 
3.5 Co-operative Banks in India 
 
The Co-operative banks have a history of almost 100 years. The Co-operative 
banks are an important constituent of the Indian Financial System, judging by the role 
assigned to them, the expectations they are supposed to fulfill, their number, and the 
number of offices they operate. The co-operative movement originated in the West, 
but the importance that such banks have assumed in India is rarely paralleled 
anywhere else in the world. Their role in rural financing continues to be important 
even today, and their business in the urban areas also has increased phenomenally in 
recent years mainly due to the sharp increase in the number of primary co-operative 
banks.  
While the co-operative banks in rural areas mainly finance agricultural based 
activities including farming, cattle, milk, hatchery, personal finance etc. along with 
some small scale industries and self-employment driven activities, the co-operative 
banks in urban areas mainly finance various categories of people for self-employment, 
industries, small scale units, home finance, consumer finance, personal finance, etc. 
Some of the co-operative banks are quite forward looking and have developed 
sufficient core competencies to challenge state and private sector banks.  
According to NAFCUB (National Federation of Urban Cooperative Banks & 
Credit Societies Ltd.) the total deposits & landings of Co-operative Banks is much 
more than Old Private Sector Banks & also the New Private Sector Banks. This 
exponential growth of Co-operative Banks is attributed mainly to their much better 
local reach, personal interaction with customers, and their ability to catch the nerve of 
the local clientele. 
Though registered under the Co-operative Societies Act of the Respective 
States (where formed originally) the banking related activities of the co-operative 
banks are also regulated by the Reserve Bank of India. They are governed by the 
Banking Regulations Act 1949 and Banking Laws (Co-operative Societies) Act, 1965. 
 
3.6 Most Comprehensive Listing of Banks in India  
 
The commercial banking structure in India consists of: Scheduled Commercial 
Banks and Unscheduled Banks. Scheduled commercial Banks constitute those banks 
which have been included in the Second Schedule of Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
Act, 1934. RBI in turn includes only those banks in this schedule which satisfy the 
criteria laid down vide section 42 (6) (a) of the Act. 
For the purpose of assessment of performance of banks, the Reserve Bank of 
India categories them as public sector banks, old private sector banks, new private 
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sector banks and foreign banks. IDBI and IDBI Bank Ltd. have been merged to form 
Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) Ltd. IDBI is notified as a scheduled 
bank by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) under the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. 
RBI has categorized IDBI under a new sub group "other public sector bank". 
 
TABLE 1.5 Lists of Banks in India 
Sr. 
No. 
Bank Name 
Sr. 
No. 
Bank Name 
Public Sector/ Nationalized Banks 
1 Allahabad Bank 11 Indian Overseas Bank 
2 Andhra Bank 12 Oriental Bank of Commerce 
3 Bank of Baroda 13 Punjab & Sindh Bank 
4 Bank of India 14 Punjab National Bank 
5 Bank of Maharashtra 15 Syndicate Bank 
6 Canara Bank 16 UCO Bank 
7 Central Bank of India 17 Union Bank of India 
8 Corporation Bank 18 United Bank of India 
9 Dena Bank 19 Vijaya Bank 
10 Indian Bank 
SBI Group 
1 State Bank of India 4 State Bank of Mysore 
2 State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur 5 State Bank of Patiala 
3 State Bank of Hyderabad 6 State Bank of Travancore 
Old Private Sector Banks 
1 Bank of Rajasthan  9 Karur Vysya Bank  
2 Catholic Syrian Bank 10 Lakshmi Vilas Bank 
3 City Union Bank 11 Nainital Bank 
4 Dhanlaxmi Bank 12 Ratnakar Bank 
5 Federal Bank 13 Karnataka Bank 
6 ING Vysya Bank 14 South Indian Bank 
7 Jammu & Kashmir Bank 15 Tamilnad Mercantile Bank 
8 SBI Commercial & International Bank 
New Private Sector Banks 
1 Axis Bank (Previously UTI Bank) 5 IndusInd Bank 
2 Development Credit Bank 6 Kotak Mahindra Bank 
3 HDFC Bank 7 Yes Bank 
4 ICICI Bank   
Foreign Banks (As on March 31, 2011) 
1 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 17 DBS Bank 
2 American Express Banking Corp. 18 Deutsche Bank 
3 Antwerp Diamond Bank 19 FirstRand Bank 
4 AB Bank 20 Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking 
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Corp. 
5 Bank International Indonesia 21 JPMorgan Chase Bank 
6 Bank of America 22 JSC VTB Bank 
7 Bank of Bahrain & Kuwait 23 Krung Thai Bank 
8 Bank of Ceylon 24 Mashreq Bank 
9 Bank of Nova Scotia 25 MIZUHO Corporate Bank 
10 Bank of Tokyo – Mitsubishi UFJ 26 Oman International Bank 
11 Barclays Bank 27 Royal Bank Scotland 
12 BNP Paribas 28 Shinhan Bank 
13 Chinatrust Commercial Bank 29 Standard Chartered Bank 
14 Citibank 30 State Bank of Mauritius 
15 Commonwealth Bank of Australia 31 UBSAG 
16 Credit Agricole 32 United Overseas Bank 
 
3.7 Indian Bank’s Operations Abroad: 
 
As on March 31, 2011, fifteen Indian Banks – thirteen from the public sector 
and three from the private sector had operations overseas spread across 30 countries 
with a network of 155 branches. The Bank of Baroda has the highest overseas 
presence, followed by the State Bank of India and Bank of India. Details are given in 
the following table. 
 
TABLE 1.6 Bank wise offices of Indian SCBs outside India - 2011 
Sr. 
No. 
Bank Name 
Overseas 
Branches 
(Total) 
Sr. 
No. 
Bank Name 
Overseas 
Branches 
(Total) 
  1 Bank of Baroda 47   9 UCO Bank 04 
  2 State Bank India 45 10 Axis Bank 03 
  3 Bank of India 24 11 HDFC Bank 02 
  4 ICICI Bank 08 12 Allahabad Bank 01 
  5 Indian Overseas Bank 06 13 IDBI Bank 01 
  6 Canara Bank 04 14 Syndicate Bank  01 
  7 Indian Bank 04 15 Union Bank of India 01 
  8 Punjab National Bank 04 Total Overseas Branches 155 
Source: RBI Statistics Hand Book, 2010-11 
 
3.8 Current Scenario of Indian Banking Sector: 
 
Good internal capital generation, reasonably active capital markets, and 
governmental support ensured good capitalisation for most banks during the period 
under study, with overall capital adequacy touching 14% as on March 31, 2011. At 
the same time, high levels of public deposit ensured most banks had a comfortable 
liquidity profile. While banks have benefited from an overall good economic growth 
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over the last decade, implementation of SARFAESI [The Securitisation and 
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002], 
setting up of credit information bureaus, internal improvements such as upgrade of 
technology infrastructure, tightening of the appraisal and monitoring processes, and 
strengthening of the risk management platform have also contributed to the 
improvement. 
Significantly, the improvement in performance has been achieved despite 
several hurdles appearing on the way, such as temporary slowdown in economic 
activity (in the second half of 2008-09), a tightening liquidity situation, increases in 
wages following revision, and changes in regulations by the RBI, some of which 
prescribed higher credit provisions or higher capital allocations. 
Currently, Indian banks face several challenges, such as increase in interest 
rates on saving deposits, possible deregulation of interest rates on saving deposits, a 
tighter monetary policy, a large government deficit, increased stress in some sectors 
(such as, State utilities, airlines, and microfinance), restructured loan accounts, 
unamortised pension/gratuity liabilities, increasing infrastructure loans, and 
implementation of Basel III. The Indian financial sector (including banks, non-
banking financial companies, or NBFCs, and housing finance companies, or HFCs) 
reported a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 19% over the last three years 
and their credit portfolio stood at close to Rs. 49 trillion (around 62% of 2010-11 
GDP) as on March 31, 2011. Banks accounted for nearly 86% of the total credit, 
NBFCs for around 10%, and HFCs for around 4%. Within banks, public sector banks 
(PSBs), on the strength of their country-wide presence, continued to be the leader, 
accounting for around 76% of the total credit portfolio, while within the NBFC sector, 
large infrastructure financing institutions accounted for more than half the total NBFC 
credit portfolio; NBFCs that are into retail financing took up the rest. 
 
FIGURE 1.4 Credit Compositions of Financial Sector Entities 
 
           Source: ICRA, RBI Research. 
 
While the Indian banking sector features a large number of players competing 
against each other, the top 10 banks accounted for a significant 57% share of the total 
credit as on March 31, 2011. 
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TABLE 1.7 Key Players in Indian Banking Sector 
Name of Bank 
Credit 
Portfolio as 
in March 
2011 
(Rs. 
Billion) 
Market 
Share 
(%) 
Net 
Interest 
Margins 
(2010-
11) 
Tier I 
Capital 
% as in 
March 
2011 
Return 
on Net 
Worth 
(2010-
11) 
Gross 
NPA 
% as 
in 
March 
2011 
SBI 7,567 18% 2.9% 07.8% 13% 3.3% 
PNB 2,421 06% 3.5% 08.4% 24% 1.8% 
BOB 2,287 05% 2.8% 10.0% 24% 1.4% 
ICICI Bank 2,164 05% 2.3% 13.2% 10% 4.5% 
BOI 2,131 05% 2.5% 08.3% 17% 2.2% 
Cnr Bank 2,125 05% 2.6% 10.9% 26% 1.5% 
HDFC Bank 1,600 04% 4.2% 12.2% 17% 1.1% 
IDBI Bank 1,571 04% 1.8% 08.1% 16% 1.8% 
Axis Bank 1,424 03% 3.1% 09.4% 19% 1.1% 
CBI 1,297 03% 2.7% 06.4% 18% 2.2% 
Total Banking Sector 42,874 100% 2.9% 09.7% 17% 2.3% 
Source: Annual Reports, Results of Banks, ICRA Research. 
 
Total banking credit4 stood at close to Rs. 39 trillion as on March 25, 2011 
and reported a strong 21.4% growth in 2010-11, led by credit to the infrastructure 
sector and to NBFCs. In 2011-12, although the pace of credit growth has been 
subdued in the first two months (up just 0.2% from March 2011 levels), it is in line 
with the pattern noticed in the previous years (0.1% in 2010-11 and 0.4% in 2009-10). 
According to ICRA‟s estimates, private banks reported a higher overall credit growth 
of around 26% in 2010-11 (10% in previous year) as compared with PSBs, which 
achieved around 22% (20% in previous year). 
 
FIGURE 1.5 Trends in Growth of Banking Assets 
 
Source: RBI, ICRA Research. 
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Historically, the banking sector’s credit portfolio has been growing at over 
20% per annum over the last several years (except in 2009-10, when the growth rate 
moderated to 17% mainly because of the decline in ICICI Bank’s credit portfolio). 
Over the years, credit growth has outpaced deposits growth; the credit portfolio 
reported a CAGR of 24% over the last eight years, while deposits achieved a CAGR 
of 19% and the investment portfolio of 14% over the same period. The higher growth 
in credit could be achieved because of the slower growth in investments and the 
increase in capital. In 2010-11, while deposits growth for SCBs slowed down to 17%, 
credit growth was maintained at 21% with the growth in investments being just 13%. 
The higher credit growth vs. deposits growth led to an increase in the credit deposits 
ratio (CD ratio) from 72.2% as in March 2010 to 75.7% as in March 2011, although 
the CD ratio moderated to 74.2% as on May 27, 2011, largely because of the slow 
credit growth in comparison with deposits during the first two months of 2011-12. 
 
TABLE 1.8 Domestic Credit Portfolio Compositions of SCBs 
Credit Portfolio Composition 
March 
25, 2010 
March 
25, 2011 
As % of Total 
Credit as in 
March 2011 
Growth 
(Year on 
Year) 
Agriculture and Allied 
Activities Loans 
4,161 4,603 13% 11% 
Non-Agri Corporate Loans     
Commercial Real Estate Loans 921 1,118 03% 21% 
Loans to NBFCs 1,134 1,756 05% 55% 
Power Sector Loans 1,878 2,692 07% 43% 
Other Infrastructure Loans 1,920 2,575 07% 34% 
Other Corporate Loans 14,528 17,076 47% 18% 
Retail Loans     
Housing Loans 3,009 3,461 09% 15% 
Credit Card Outstanding 201 181 00% -10% 
Vehicle Loans 638 793 02% 24% 
Other Retail Loans 2,008 2,419 07% 20% 
Total Non Food Credit 30,400 36,674 100% 21% 
Source: RBI, ICRA Research 
 
During 2010-11, the infrastructure sector, particularly power, and NBFCs 
were the key drivers of the credit growth achieved by the banking sector. Credit to the 
power sector reported a growth of 43%, while other infrastructure credit grew by 34% 
during 2010-11, against an overall credit growth of 21%. As in March 2011, the 
infrastructure sector (including power) accounted for 14% of the total credit portfolio 
of banks. Within the power sector, historically banks have been taking exposure to 
State power utilities as well as independent power producers (IPPs). Going forward, 
with many banks approaching the exposure cap on lending to the power sector and 
given the concerns hovering over the prospects of the sector itself, the pace of growth 
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of credit to this segment could slow down. However, in the short to medium term, the 
undisbursed sanctions to power projects are likely to provide for a moderate growth. 
As for bank credit to NBFCs, the same increased by 55% in 2010-11 and 
accounted for around 5% of the banks‟ total credit portfolio as in March 2011. 
Moreover, around half of this went to infrastructure related entities, and the rest 
mainly to NBFCs engaged in retail financing. Most of the NBFCs are focused on 
secured assets classes, have reported low NPA percentages, and are well-capitalised. 
As for banks’ retail lending, this continued to lag overall credit growth during 
2010-11. Retail credit grew by 17% in 2010-11 against the overall credit growth of 
21%, although the 17% figure marked a significant increase over the 4.1% reported in 
2009-10. Credit to commercial real estate also increased in 2010-11, reporting a 21% 
growth that year as against nil in 2009-10. 
The Gross NPA percentage of SCBs did not increase by the extent that the 
stress in the Indian market during 2008-09 would warrant because of large loan 
restructuring over last 2-3 years (4-5% of total advances); Gross NPAs declined 
marginally from 2.4% as in March 2010 to 2.3% as in March 2011. However, higher 
provisioning led to a reduction in Net NPAs from 1.1% as in March 2010 to 0.9% as 
in March 2011. Over the last two years, PSBs’ Gross NPAs rose from 2% to 2.3%, 
while private banks‟ NPAs declined from 2.9% to 2.3%. The Gross NPA percentage 
of the PSBs got impacted by slippages from restructured accounts, “agri debt relief”, 
and slippages because of automation of asset classification. 
Better provisioning coverage and a stronger capitalisation profile allowed 
private banks report better solvency (Net NPA/Net Worth) than PSBs during last few 
years. 
TABLE 1.9 Trends in Asset Quality Indicators of SCBs 
SCBs FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11* 
Gross NPAs (%) 3.3 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 
Net NPAs (%) 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.9 
Fresh NPA Generation Rate (%) 2.0 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.0 
Net NPAs/ Net Worth (%) 10.1 9.2 7.8 8.6 9.1 10.0 
PSBs FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 
Gross NPA (%) 3.6 2.7 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.3 
Net NPA (%) 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.1 
Net NPA/ Net Worth (%) 13.1 12.1 11.2 11.4 13.5 13.4 
Private Banks FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 
Gross NPAs (%) 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.9 2.7 2.3 
Net NPAs (%) 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.0 0.6 
Net NPAs/ Net Worth (%) 6.3 7.8 6.1 7.5 5.3 3.2 
Source: Annual Reports of Banks, RBI, ICRA Research 
 
In the banking system, historically, there has been a positive correlation 
between growth in deposits base and increase in interest rates; periods with high 
interest rates have seen relatively high deposits growth, as in a high interest rate 
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regime bank fixed deposits become more attractive than many other instruments. At 
present, it appears that given the outlook on interest rates, banks may be able to 
mobilise retail deposits at a higher pace in 2011-12 than in the previous year. 
 
FIGURE 1.6 Trends in Low- Cost Deposits of Banks 
 
Source: RBI, Annual Reports/ Results of Banks, ICRA Research 
 
In 2010-11, according to ICRA‟s estimates, the overall deposits of private 
banks increased by 22%, while that of PSBs increased by 18%. Within deposits, low 
cost deposits (CASA, current and saving accounts) increased by 27% for private 
sector banks and by 15% for PSBs. CASA deposits represented 41% of the total 
deposits for private banks, and for a lower 33% for PSBs. For banks, having 
significant low cost deposits (CASA) as a proportion of total deposits could help them 
keep their cost of funds under control even in a scenario of rising interest rates in the 
system. 
The capitalisation profile of SCBs remains comfortable and much above the 
minimum regulatory requirements of 6% and 9% for Tier I capital and Capital to Risk 
weighted Assets Ratio (CRAR), respectively, although the CRAR and Tier I capital of 
SCBs declined in 2010-11. The decline is attributable largely to strong credit growth 
and the fall in the capitalisation level of the country’s largest bank, State Bank of 
India (SBI). 
FIGURE 1.7 Capitalization Profiles of SCBs 
 
Source: RBI, ICRA Research. 
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The capitalisation profile of private banks continues to be better than that of 
PSBs, with the private banks’ CRAR at around 16% and that of PSBs at around 13%, 
as in March 2011. However, continuous government support (via capital infusion) to 
enable PSBs maintain a minimum Tier I capital of 8% is likely to result in these banks 
being able to maintain a comfortable capitalisation profile over short to medium term. 
The profitability profile of SCBs has remained steady over the years with the 
ratio of Profit after Tax to Average Total Assets (PAT/ATA) being in the 0.9-1.1% 
range. In 2010-11, while the profitability of SCBs benefited from the improvement in 
NIMs, the benefit was partly offset by the increase in their operating expenses and in 
credit provisioning, with banks rushing to raise the provisioning cover to 70%7. The 
rise in operating expenses largely followed the increase in the liability for pension & 
gratuity expenses8. 
 
FIGURE 1.8 Trends in Profitability of SCBs and PSBs 
 
Source: RBI, Annual Reports and ICRA Research 
 
As Chart 6 shows, banks have historically reported an increase in NIM in a 
rising interest rate scenario, although the trend was broken in the fourth quarter (Q4) 
of 2010-11 by a higher rise in the cost of funds versus yield in advances. This positive 
correlation could be partly explained by the lag effect in term deposit re-pricing and 
partly by CASA deposits (34% of deposits or 28% of total liabilities), which are not 
interest rate sensitive; that is, interest rates are not linked to market rates. 
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Going forward, the interest rate sensitivity of banks could increase as the 
proportion of infrastructure loans (which are not as dynamically aligned to variable 
benchmark rates as loans to other sectors) increases and also if interest rates on SB 
deposits are deregulated. Overall, a temporary slack in credit growth (as is typically 
seen in the first half of a financial year) and adjustments in the lending rate to 
incorporate a higher rate on SB deposits (and such other factors) may lead to a dip in 
the NIM in the first half of 2011-12, but the margin could recover subsequently, 
depending on the credit off-take. 
 
FIGURE 1.9 Quarterly Movements in NIM vs. Interest Rates 
 
Source: RBI, ICRA Research 
 
The profitability (PAT as a percentage of Total Assets) of SCBs has been 
stable at 0.9-1.1% over the last five years. Further, the profitability (PAT/Average 
Total Assets) of the PSBs has been lower (at around 0.9%) than that of private banks 
(at around 1.4%) over the same period. However, despite lower profitability, the 
return indicators (Return on Net Worth) of the PSBs remain higher than those of 
private banks primarily because of higher leveraging. During 2010-11, PSBs reported 
a Return on Net Worth of around 18%, and private banks of around 14%. Going 
forward, a temporary slack in credit growth (typical in the first half) and adjustments 
in lending rates (to incorporate a higher rate on saving deposits, etc.) may lead to a dip 
in the NIM in the first half of 2011-12. Subsequently, the NIM could recover, 
depending on the credit off-take. 
Overall, despite the high levels of operating expense, banks are expected to 
report good core profitability, given their reasonable NIMs and lower credit 
provisions. At the same time however, depreciation on investments because of rising 
yields (50-75 bps from the March 31, 2011 levels) could pull down profitability by 5-
10 bps. 
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FIGURE 1.10 Trends in Profitability in Gearing 
 
Source: RBI, ICRA Research 
 
3.9 Conclusion: 
 
For SCBs, the cost of funds could go up partly because of the increase in the 
saving bank rate (by 5-15 bps) and partly because of higher incremental costs. A 
temporary slack in credit growth (as is typically seen in the first half of financial year) 
and adjustment in the lending rate (to incorporate the higher rate on saving deposits, 
etc.) may lead to a dip in the NIM in the first half of 2011-12, which could however 
recover subsequently, depending on the credit off-take. 
The credit profiles of borrowers could weaken in 2011-12 because of a tight 
liquidity situation, higher interest rates, and moderation in GDP growth rate. The 
vulnerability of banks because of their increasing exposure to State power utilities is 
likely to increase, unless tariffs are revised upwards. However, these may not reflect 
in the Gross NPA percentage as there may be some regulatory respite. The Gross 
NPA percentage (for PSBs and private sector banks) may remain in the 2.3-2.7% 
range, as against 2.3% as on March 31, 2011. However, following regulatory 
relaxations, incremental credit provisions for 2011-12 could reduce to 0.35-0.45% of 
Average Total Assets as against 0.6% in 2010-11. 
An increase in the proportion of infrastructure loans (from the current 14% of 
domestic credit) and deregulation of saving rates could worsen the asset-liability 
management (ALM) profile and increase the interest rate sensitivity of banks. 
Indian banks continue to enjoy a comfortable capitalisation as compared with 
existing RBI norms with their Tier I capital close to 9%. Thus, apart from SBI, none 
of the PSBs may need significant Tier I capital in the short term. However, some of 
the fast-growing small private sector banks may need Tier I capital over short to 
medium term. 
Overview of Corporate Governance and Conceptual Framework Chapter 1 
 
An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector 38 
 
4. Corporate Governance and Banks 
 
Banks are central to market development and socio-economic growth, 
regulatory and economic reforms including corporate governance practices. Like in 
many other parts of the world, bank also playing a critical role in the socio-economic 
development process in Asia. For example, banks are the dominant industry, 
important drivers for economic growth, most important sources of finance, and main 
depository for the economy’s savings. Corporate governance principles and practices 
are most significant in the banking industries compared to the other industries and 
arguably one of the most important discussions in this current financial crisis. Banks 
accept money largely in the form of deposits from the general public (i.e. depositors). 
Banks lend money that is in effect “borrowed: from these depositors, and the failure 
of banks could result in a monetary loss for the depositors with significant 
consequences for the economy2. 
Corporate governance principles and practices are particularly significant in 
the banking sector. Banks have an especially important role in any economy. First and 
foremost, they accept deposits from and are liable to the general public. These 
deposits constitute a significant portion of a nation’s wealth, and must therefore be 
managed appropriately. Should this wealth be managed inadequately, people’s money 
and livelihood could be at stake. Another issue that makes bank governance 
difference is the fact that banks provide loans. Banks are the sole source of finance for 
the great majority of the enterprises, in particular in emerging markets. The 
assessment and selection of customers and the ensuing decisions to extend or refuse 
credit are important processes that fundamentally influence the growth of the 
economy. Finally, some banks are expected to make credit and liquidity available in 
difficult market conditions. The importance of banks to national economies is 
underscored by the fact that banking is, almost universally, a regulated industry. It is 
thus of great importance that banks have strong corporate governance practices. 
Source: Lebanese Banking Sector Corporate Governance Survey – July 2006, IFC 
and Association of Banks in Lebanon. 
It is important to take a wider corporate governance view since banks are not 
fundamentally different from other companies with respect to corporate governance, 
even though there are important differences of degree and failures will have economy 
– wide ramifications. For example, operational and reputational risks might be more 
dynamic and valuable in banking than in other companies but the need to effectively 
manage risk is the same. What differentiates banking in terms of corporate 
governance is the more important role of stakeholders (i.e. depositors) and implicit or 
explicit guarantees with respect to classes of liabilities which changes the incentives 
facing boards, shareholders and managers. Failure of a bank could also have 
systematic consequences which is not the case with non banks. 
Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings and Main Messages, 
June 2009, OECD. 
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4.1 Why Corporate Governance in Banks? 
 
If we examine the need of improving corporate governance in banks, two 
reasons stand out: 
(i) Banks exist because they are willing to take on and manage the risks. Besides with 
the rapid pace of financial innovations and globalization, the face of banking business 
is undergoing a sea change. Banking business is becoming more complex and 
diversified. Risk taking and management in a less regulated competitive market will 
have to be done in such a way that investors’ confidence is not eroded. 
(ii) Even in a regulated set up some big banks in the public as well as in the private 
sector had incurred substantial losses. This along with the massive failure of NBFCs, 
had adversely impacted investors’  
Another important paramount matter for banks is protecting the interest of 
depositors. Banks deal in peoples’ funds and should, therefore, act as trustees of the 
depositors. But there are evidence across the world that vulnerability of depositors to 
the whims of managerial misadventures in banks and that why banks should be 
regulated tightly than other corporate. 
  So we can say that the main objective of corporate governance in banks is to 
protect the depositors’ interest and then be to ‘optimise’ the shareholders’ interests. 
All other consideration would fall in place once these two are archived. And for 
achieving all these, sound corporate governance is very much essential. Sound 
corporate governance makes the work of supervisors infinitely easier and also 
contributes to a collaborative working relationship between bank management and 
bank supervisors. In addition, transparency of information related to existing 
conditions, decisions and action is integrally related to accountability in that it gives 
market participants sufficient information with which to judge the management of a 
bank. 
 
4.2 Corporate Governance and the World Bank: 
 
The World Bank report in corporate governance is a landmark in the evolution 
of the theory and application of this concept of best corporate behaviour. The World 
Bank report on corporate governance recognizes the complexities of the very concepts 
of corporate governance and therefore focuses on the principles on which it is based. 
These principles such as transparency, accountability, fairness and responsibility are 
universal in their application. The way they are put into practice has to be determined 
by those with the responsibility for implementing them. The stronger the partnership 
between the public and private sectors, the more soundly base will be their 
governance structures. Equally as the report emphasises, governance initiatives wins 
more support when driven from the bottom up rather than from the top down. 
Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between 
economic and social goals and between individuals and community goals. The 
governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally 
to require accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as 
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nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society. The World 
Banks report points the way to the establishment of trust and the encouragement of 
enterprise. It marks an important milestone in the development of corporate 
governance. 
 
4.3 Basel Committee on Corporate Governance: 
 
In 1988, the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) – based Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision came out with regulations regarding the capital requirements 
for banks. Although these were essentially intended for internationally operating 
banks, in due course, almost all countries adopted these regulations for their banks. 
 The crux of the Basel-I requirements is the assignment of risk weights for 
different assets in a bank’s book and aggregating the risk weighted assets of which 8 
percent was recommended as the capital of the bank. The committee’s 
recommendations were not mandatory but the world’s central banks speeded up the 
process of compliance, particularly following the East Asian crisis and the collapse of 
certain hedge funds in New Your which threatened to bring down banking systems of 
the US and the developed world. India adopted Basel – I norms in 1992 closely 
following the inception of economic reforms. 
Basel committee published a paper on corporate governance for banking 
organizations in September 1999. The committee felt that it was the responsibility of 
banking supervisors to ensure that there was effective corporate governance in the 
banking industry. Basel Committee underscored the need for banks to set strategies 
for their operations. The committee also insisted banks to establish accountability for 
executive these strategies. 
The Basel Committee has also issued several papers on specific topics, where 
the importance of corporate governance has been emphasized. These includes 
Principles for the Management of Interest Rate Risk (September 1997), Framework 
for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organizations (September 1998), Enhancing 
bank Transparency (September 1998) and Principles for Management of Credit Risk 
(issued as a consultative document in July 1999). These papers have highlighted the 
fact that strategies and techniques that are basic to sound corporate governance 
include the following: 
 The corporate values, codes of conduct and other standards of appropriate 
behaviour and the system used to ensure compliance with them. 
 A well articulated corporate strategy against which the success of the overall 
enterprise and the contribution of individuals can be measured. 
 The clear assignment of responsibilities and decision making authorities, 
incorporating a hierarchy of required approvals from individuals to the board of 
directors. 
 Establishment of mechanism for the interaction and cooperation among the board 
of directors, senior management and the auditors. 
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 Strong internal control systems, including internal and external audit functions, 
risk management functions, independent of business lines and other checks and 
balances. 
 Special monitoring of risk exposures where conflict of interest are likely to be 
particularly great, including business relationship with borrowers affiliated with 
the banks, large shareholders, senior management or key decision makers within 
the firm. 
 The financial and managerial incentives to act in an appropriate manner offered to 
senior management, business line management and employees in the form of 
compensation, promotion and other recognition. 
 Appropriate information flows internally and to the public. 
 
 
4.4 Sound Corporate Governance Practices for Banks: 
 
Supervisors have a keen interest in determining that banks have sound corporate 
governance. For that purpose, supervisors are required to critically evaluate the 
corporate governance structure on the basis of following elements: 
 
4.4.1 Ensuring the Critical Elements of Corporate Governance Process: 
 
a) Establishing strategic objectives and a set of corporate valued that are 
communicated throughout the banking organizations. 
b) Setting and enforcing clear lines of responsibility and accountability 
throughout the organization. 
c) Ensuring that board members are qualified for their positions, have a clear 
understanding of their role in corporate governance and are not subject to 
undue influence from management or outside concerns. 
d) Ensuring that there is appropriate oversight by senior management 
e) Effectively utilizing the work conducted by internal and external auditors, in 
recognition of important control function they provide. 
f) Ensuring that compensation approaches are consistent with the bank’s ethical 
values, objectives, strategy and control environment 
g) Conducting corporate governance in transparent manner 
 
4.4.2 Ensuring Sound Corporate Governance Environment: 
 The Basel Committee recognizes that primary responsibility for good corporate 
governance resets with board of directors and senior management of banks; however 
there are many other ways that corporate governance can be promoted, which 
includes the following: 
a) Government – through laws 
b) Securities’ regulations, stock exchanges – through disclosure and listing 
requirements 
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c) Auditors – through audit standards on communications to board of directors, 
senior management and supervisors 
d) Banking industry associations – through initiatives related to voluntary 
industry principles and agreement on and publication of sound practices. 
 
4.4.3 Ensuring the Role of Supervisors: 
 
Supervisors should be aware of the importance of corporate governance and 
its impact on corporate performance. They should expect banks to implement 
organizational structures that include appropriate checks and balances. Regulatory 
safeguards must emphasis accountability and transparency. Supervisors should 
determine that the boards and senior management of individual institutions have in 
place processes that ensure they are fulfilling all of their duties and responsibilities. 
Sound corporate governance considers the interest of all stakeholders, 
including depositors, whose interest may not always be recognized. Therefore it is 
necessary for supervisors to determine that individual banks are conducting their 
business in such a way as not to harm depositors. 
 
4.4.4 Ensuring the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), its Implementation and 
its Impact: 
 
On 26
th
 June, 2004, the committee came out with new Basel norms that are 
expected to change the complexion of banking throughout the world. The final 
version of the revised accord, titled “The International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework” is known in short as the 
New Basel Capital Accord or simply Basel II.  
Basel II aims at correcting most of the deficiencies that Basel I suffered from. 
Basel II rests on three pillars as given below: 
 
 Pillar I of the new capital framework revised the 1988 Accord’s guidelines by 
aligning the minimum capital requirements more closely to each bank’s actual risk 
of economic loss. 
 Pillar II of the new capital framework recognizes the necessity of exercising 
effective supervisory review of banks’ internal assessment of their overall risks to 
ensure that bank management is exercising sound judgement and has set aside 
adequate capital for these risks. 
 Pillar III leverages the ability of market discipline to motivate prudent 
management by enhancing the degree of transparency in banks’ public reporting. 
It sets out the public disclosures that banks must make that lend greater insight 
into the adequacy of their capitalization. 
 
The implementation of Basel II is imperative in the context of emerging market 
economies that “may face unique problems in the absence of well developed credit 
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rating systems, robust data collection mechanisms and other infrastructure”. So non 
implementation without justifiable reasons will finally get reflected in adverse credit 
ratings, higher borrowing costs and the consequent effects on the real economy. This 
is one reason no country can afford to delay implementation of Basel II indefinitely.  
 
4.5 Corporate Governance and Indian Banks: 
 
The subject of corporate governance has received a lot of attention in recent 
times in India, corporate governance issues and practices by Indian banks have 
received only a scanty notice. The question of corporate governance in banks is 
important for several reasons in India, because India has recently liberalized its 
banking system through privatization, disinvestments and has reduced the role of 
economic regulation and consequently managers of banks have obtain greater 
autonomy and freedom with regard to running of banks. This would necessitates their 
observing best corporate practices to regain the investors’ confidence now that the 
government authority does not protect them anymore. Corporate governance in banks 
has assumed importance in India post 1991 reforms because competition compelled 
banks to improve their performance. Even the majority of banks and financial 
institutions, owned, managed and influence by the government with neither high 
quality management nor any exemplary record of practising corporate governance 
have realised the importance of adopting better practices to protect their depositors 
and the banking public. 
  
4.5.1 Indian Banking Sector’s Unique Nature and its Implications: 
 
 The unique nature of banking firm is in the developed or developing world, 
requires a broad view of corporate governance to be adopted by banks which 
encapsulates both shareholders and depositors. In particular, the nature of the banking 
sector is such that regulations are necessary to protect depositors as well as the overall 
financial system. The narrow approach to corporate governance views the subject as 
the mechanism through which the shareholders are assured that managers will act to 
promote their interests. The special nature of banking will call for the adoption of the 
broader view of corporate governance for banks. Besides, the special nature of 
banking requires government intervention in order to restrain the behaviour of bank 
management. 
 A further issue is that interest of bank shareholders may oppose those of 
governmental regulators, who have their own agendas, which may not necessarily 
coincide with maximizing bank value. Shareholders may want managers to take more 
risk than a socially optimal, whereas regulators have a preference for managers to take 
substantially less risk due to their concerns about system-wide financial stability. 
Shareholders could motivate such risk taking using incentive compatible 
compensation schemes. However, from the regulators point of view, managers’ 
compensation schemes should be structured so as to discourage banks from becoming 
too risky. 
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4.5.2 Government Control and Withdrawal Effects: 
 
 In India, the issue of corporate governance in banks is complicated by 
extensive political intervention in the operation of the banking system. Government 
ownership of banks is a common feature in India. The reason for such ownership may 
include solving the severe informational problems inherent in developing financial 
systems, aiding the development process or supporting vested interests and 
distribution cartels. With a government owned bank, the severity of the conflict 
between depositors and managers very much depends upon the credibility of the 
government. Given a credible government and political stability, there will be little 
conflict as the government ultimately granted deposits. 
 The inefficiencies associated with government owned banks especially those 
emanating from a lack of adequate managerial incentive have led governments under 
some pressure from international agencies to begin divesting their ownership stakes. 
In the case of India too, there are subtle pressure on the government from 
international organizations that provide development funds such as the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund to withdraw their stakes in commercial banks. The 
divestment of government owned banks raises several corporate governance issues. If 
banks are completely privatised, then there must be adequate deposit insurance 
schemes and supervisory arrangements established in order to protect depositors and 
prevent a financial crash. 
 To sum up, effective governance of banks must have the following minimum 
criteria: 
1. The basic objective of governance should be safeguarding depositors’ money and 
optimising shareholders’ interests. 
2. The directors should be competent and persons of integrity. 
3. The chairman of the board should preferably be unconnected with the management 
of the bank. 
4. Board can function through committees and Risk Management Committee assumes 
special importance in the context of rapid changes taking place in the financial 
markets. In measuring and monitoring risks, the board should enlist the assistance of 
experts. 
5. The board should forbid banks from pursuing business which might be proper in 
form but highly improper in substance. 
6. As a general rule, the board should ask the management to spell out as to when a 
transaction, especially in derivative products, could result in losses and take a view on 
the probability of incurring the losses. On the basis of the overall risks appetite of 
banks, the transaction may be approved or rejected. 
7. Suitable risks and rewards system should be put in place for the directors of banks. 
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2.1 Introduction: 
 
Corporate governance is a system of structuring, operating and controlling a 
company with a view to achieve long term strategic goals to satisfy its shareholders, 
creditors, employees, customers and suppliers. It aims to comply with the legal and 
regulatory requirements, besides meeting the environmental and local community 
needs. It includes the policies and procedures adopted by a company to achieve its 
objectives in relation to its shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, regulatory 
authorities and the community at large. It prescribes a Code of Corporate Conduct in 
relation to all the stakeholders. Therefore a framework of effective accountability to 
the stakeholders is the essence of corporate governance. 
In India, the question of corporate governance has come up mainly in the wake 
of economic liberalization and deregulation of industry and business as well as the 
demand for a new corporate ethos and stricter compliance with the legislation. In this 
context, where the financial institutions hold substantial stakes in companies, the 
accountability of all the directors, including ex-officious/ independent and nominees, 
has come into sharp focus. Therefore a good governance demands that a company 
must have a responsibility to set exemplary standards of ethical behaviour, both 
within the organization as well as in their external relationships by virtue of which the 
company can achieve value addition in terms of stability and growth, confidence, 
reduction of perceived risks, reduction of cost of capital, stability and long term 
sustenance of stakeholders relationship, position of pride and exemplary governance 
credentials. The new economic policy adopted by the Government of India 
consequent to liberalization and opening up of the economy since 1991, has 
necessitated the demand for introduction and implementation of a proper corporate 
governance policy in the day to day management of the companies, not only in the 
interest of their stakeholders but also for the development of the economy. 
Corporate governance reforms in India have evolved a wide range of 
institutional and corporate initiatives that include (i) improving the functioning of 
capital markets, (ii) ensuring more effective protection of minority investors through 
promoting greater transparency of operations and higher standards of information 
disclosures, (iii) reforming company board structure and operational system to make 
the board of directors more accountable to the shareholders, (iv) reforming 
governance mechanisms of financial institutions etc.  
The corporate governance initiatives have come from (a) the Government 
through governmental legislations involving several amendments to the Companies 
Act, 1956; (b) the organizations, regulating capital market, especially the SEBI in the 
form of statutory regulations; (c) through self disciplining and voluntary initiatives 
taken by the industry, chamber of commerce and business associations, professional 
bodies and the company themselves. Various committees have been formed by 
Government of India, SEBI and industry associations and their recommendations for 
implementation of corporate governance norms in Indian corporate houses have been 
submitted during the period 1998 to 2005. 
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2.2 Problem Identification: 
 
Researcher has framed the following problem for this work: 
 
“AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INDIAN 
BANKING SECTOR” 
 
The title of the study highlights the detailed analysis of corporate governance 
practices of selected Indian banks and on the basis of analysis, researcher has shown 
the findings and suggestions for improvement of the current system. 
 
2.3 Objectives of the Study: 
 
The main objective of this study is to determine the corporate governance 
practices in the banking sector of India. The study targets to identify the practices in 
different CG issues e.g. level of commitment to good corporate governance, effective 
board practices, control environment and processes, information disclosure and 
transparency, shareholders rights, and external monitoring etc. The present study also 
critically examines the governance prevailing in the banking sector in India in the 
light of notable international practices with a view to suggesting ways and means for 
improvement to serve the needs, as best as possible, of the stakeholders within the 
regulatory  framework. Good governance is likely to lead to growth and prosperity of 
not only of the corporate sector but also of the economy as a whole. On the contrary, 
bad governance may bring in disaster to the stakeholders and the economy. More 
specifically, the objectives of the study are to: 
 
1) Determine the commitment to implement good corporate governance practices 
among the public sector banks and private sector banks in India. 
2) Identify the control environment and processes of the corporate governance in 
banking sector of India. 
3) Determine the level of disclosures, the accuracy and timeline of the financial 
position, condition and prospects, and other non-financial information of the 
banks in India. 
4) To develop Corporate Governance Disclosure Index on the basis of financial and 
non financial disclosures. 
5) Finally, to develop a set of policy recommendations for addressing the major 
concerns derived from the analysis. 
 
2.4 Review of the Existing Literature: 
 
A good number of theoretical and empirical researches on corporate 
governance disclosure have been undertaken throughout the globe due to the 
continuing emphasis on this. For this study, researcher has reviewed various research 
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publications and other useful data to get the proper understanding of the concept. 
Review of the existing literature used for this study is briefed as under.  
Karim et al. (1996)
lii
 argued that annual reports of the companies should be 
considered as the most important source of information about a company and they 
used that for a variety of reasons.  
From the context of India, N. Gopalswamy (1998) has written a book “A 
Corporate Governance: A New Paradigm”, covers the basic three parts: corporate 
governance, business environment and globalization. For corporate governance, he 
has conceptual overview, role of board of directors, audit committee, corporate 
disclosure practices and investors’ protection. A few studies have examined corporate 
governance in emerging markets, although none has estimated the link between CEO 
turnover and corporate performance that is the focus of this paper. Researchers have 
studied the implications of the concentrated ownership that is common in many 
emerging and developed markets.  
Reddy (1998)
liii
 had recommended that the positions of chairman and 
managing director in public enterprises1 would be needed to be vested in one person 
as against the popular view for the private sector. This is in order to protect the 
interests of the organisation. The major challenge in progressing to good corporate 
governance is to build essential knowledge on relevant laws, duties and 
responsibilities, financial analysis, strategy, business ethics and effective decision-
making. 
La Porta et al (1998)
liv
 study corporate governance patterns in 27 countries and 
conclude that “the principal agency problem in large corporations around the world is 
that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling 
shareholders”.  
More recently, the intellectual debate on corporate governance has come to 
focus on two different issues. The first concerns whether corporate governance should 
focus exclusively on protecting the interests of equity claimants, on whether corporate 
governance should expand its role to deal with the problem of the other group: the 
‘stakeholders’ or non-shareholder constituencies. The second issue of importance to 
corporate governance scholars begins with the assumption that corporate governance 
concerns itself exclusively with the challenge of protecting equity claimants and 
attempts to specify ways in which the corporation can better safeguard those interests 
[BCBS 1999]
lv
. 
As regards the issue of corporate governance in banking organisation, Jalan 
(2001)
lvi
 has examined the issue of corporate governance in public versus private 
banks and thereafter. Sarkar and Sarkar (2000)
lvii
 provided evidence on the role of 
large shareholders in monitoring company value in the Indian context, whose 
corporate governance system is a hybrid one. Similar to other studies, this study also 
found that after a definite level of block holdings by directors the company value 
enhances. But it did not find any substantial proof that institutional investors, 
normally mutual funds, are active in corporate governance. The outcome advocates 
that lending institutions start supervising the corporation efficiently only after the 
equity holding cross a considerable value and this supervision is reinforced by the 
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level of liability of these corporations. The study provides substantial proof that 
company value is enhanced by foreign equity ownership. In general, the analysis 
supports the view emerging from developed country studies that the Identity of large 
shareholders matters in corporate governance. 
Bushman and Smith (2001)
lviii
 argued that a fundamental objective of 
corporate governance research in accounting is to provide evidence on the extent to 
which information provided in financial accounting systems mitigate agency 
problems. But except for size and, to a lesser extent, ownership structure, Réal 
Labelle (2002)
lix
 did not find consistent and significant relations between disclosure 
quality of governance practices and firm performance or other corporate governance 
variables such as the proportion of unrelated director, the CEO’s plurality of offices 
and the level of financing activity in Canada.  
Mukherjee (2002) argues that India has been moving closer to taking on an 
Anglo-American (Anglo-Saxon) form of corporate governance. But the author 
questions the usefulness of the Anglo-American model. She answers this question 
through an assessment of the "development impact" of the new model as pointed out 
by measures such as growth, employment and respect for shareholder rights. The 
results suggest that the Anglo-American model is not very effective in meeting the 
objectives of the social system in India. 
Reddy (2002)
lx
 has discussed the governance challenges in public sector 
banking. To quote from Reddy (2002): 
Corporate governance in PSBs is important, not only because PSBs happen to 
dominate the banking industry, but also because, they are unlikely to exit from 
banking business though they may get transformed. To the extent there is public 
ownership of PSBs, the multiple objectives of the government as owner and the 
complex principal-agent relationships cannot be wished away. PSBs cannot be 
expected to blindly mimic private corporate banks in governance though general 
principles are equally valid. Complications arise when there is a widespread feeling of 
uncertainty of the ownership and public ownership is treated as a transitional 
phenomenon. The anticipation or threat of change in ownership has also some impact 
on governance, since expected change is not merely of owner but the very nature of 
owner. Mixed ownership where government has controlling interest is an institutional 
structure that poses issues of significant difference between one set of owners who 
look for commercial return and another who seeks something more and different, to 
justify ownership. Furthermore, the expectations, the reputational risks and the 
implied even if not exercised authority in respect of the part-ownership of government 
in the governance of such PSBs should be recognised. In brief, the issue of corporate 
governance in PSBs is important and also complex. 
Research in the field of corporate governance disclosure during the past years 
has mainly focused on the disclosure practices found in the annual reports by 
determining the extent of corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports of 
the companies of a country.  
Gompers et al (2003)
lxi
 used the incidence of 24 governance rules to construct 
a “Governance Index” to proxy for the level of shareholder rights at about 1500 large 
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firms in the USA during the 1990s. They found that firms with stronger shareholder 
rights had higher firm value, higher sales growth, higher profits, lower capital 
expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions. Similarly, a number of attempts 
have been made by various researchers throughout the world regarding the 
determinants of corporate governance. 
The study by Mohanty (2003) suggests that companies with good corporate 
governance measures are easily able to borrow money from financial institutions as 
compared to companies with poor corporate governance measures. Moreover, there is 
evidence that mutual funds have invested money in companies with a good corporate 
governance track record as compared to companies with a poor CG track record.  
By making use of a simultaneous equation approach, this study wraps up by 
saying that this positive relationship is a result of the “mutual funds (development 
financial institutions) investing (lent money) in companies with good governance 
records” and also because “their investments have helped to enhance the financial 
performance of such companies” (Mohanty, 2003). 
Some recent studies have attempted to explore the issue of corporate 
governance in banking organisations. Boubakri et al (2003)
lxii
 examine the corporate 
governance features of newly privatised firms in Asia and documents how their 
ownership structure evolves after privatisation. The results suggest that, on the one 
hand, privatisation leads to a significant improvement in profitability, while, on the 
other hand, it creates value for shareholders.  
Joh (2003)
lxiii
 presents evidence on corporate governance and firm profitability 
from Korea before the economic crisis and finds that the weak corporate governance 
system offered few obstacles against controlling shareholders expropriation of 
minority shareholders. In fact, weak corporate governance systems allowed poorly 
managed firms to stay in business and resulted in inefficiency of resource allocation, 
despite low profitability over the years.  
Anderson and Campbell (2003)
lxiv
 investigate corporate governance activity at 
Japanese banks. The results indicate that there does not exist any relation between 
bank performance and non-routine turnover of bank presidents, in the pre-crisis 
(1985-90) period, although there is an observed significant relationship between 
turnover and performance in the post-crisis (1991-96) period. 
In the Twenty First Session of International Standards of Accounting and 
Reporting (Geneva 27-29 October, 2004) UNCTAD Secretariat presented a report
lxv
 
(which was prepared after conducting a survey on 30 companies representing 
different geographical regions and industry) that found increasing convergence among 
national and international corporate governance codes and guidelines but it also 
reported significant deviation in terms of disclosure practices and content of 
disclosure.  
The role and the need of good corporate governance in India have been 
reiterated in several forums [Verghese 2002]
lxvi
. However, Kohli (2003)
lxvii
 stressed 
that corporate governance has to be perceived and understood in a much broader 
spectrum, encompassing all players involved in the business, instead of restricting it 
only to board and executive management. It is believed that a company having better 
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corporate governance is quoted at a premium in the bourses than those with weak 
corporate governance practices. 
Das and Ghosh (2004)
lxviii
 tried to establish a linkage between CEO 
compensation and bank performance in India. They concluded that CEOs of properly 
performing banks are likely to face higher turnover than the CEOs of well performing 
banks. As there is a dearth of impact studies of corporate governance policy 
implementation on financial performance of the banks, more particularly in Indian 
context, this study is an attempt to fill the gap. 
Morck Et al. (2005)
lxix
 reviews the large literature that explores the connection 
between country level rules affecting corporate governance and firm behavious and 
the strength of security markets. Whereas Choiand Hasan (2005)
lxx
 examined the 
effect of ownership and governance on firm performance and discover the evidence 
that the extent of foreign ownership level has a significant positive association with 
the bank return and a significant negative association with the bank risk; the number 
of outside board of directors does not have any significant effect of ownership and 
governance on firm performance. 
Durnev and Kim (2005)
lxxi
 provide empirical and theoretical evidence that 
companies with greater growth opportunities, greater needs for external financing, and 
more concentrated cash flow rights practice higher quality governance and disclose 
more and the strength of their influence depends in part on the country’s legal 
environment. On the other hand, Barucci and Falini (2005)
lxxii
 find that in Italian 
financial market, governance features are affected by shareholders’ composition, 
balance sheet data and company features.  
Bernard S. Black has made a seminal contribution to the study of the impact of 
governance on firm valuation in Russia and other emerging markets. [Black et al. 
2006]. He finds that economically important and statistically strong correlation 
between governance and market value possible when the measures of corporate 
governance matters. 
Rajesh Chakrabarti (2006)
lxxiii
 said that the problem of corporate in India is 
different from   that of the Anglo-Saxon environment. In India, the problem is the 
exploitation of minority shareholders by the dominant shareholders, whereas in the 
Anglo-Saxon environment, it is exploitation of shareholders by the managers. The 
author argues that in the Indian context, the capital market is more capable of 
disciplining the majority shareholders than the regulators. The regulator can just 
facilitate the market to ensure corporate governance. It cannot enforce corporate 
governance effectively, since it involves micro-management.  
Anand et al. (2006)
lxxiv
 provide empirical evidence that the absence of a large 
empirical block holding and a high need for external financing are the firm 
characteristics associated with the adoption of the Canadian guidelines and when it 
comes to voluntarily adopting the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) provisions, firm 
size becomes an important determinant. Although executive pay has been a 
controversial issue for many years, the current financial crisis has drawn greater 
attention to the role of executive pay in encouraging excessive risk taking, promotion 
and undue focus on the short term and rewarding senior management for poor 
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performance and, in some cases, unmitigated failure. Moody’s (2008)lxxv has claimed 
that the most pressing challenges for boards in the area of executive compensation 
will be (a) moderating potential pay outcomes, (b) structuring pay to better promote a 
long term focus, (c) ensuring the appropriateness of performance targets and ,metrics, 
(d) improving exit pay practices, and (e) ensuring appropriate executive retirement 
and deferred composition plans. 
Adams (2009)
lxxvi
 compared board characteristics and incentives in financial 
firms and non financial firms to address the question of how much blame the board of 
directors should shoulder for the failure. Boards of financial firms clearly share some 
responsibility for the crisis because it was their duty to oversee managers who led 
their banks to the brink of failure. Lag and Jagtiani (2010)
lxxvii
 continued their analysis 
adding that one of the financial crisis was that large financial firms were willing to 
engage in this complex mortgage related products when they had not built the 
capability to analyse the portfolio risk of these activities. Further, no oversight 
function within the company demanded that kind of information and that kind of 
analysis. 
Irrespective of the business goal considered, effective governance guarantees 
that the administration (managers and the board) are responsible for achieving it. The 
job of successful corporate governance is of immense significance to society as a 
whole. In the first place it promotes efficient use of scarce resources both within the 
organization and the larger economy. Secondly, it makes the resources flow to those 
sectors or entities where there are efficient production of goods and services and the 
return is adequate enough to satisfy the demands of stakeholders. Thirdly, it provides 
a broad mechanism for choosing the best managers to administer the scarce resources. 
Fourthly, it helps the managers to constantly focus on enhancing the company 
performance, ensuring that they are sacked when they don’t succeed in doing so. 
Fifthly, it puts pressure on the corporation to abide by the law as well as achieve what 
the society expects from it. And last but not least, it assists the supervisors in 
regulating the entire economic sector without partiality and nepotism. 
 
2.5 Scope of the Study: 
 
This study is based on the corporate governance practices of Indian banking 
sector. Further, the corporate governance practices of banking sector companies 
which are listed in the BSE BANKEX on 1
st
 January, 2010 are studied. The present 
study is made for a period of five accounting year starting from 2006- 07 to 2010 - 11. 
Researcher has selected the base year 2006- 07. This year is normal for the purpose of 
analysis and evaluation. It can be summarized that this study scope will include the 
areas of corporate governance and its practices in banking sector of India for five 
financial years 2006-07 to 2010-11. 
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2.6 Period of the Study: 
 
 In present study, the researcher has considered the duration of five financial 
years, from 2006-07 to 2010-11. So all the data collected is based on the annual 
reports of this duration only. 
 
2.7 Rational of the Study: 
 
This study provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of corporate 
governance regulatory systems and their evolution over the last 5 years in selected 
banks of India. It proposes a methodology to create detailed corporate governance 
indices which capture the major features of capital market laws in the analyzed Indian 
banking sector. The indices indicate how the law in each bank addresses various 
potential agency conflicts between corporate constituencies: namely, between 
shareholder and managers, between majority and minority shareholders, and between 
shareholders and bondholders. The analysis of regulatory provisions within the 
suggested framework will enable researcher to understand better how corporate law 
works in a particular banking company and which strategies regulators adopt to 
achieve their goals. 
 
2.8 Sampling: 
Table 2.1: Selected Banks for the Research 
Sr. No. BSE Scrip Code Banks PSB/ PVT* 
1 532480 Allahabad Bank PSB 
2 532215 Axis Bank PVT 
3 532134 Bank of Baroda PSB 
4 532149 Bank of India PSB 
5 532483 Canara Bank PSB 
6 500469 Federal Bank PVT 
7 500180 HDFC Bank PVT 
8 532174 ICICI Bank PVT 
9 500116 IDBI Bank PSB 
10 532388 Indian Overseas Bank PSB 
11 532187 IndusInd Bank PVT 
12 532652 Karnataka Bank PVT 
13 500247 Kotak Mahindra Bank PVT 
14 500315 Oriental Bank of Commerce PSB 
15 532461 Punjab National Bank PSB 
16 500112 State Bank of India PSB 
17 532477 Union Bank of India PSB 
18 532648 Yes Bank PVT 
*PSB = Public Sector Bank, PVT = Private Sector Bank 
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Indian banking sector comprises the varieties of banks that can be divided as 
PSBs, Private Sector Banks, Foreign Banks and Co-operative Banks etc. Though, 
corporate governance bind to all type of banks but for precise focus, researcher has 
selected the banking companies listed in the BANKEX [BSE] as on 1
st
 January, 2010 
on the basis of their market capitalization. All the listed banks in BANKEX are 
divided in two groups – PSBs and private sector banks to study and analyze their 
Corporate Governance Practices. The selected banks are shown under Table 2.1 in 
alphabetical order. 
 
2.9 Sources and Collection of Data: 
  
The main source of data used for the study is secondary, derived from the 
published annual reports of selected banks and disclosure on websites of the banks 
and some portion is primary data which is collected through personal visits at the 
banks. The data relating to history, growth and development of Indian banking sector 
and selected banks have been collected mainly from the books, magazines relating to 
banking sector, published paper, report, articles, news papers, bulletins, other journals 
like monthly review of Economy and web sites relating to banking sector. The data 
relating to the selected banks under the study have been obtained from prospectus, 
pamphlets and annual reports of the selected banks. 
 
2.10 Data Analysis: 
 
The main objective of this study is to examine the level of corporate 
governance disclosures of the sample banks. So a disclosure index has been 
developed [based on the papers prepared by the UN secretariat for the nineteenth 
session of ISAR (International Standards of Accounting and Reporting), entitled 
“Transparency and disclosure requirements for corporate governance” and the twenty 
second session of ISAR, entitled “Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate 
Governance Disclosure”] for the banks under study. Issues in corporate governance 
disclosure are classified into 5 broad categories. Financial disclosures, non-financial 
disclosures, annual general meetings, timing and means of disclosure, and best 
practices for compliance with corporate disclosure. Under non-financial disclosures, 
different headings such as company objectives, governance structure and policies, 
members of the board and key executives, material issues regarding employees, 
environmental and social stewardship, material foreseeable risk factors, and 
independence of auditors are used. Under all these broad and subcategories, a total of 
45 issues have been considered. 
For this research, selected banks listed in the BSE BANKEX index will be 
considered. The banks will be classified into two categories under 2 broad headings: 
Nationalized Banks and Private Banks. Nationalized banks include nationalized banks 
and. Private Banks includes private banks working in India. The primary sources used 
for the survey include company annual reports and internet. 
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With the help of the list of disclosure issues, the annual reports of the banks 
will be examined. A dichotomous procedure will be followed to score each of the 
disclosure issue. Each bank will be awarded a score of ‘1’ if the bank appears to have 
disclosed the concerned issue and ‘0’ otherwise. The score of each bank will be 
totalled to find out the net score of the bank. A corporate governance disclosure index 
(CGDI) was then computed by using the following formula: 
 
 
CGDI =             Total Score of the Individual Company               . × 100 
Maximum Possible Score Obtainable by the Company 
 
 
2.11 Hypothesis: 
  
The following hypothesis will be tested during the research study: 
 
H0: Banks do not differ significantly in average financial disclosure index. 
H1: Banks differs significantly in average financial disclosure index. 
 
H0: Banks do not differ significantly in average non financial disclosure index. 
H1: Banks differs significantly in average non financial disclosure index. 
 
H0: There is no significant difference in the average CGDI among Group I Banks. 
H1: Significant difference exists in the average CGDI among Group I Banks. 
 
H0: There is no significant difference in the average CGDI among Group II Banks. 
H1: Significant difference exists in the average CGDI among Group II Banks. 
 
H0: There is no significant difference in between financial and non financial average 
CGDI. 
H1: Significant difference exists between the financial and non financial average 
CGDI. 
 
2.12 Organization of the Research: 
 
The research study report is prepared and presented under the sequentially 
arranged in four chapters. Between the highlights of each chapter are as under: 
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Chapter – 1: Overview of Corporate Governance and Conceptual Framework: 
This chapter includes introduction, history, need and concept of corporate 
governance, objectives of corporate governance, corporate governance scenario in 
Indian Banking Sector and guidelines of different committees, Listing Agreement and 
factors affecting to the corporate governance, corporate governance report and 
qualitative characteristics of good corporate governance disclosure. 
 
Chapter 2: Research Methodology: This chapter includes the introduction, title of 
the study, sources of data, data collection, scope of the study, sample design, 
objectives of the study, hypothesis, analysis of data, outline of the chapter plan and 
limitations and future scope of the research. 
 
Chapter 3: Analysis and Interpretation of Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Index: The chapter covers the analysis and interpretation of data related with the 
corporate governance disclosure index of selected banks including information of 
each bank, financial disclosures, non financial disclosures and other related 
information for correlation and regression analysis. This chapter also covers the 
hypothesis testing with the help of various statistical tools like Run Test, F test, T Test 
and ANOVA and conclusions drawn on the basis of the analysis. 
 
Chapter 4: Summary, Findings and Suggestions: This chapter includes the 
summary of each chapter and findings of the study, conclusions drawn based on the 
study and at the last, suggestions for improvement in corporate governance practices. 
 
2.13 Limitations of the Study: 
 
The study attempted to capture the current status of the corporate governance 
practices in the banking sector of India. Following are the major limitations of the 
study: 
 
1) This study is limited to analysis of corporate governance practices in selected 18 
public sector and private sector banks from Bankex as on 31
st
 January, 2010 only 
[Table 2.1].  
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2) It is purely based on secondary data collected from the websites and annual 
reports of the banks as per requirement. Information of website/information is 
subject to last updated by the bank.  
3) Changes in board pattern after above mentioned duration or the information which 
is not provided by the banks till above mentioned duration are not considered 
here.  
 
2.14 Future Scope of the Study: 
 
There is a vast scope for the further research as this area needs a lot work. The 
same research can be enriched by using the extended parametric tests or statistical 
tools. Further, this study is based on the limited sample size only, so the same may be 
extended by comparison of corporate governance practices with other financial 
institutions, banks of developed countries etc.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Research Methodology Chapter 2 
 
An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector 61 
 
END NOTES:  
                                                          
lii
 Karim, A.K.M.W. 1996. The Association between Corporate Attributes and the 
extent of Disclosure in Bangladesh. Dhaka University Journal of Business Studies 
17(2): 89-124. 
liii
 Reddy, Y R K (1998): ‘Corporate Governance and Public Enterprises: From 
Heuristics to an Action Agenda in the Indian Context’, The ASCI Journal of 
Management, 27, 1-24. 
liv
 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lòpez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Rob Vishny, 
1998, “Law and Finance,” Journal of Political Economy 106, pp. 1113-1150. 
lv
 BCBS (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision). 1999. A New Capital Adequacy 
Framework. Consultative Paper, Basle: BCBS, June 2009 
lvi
 Jalan, B (2001): ‘Corporate Governance and Financial Sector: Some Issues’, 
Inaugural Address at NIBM Annual Day, NIBM: Pune. 
lvii
 Jayati Sarkar and Subrata Sarkar, 2000. Large shareholder activism in developing 
countries: Evidence from India, International Review of Finance, 1, pp. 161-94. 
lviii
 Bushman, Robert M., and Abbie J. Smith. 2001. Financial Accounting Information 
and Corporate Governance. Journal of Accounting & Economics 32(1-3): 237-333 
lix
 Labelle, Réal. 2002. The Statement of Corporate Governance Practices (SCGPS): A 
Voluntary Disclosure and Corporate Governance Perspective. Available at 
www.ssrn.com.  
lx
 Y.V. Reddy, 2002. “Public Sector Banks and the Governance Challenge - The 
Indian Experience,” BIS Review 25/2002, Bank for International Settlements, Basle. 
 
lxi
 Gompers, Paul A., Joy L. Ishii, and Andrew Metrick. 2003. Corporate Governance 
and Equity Prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1): 107-155. 
lxii
 Boubakri, N, J Claude-Cosset and O Guedhami (2003): ‘Privatisation, Corporate 
Governance and Economic Environment: Firm-Level Evidence from Asia’, Pacific-
Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 281, 1-26. 
lxiii
 Joh, S W (2003): ‘Corporate Governance and Firm Profitability: Evidence from 
Korea before the Economic Crisis’, Journal of Financial Economics, 68, 287-322. 
lxiv
 Anderson, C W and T L Campbell (2003): ‘Corporate Governance of Japanese 
Banks’, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol 189, 1-28. 
Research Methodology Chapter 2 
 
An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector 62 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
lxv
 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2005. 
Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure. Available at 
www.unctad.org. 
lxvi
 Verghese, K C (2002): ‘Best Practices for Corporate Governance’, IBA Bulletin, 
Special Issue, March, pp 13-15. 
lxvii
 Kohli, S S (2003): ‘Corporate Governance in Banks: Towards Best Practices’, 
IBA Bulletin, Special Issue, March, pp 29-31. 
lxviii
 Das, A and Ghosh, S, ―Corporate Governance in Banking System: An Empirical 
Evidence‖, EPW, Vol.XXXIX, (12), March 20, 2004, 1263-66. 
lxix
 Morck, Randall, Daniel Wolfenzon, and Bernard Yeung. 2005. Corporate 
Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth. Journal of Economic Literature 
43(3) forthcoming. 
lxx
 Choi, Sungho and Hasan, Iftekhar, Ownership, Governance, and Bank 
Performance: Korean Experience. Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, Vol. 
14, No. 4, pp. 215-242, November 2005. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=813309 
lxxi
 Durnev, A., and E. H. Kim. 2005. To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal 
Environment, and Valuation. Journal of Finance 60: 1461-1493. 
lxxii
 Barucii, E., and J. Falini. 2005. Determinants of Corporate Governance in the 
Italian Financial Markets. Economic Notes byBanca Monte dei Paschidi Siena SpA, 
34(3): 371-405. 
lxxiii
 Rajesh Chakrabarti, 2006. The Financial Sector in India – Emerging Issues, (with 
a Foreword by Richard Roll), Oxford University Press, New Delhi, India. 
lxxiv
 Anand, A.I., F. Milne, and L.D. Purda. 2006. Voluntary Adoption of Corporate 
Governance. Bepress legal series Working Paper 1277, 
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1277. 
lxxv
 Moody’s (2008, November). Corporate governance in the credit crisis: Key 
considerations for investors (Special Comment). Retrieved from SSRN website: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1309707 
lxxvi
 Adams, R. (2009, April). Governance and the financial crisis (ECGI Finance 
Working Paper No. 248/2009). Retrieved from SSRN website: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1398583 
Research Methodology Chapter 2 
 
An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector 63 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
lxxvii
 Lang, W. W., & Jagtiani, J. A. (2010). The mortgage and financial crises: The 
role of credit risk management and corporate governance. Atlantic Economic Journal, 
38(2), 295-316 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Analysis and Interpretation  
of  
Corporate Governance Disclosure Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
DISCLOSURE INDEX 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………......   64 
3.2 Sample Profile…………………………………………………………...   66 
3.3 Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure...   96 
3.4 Analysis of Financial Disclosures of selected Banks…………………..         118 
3.5 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of Selected Banks……………. 132 
3.6 Corporate Governance Disclosure Index Items and their Rankings.. 160 
3.7 Analysis of Data…………………………………………………………. 163 
3.8 Testing of Hypothesis…………………………………………………… 186 
Analysis & Interpretation of Corporate Governance Disclosure Index Chapter 3 
 
An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector 64 
 
3.1 Introduction: 
“Corporate Governance in essentially about leadership; leadership for 
efficiency in order for companies to compete effectively in the global economy, 
and thereby create jobs; leadership for probity because investors require 
confidence and assurance that the management of a company will behave honestly 
and with integrity in regard to their shareholders and others; leadership with 
responsibility as companies are increasingly called upon to address legitimate 
social concerns relating to their activities; and , leadership that is both 
transparent and accountable because otherwise business leaders cannot be 
trusted and this will lead to the decline of companies and the ultimate demise of a 
country’s economy.” 
- Mervyn King, King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa [King II 
Report] [Parktown, South Africa: Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 2002] 
p.18 
The issue of corporate governance continues to receive a high level of 
attention. Valuable lessons have been learned from the series of corporate collapses 
that occurred in different parts of the world in the early part of this decade. In this 
study, researcher has selected the banks from the Bankex, recorded on 1
st
 January 
2010. Out of total 18 banks, 8 banks are from the private sector and remaining ten 
banks are from the public sector banks. The following issues are framed for the 
purpose of the empirical study: 
(a) What are the structure, strength and size of selected banks’ board of directors? 
Has the requirement of clause 49 of the Listing Agreement in respect of 
minimum number of independent directors in the boards been maintained? 
(b) What is the position of Chairman and CEO in banks? Is the post of Chairman 
separated from the post of CEO/MD? How many banks did appoint a lead 
independent director in their boards? 
(c) Did the companies disclose the retirement policy of directors including the 
tenure and age limit in the annual report? If so,, whether it is in line with the 
Provisions of Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement? 
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(d) How many banks have defined ‘independent director’, ‘financial expert’ and 
disclosed the selection criterion of board directors including independent 
directors? 
(e) Are the disclosures of board procedures and information placed before the 
board? Is there a regular post meeting follow up system and compliance 
reporting to the board?  
(f) Are there adequate disclosures of remuneration policy and remuneration of 
directors in the annual report? Did they fully comply with the provisions of the 
Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement? 
(g) Did the companies disclose information about formation of statutory board 
committees, e.g., audit committee, share holders’/ investors’ grievance 
committee? Is the minimum requirement of the number of independent 
directors and the number of audit committee meetings maintained? Was there 
any disclosure regarding ‘charters’ of these committees and the roles played 
by them? Is there adequate information of nature of shareholders’ complaints 
and queries received and disposed – item wise, in the annual reports? 
(h) How many companies have set up non mandatory board committees, e.g., 
remuneration committee, nomination committee, etc.? is there adequate 
disclosure of minimum requirement of the non executive directors in 
remuneration committee, independent directors as the chairman of 
remuneration committee? Is there disclosure of nomination committee charter 
and report of nomination committee in the annual report? 
(i) Did the company comply with all disclosure norms as required by the Clause 
49 of the Listing Agreement as also by the Companies Act? 
(j) Are there adequate disclosure regarding stakeholders’ interest and the policies 
on (i) Environment, Health and Safety (EHS), (ii) Human Resource 
Development (HRD), (iii) Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and (iv) 
Industrial Relations (IR)? 
In the light of abovementioned issues, the researcher has examined the 
corporate governance practices followed by some selected Indian public sector as well 
as the private sector banks as disclosed in their annual reports for the financial years 
2006-07 to 2010-11. 
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3.2 Sample Profile: 
For the purpose of this research, researcher has selected the banks, which are 
considered for computing the Bombay Stock Exchange Banking Index, known as the 
Bankex, as on 1
st
 January, 2010. There were total 18 banks listed on this day. The 
main reason of selection of these banks is that their scripts dominate and influence the 
stock movement of the country. Further, banks considered for the Bankex represents 
the major banks of the country.  The list of all these banks is given below in Table 3.1 
Table 3.1: Selected Banks for the Research 
Sr. No. BSE Scrip Code Banks PSB/PVT* 
1 532480 Allahabad Bank PSB 
2 532215 Axis Bank PVT 
3 532134 Bank of Baroda PSB 
4 532149 Bank of India PSB 
5 532483 Canara Bank PSB 
6 500469 Federal Bank PVT 
7 500180 HDFC Bank PVT 
8 532174 ICICI Bank PVT 
9 500116 IDBI Bank PSB 
10 532388 Indian Overseas Bank PSB 
11 532187 IndusInd Bank PVT 
12 532652 Karnataka Bank PVT 
13 500247 Kotak Mahindra Bank PVT 
14 500315 Oriental Bank of Commerce PSB 
15 532461 Punjab National Bank PSB 
16 500112 State Bank of India PSB 
17 532477 Union Bank of India PSB 
18 532648 Yes Bank PVT 
 
Table 3.1 shows the banks selected for this study by the researcher. First 
column shows the total number of banks, which are 18 followed by the second 
column which shows the BSE Scrip Code for each bank. The third column shows the 
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names of the banks and last columns shows the bank is from public sector [PSB] or 
private sector [PVT]. The list is arranged alphabetically. For the purpose of the brief 
profile of each selected banks including the performance parameters, the banks are 
divided in two groups: Public Sector Banks and Private Sector Banks. 
Table 3.2: List of Group I Banks [PSBs] 
Sr. No. BSE Scrip Code Banks 
1 532480 Allahabad Bank 
2 532134 Bank of Baroda 
3 532149 Bank of India 
4 532483 Canara Bank 
5 500116 IDBI Bank 
6 532388 Indian Overseas Bank 
7 500315 Oriental Bank of Commerce 
8 532461 Punjab National Bank 
9 500112 State Bank of India 
10 532477 Union Bank of India 
 
Table 3.2 shows the list of Group I banks which are public sector banks, which 
contains total 10 banks. Out of the total sample size, majority is from the public sector 
banks [55.56%]. The list is arranged alphabetically.  
Table 3.3: List of Group II Banks [PVTs] 
Sr. No. BSE Scrip Code Banks 
1 532215 Axis Bank 
2 500469 Federal Bank 
3 500180 HDFC Bank 
4 532174 ICICI Bank 
5 532187 IndusInd Bank 
6 532652 Karnataka Bank 
7 500247 Kotak Mahindra Bank 
8 532648 Yes Bank 
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Table 3.3 shows the list of Group II banks which are private sector banks, 
which contains total 8 banks. Out of the total sample size, banks from the private 
sector banks are 44.44%. The list is arranged alphabetically. Detailed profile of banks 
in each group is as under: 
3.2.1: Sample Profile of Group I Banks: 
3.2.1.1 Allahabad Bank 
 
Head Office: 2, Netaji Subhash Road, Kolkata – 700 001 
The Oldest Joint Stock Bank of the Country, Allahabad Bank was founded on 
April 24, 1865 by a group of Europeans at Allahabad. Thus, the History of the Bank 
spread over three Centuries - Nineteenth, Twentieth and Twenty-First. On 19
th
 July, 
1969, the bank was nationalized along with 13 other banks, with total branches – 151, 
total deposits - Rs.119 crores and total advances - Rs.82 crores. In October 1989, 
United Industrial Bank Ltd. merged with Allahabad Bank. In October 2002, the Bank 
came out with Initial Public Offer (IPO), of 10 crores share of face value Rs.10 each, 
reducing Government shareholding to 71.16%. In April 2005, follow on Public Offer 
(FPO) of 10 crores equity shares of face value Rs.10 each with a premium of Rs.72, 
reducing Government shareholding to 55.23%. In June 2006, the Bank transcended 
beyond the national boundary, opening representative office at Shenzen, China and in 
February 2007, the Bank opened its first overseas branch at Hong Kong. Today, the 
bank has network of total 2,261 branches in India, 1 branch overseas (Hong Kong), 
21,227 employees and total 316 ATMs in the country
LXXVIII
. 
Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
 Figure 3.1 shows the ownership pattern chart of Allahabad Bank. Being a 
nationalized bank, central Government has the maximum ownership. The portion of 
FII is continuous fluctuating throughout the period. The portion of DII is partially 
increasing. The public is also having the share that is also fluctuating. The least share 
is with the corporate. 
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Figure 3.1: Ownership Pattern of Allahabad Bank 
 
Figure 3.2: Performance Chart of Allahabad Bank 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the performance of Allahabad Bank for last five years. As 
per the chart, net sales of the bank is continuously increased. Whereas increase in the 
net profit shows large fluctuations. The market capitalization of the bank was 
fluctuating for first three years, but after that it is constant. 
3.2.1.2 Bank of Baroda 
 
Head Office: Baroda House, Mandavi, Vadodara 390 006 
 Bank of Baroda, a leading Indian public sector bank was established on 20
th
 
July, 1908, under the Companies Act of 1897, and with a paid up capital of Rs. 10 
Analysis & Interpretation of Corporate Governance Disclosure Index Chapter 3 
 
An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector 70 
 
lakhs by visionary king of Vadodara, Maharaja Sayajirao Gaekwad. The Bank was 
nationalized on 19
th
 July 1969, along with 13 other major commercial banks, by 
Government of India. Even after nationalization, the Bank conquered the unique 
heights at various levels. Today Bank of Baroda is known as India’s International 
Bank with presence in 25 countries and 45 branches, which includes subsidiaries in 8 
countries, representative office in two countries and joint venture in 1 country. In 
India, the bank has 3,088 branches with 39,385 employees.
LXXIX
 
Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
 Figure 3.3 shows the ownership pattern of the Bank of Baroda. The maximum 
portion is hold by the central Government. Next to that, FIIs and DIIs have 
considerable share which is fluctuating throughout the period. Corporate have the 
least share but it is gradually increasing. The portion with the public is also 
fluctuating. 
Figure 3.3: Ownership Pattern of Bank of Baroda 
 
Figure 3.4: Performance Chart of Bank of Baroda 
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 Figure 3.4 shows the performance of Bank of Baroda for throughout the 
period. Net sales of the bank is continuously increasing. The net profit of the bank has 
also vast changes but it growth is very fast. Market capitalization is fluctuating 
initially but after that it is stable. 
3.2.1.3 Bank of India 
 
Head Office:  Star House, C-5,’G’ Block, Bandra-Kurla Complex,  
  Bandra (E), Mumbai – 400 051 
 Bank of India was founded on 7
th
 September, 1906 by a group of eminent 
businessmen with a paid up capital of Rs. 50 lakhs and 50 employees in Mumbai. The 
bank was under private ownership and control till July 1969 when it was nationalized 
along with 13 other banks. After successful journey of 106 years, the Bank has made 
a rapid growth over the years and blossomed into a mighty institution with a strong 
national presence and sizable international operations. Today, the Bank has 3,752 
branches in India and there are 29 branches/ offices [including five representative 
offices] and 3 subsidiaries and 1 joint venture abroad
LXXX
. 
Ownership Patter and Performance Chart: 
Figure 3.5: Ownership Patter of Bank of India: 
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 Figure 3.5 shows the ownership pattern of Bank of India. Being a nationalized 
bank, maximum portion is held by the central Government, followed by FIIs and DIIs. 
The share of FIIs is constant whereas share of DIIs increased during the period. 
Corporate have the least share and public share is also looking stable without any 
major fluctuations. 
Figure 3.6: Performance Chart of Bank of India 
 
 Figure 3.6 shows the performance chart of Bank of India. As per the chart, net 
sales of the bank is increasing gradually. There are drastically changes in the net 
profit, which is not stable but highly fluctuating. Market capitalization of the bank is 
fluctuating initially but after that it seems stable. 
3.2.1.4 Canara Bank 
 
Head Office: 112, J.C. Road, Bangalore. 560 002 
 Canara Bank was founded by Shri Ammembal Subba Rao Pai, in July 1906 at 
Mangalore. The Bank was nationalized in 1969. As at June 2010, the Bank has 3,057 
branches and 2000 ATMs covering 732 centers, 2,681 branches providing internet 
and mobile banking services and 2091 branches offering ‘Anywhere Banking’ 
services. Not just in commercial banking, the Bank has also carved a distinctive mark 
in various corporate social responsibilities and spearheading financial inclusion 
objective
LXXXI
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Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
Figure 3.7: Ownership Pattern of Canara Bank 
 
Figure 3.8: Performance Chart of Canara Bank 
 
 Figure 3.8 shows the performance chart of Canara Bank. As per the chart, net 
sales of the bank is continuously increasing for throughout the period. Same way, net 
profit is also increasing, but highly fluctuations are seems. The market capitalization 
is not stable initially but after that it seems stable. 
3.2.1.5 IDBI Bank: 
 
Head Office: IDBI Tower, WTC Complex, Cuffe Parade, Mumbai 400 005  
Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) was constituted under Industrial 
Development Bank of India Act, 1964 as a Development Financial Institution and 
came into being as on July 01, 1964 vide GoI Notification Dated June 22, 1964. It 
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was regarded as a Public Financial Institution in terms of the provisions of Section 4A 
of the Companies Act, 1956. It continued to serve as DFI for 40 years till the year 
2004, when it was transformed into a Bank. In response to the felt need and on 
commercial prudence, it was decided to transform IDBI into a Bank. For the purpose, 
Industrial Development bank (transfer of undertaking and Repeal) Act, 2003 [Repeal 
Act] was passed repealing the Industrial Development Bank of India Act, 1964. In 
terms of the provisions of the Repeal Act, a new company under the name of 
Industrial Development Bank of India Limited (IDBI Ltd.) was incorporated as a 
Govt. Company under the Companies Act, 1956 on September 27, 2004. Thereafter, 
the undertaking of IDBI was transferred to and vested in IDBI Ltd. with effect from 
the effective date of October 01, 2004. In terms of the provisions of the Repeal Act, 
IDBI Ltd. has been functioning as a Bank in addition to its earlier role of a Financial 
Institution
LXXXII
. 
Today, IDBI Bank Ltd. is a Universal Bank with its operations driven by a 
cutting edge core Banking IT platform. The Bank offers personalized banking and 
financial solutions to its clients in the retail and corporate banking arena through its 
large network of 951 Branches and 1,529 ATMs, spread across length and breadth of 
India. The Bank also has an overseas branch at Dubai. 
Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
Figure 3.9: Ownership Pattern of IDBI Bank 
 
 Figure 3.9 shows the ownership pattern of IDBI Bank. Central Government 
has the maximum portion followed by the DIIs and Public. FIIs and corporate have 
comparatively low portion in the bank. 
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Figure 3.10: Performance Chart of IDBI Bank 
 
Figure 3.10 shows the performance chart of IDBI Bank. For the years, net 
sales of the bank is highly increased. Following it, net profit is also increased but with 
some fluctuations. Market capitalization of the bank is highly fluctuating initially but 
after that it is stable. 
3.2.1.6 Indian Overseas Bank: 
 
Head Office: 763, Anna Salai, Chennai – 600 002 
 Indian Overseas Bank (IOB) was founded on February 10th 1937, by 
Shri.M.Ct.M. Chidambaram Chettyar, a pioneer in many fields - Banking, Insurance 
and Industry with the twin objectives of specialising in foreign exchange business and 
overseas banking.  The Bank was nationalized in 1969, and on the eve of 
nationalization, IOB had 195 branches in India with aggregate deposits of Rs. 67.70 
Crs. and Advances of Rs. 44.90 Crs. Today, the Bank has network of 2,022 branches 
in India, 6 branches overseas with total 25,626 employees
LXXXIII
. 
Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
 Figure 3.11 shows the ownership pattern of Indian Overseas Bank. Maximum 
portion is with the central Government followed by public. FIIs have considerable 
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share initially but that is gradually decreasing and that portion is gone to DIIs. 
Corporate has the least share in the bank but yet it is increasing. 
Figure 3.11: Ownership Pattern of Indian Overseas Bank 
 
Figure 3.12: Performance Chart of Indian Overseas Bank 
 
Table 3.12 shows the performance chart of Indian Overseas Bank. As per the 
chart, net sales of the bank is growing slowly initially, but there is fast growth after 
March 2010. But on the other hand, such type of growth is not recorded in net profit. 
Profit is gradually decreasing. There are vast changes in the market capitalization of 
the bank initially, but then it is stable. 
3.2.1.7 Oriental Bank of Commerce: 
Oriental Bank of Commerce, established on 19 February, 1943, in Lahore 
(then a city of British India, and currently in Pakistan), is one of the public sector 
banks in India. 
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Head Office: Harsha Bhawan, E-Block, Connaught Place, New Delhi - 110001 
Oriental Bank of Commerce made a modest beginning under its Founding 
Father, Late Rai Bahadur Lala Sohan Lal, the first Chairman of the Bank. Within four 
years of coming into existence, the Bank had to face the holocaust of partition. 
Branches in the newly formed Pakistan had to be closed down and the Registered 
Office had to be shifted from Lahore to Amritsar. Late lala Karam Chand Thapar, the 
then Chairman of the Bank, in a unique gesture honored the commitments made to the 
depositors from Pakistan and paid every rupee to its departing customers. The bank 
was nationalized on 15th April, 1980. At that time total working of the bank was 
Rs.483 crores having 19th position among the 20 nationalized banks. Within a decade 
the bank turned into one of the most efficient and best performing banks of India. 
Today, the Bank has a network of 1,530 branches and 16,618 employees
LXXXIV
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Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
Figure 3.13: Ownership Structure of Oriental Bank of Commerce 
 
 Figure 3.13 shows the ownership structure of Oriental Bank of Commerce. 
The maximum share is owned by the central Government. Second highest portion is 
owned by the DIIs followed by FIIs. Share of FIIs is reducing gradually. The public 
shareholding is comparatively very lower and shareholding by corporate is least. 
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Figure 3.14: Performance Chart of Oriental Bank of Commerce 
 
 Figure 3.14 shows the performance chart of Oriental Bank of Commerce. As 
per the chart, net sales of the bank is slowly increasing. With compare to the sales, net 
profit is increasing rapidly but with vast fluctuations. Market capitalization of the 
bank is very stable throughout the year. 
3.2.1.8 Punjab National Bank 
 
Head Office: 7, Bhikhaji Kama Place, New Delhi – 110 607 
Punjab National Bank was incorporated in 1895 in Lahore. It was sole bank 
that had started its operations with Indian money. Along with 13 other banks, Punjab 
National Bank was nationalized in July 1969. It provides a wide variety of financial 
products and services to a vast client base across India. At present, total client count 
of Punjab National Bank is around 35 million. It has 4540 offices, which include 421 
extension counters. It is regarded as having potential to challenge blue chip 
companies in future
LXXXV
. 
Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
 Figure 3.15 shows the ownership pattern of Punjab National Bank. Central 
Government has the highest portion in the bank and that is very stable throughout the 
years, followed by FIIs and DIIs. There is a gradually increase in the share of DIIs. 
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Comparatively public has less portion and corporate has nominal shareholding in the 
bank. 
Figure 3.15: Ownership Pattern of Punjab National Bank 
 
Figure 3.16: Performance Chart of Punjab National Bank 
 
 Figure 3.16 shows the performance chart of Punjab National Bank. As per the 
chart, net sales of the bank is continuously increasing along with the net profit. 
Market capitalization in fluctuating in initial years but after that it is stable. 
3.2.1.9 State Bank of India 
 
Head Office: Central Office, Mumbai 400 021. 
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The origin of the State Bank of India goes back to the first decade of the 
nineteenth century with the establishment of the Bank of Calcutta in Calcutta on 2 
June 1806. Three years later the bank received its charter and was re-designed as the 
Bank of Bengal (2 January 1809). A unique institution, it was the first joint-stock 
bank of British India sponsored by the Government of Bengal. The Bank of Bombay 
(15 April 1840) and the Bank of Madras (1 July 1843) followed the Bank of Bengal. 
These three banks remained at the apex of modern banking in India till their 
amalgamation as the Imperial Bank of India on 27 January 1921.  
The Imperial Bank during the three and a half decades of its existence 
recorded an impressive growth in terms of offices, reserves, deposits, investments and 
advances, the increases in some cases amounting to more than six-fold. When India 
attained freedom, the Imperial Bank had a capital base (including reserves) of 
Rs.11.85 crores, deposits and advances of Rs.275.14 crores and Rs.72.94 crores 
respectively and a network of 172 branches and more than 200 sub offices extending 
all over the country. When India attained freedom, the Imperial Bank had a capital 
base (including reserves) of Rs.11.85 crores, deposits and advances of Rs.275.14 
crores and Rs.72.94 crores respectively and a network of 172 branches and more than 
200 sub offices extending all over the country. 
 In 1951, when the First Five Year Plan was launched, the development of rural 
India was given the highest priority. The commercial banks of the country including 
the Imperial Bank of India had till then confined their operations to the urban sector 
and were not equipped to respond to the emergent needs of economic regeneration of 
the rural areas. In order, therefore, to serve the economy in general and the rural 
sector in particular, the All India Rural Credit Survey Committee recommended the 
creation of a state-partnered and state-sponsored bank by taking over the Imperial 
Bank of India, and integrating with it, the former state-owned or state-associate banks. 
An act was accordingly passed in Parliament in May 1955 and the State Bank of India 
was constituted on 1 July 1955. The State Bank of India was thus born with a new 
sense of social purpose aided by the 480 offices comprising branches, sub offices and 
three Local Head Offices inherited from the Imperial Bank. 
Today, the State Bank of India, the country’s oldest Bank and a premier in 
terms of balance sheet size, number of branches, market capitalization and profits is 
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today going through a momentous phase of Change and Transformation – the two 
hundred year old Public sector behemoth is today stirring out of its Public Sector 
legacy and moving with an ability to give the Private and Foreign Banks a run for 
their money
LXXXVI
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Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
Figure 3.17: Ownership Structure of State Bank of India 
 
Figure 3.17 shows the Ownership Structure of India’s largest bank State Bank 
of India. Majority of the ownership is with central Government followed by FIIs and 
DIIs. Public has comparatively lower portion and corporate has the least portion in the 
ownership of the bank. 
Figure 3.18: Performance Chart of State Bank of India 
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 Figure 3.18 shows the performance chart of State Bank of India. As per the 
chart, net sales of the bank are increasing very fast along with the net profit. But there 
are large fluctuations in the net profit. Market capitalization of the bank is also highly 
fluctuating and increasing rapidly, after that it stabled. 
3.2.1.10 Union Bank of India 
 
Head Office: Union Bank Bhavan, 239, Vidhan Bhavan Marg, Nariman Point, 
Mumbai – 400 021. 
Union Bank of India was established on 11th November 1919 with its 
headquarters in the city of Bombay. The Head Office building of the Bank in Mumbai 
was inaugurated by Mahatma Gandhi, the Father of the nation in the year 1921. His 
prescient words anticipated the growth of the bank that has taken place in the decades 
that followed. The Bank now operates through over 2800 branches across the country. 
The Bank's core values of prudent management without ignoring opportunities is 
reflected in the fact that the Bank has shown uninterrupted profit during all 90 years 
of its operations
LXXXVII
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Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
Figure 3.19: Ownership Pattern of Union Bank of India 
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 Figure 3.19 shows the ownership pattern of Union Bank of India. The share of 
central Government is highest and stable throughout the years, followed by FIIs and 
DIIs. Slight fluctuations are there in the share of FIIs and DIIs. Share of public is 
gradually reducing. Share of corporate is least but is slowly increasing. 
Figure 3.20: Performance Chart of Union Bank of India 
 
Figure 3.20 shows the performance chart of Union Bank of India. As per the 
chart, there is a continuous gradual growth in net sales. Growth is also there in net 
profit but with vast fluctuations. Market capitalization is initially lower and 
fluctuating which is stable after. 
3.2.2 Sample Profile of Group II Banks 
3.2.2.1 Axis Bank 
 
Head Office: Axis House, Bombay Dying Mills Compound, Pandurang Budhkar 
Marg, Worli, Mumbai - 400025 
Axis Bank was the first of the new private banks to have begun operations in 
1994, after the Government of India allowed new private banks to be established. The 
Bank was promoted jointly by the Administrator of the specified undertaking of the 
Unit Trust of India (UTI - I), Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) and General 
Insurance Corporation of India (GIC) and other four PSU insurance companies, i.e. 
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National Insurance Company Ltd., The New India Assurance Company Ltd., The 
Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and United India Insurance Company Ltd. 
The Bank's Registered Office is at Ahmedabad and its Central Office is 
located at Mumbai. The Bank has a very wide network of more than 1281 branches 
(including 169 Service Branches/CPCs as on 31st March, 2011). The Bank has a 
network of over 7591 ATMs (as on 30th September, 2011) providing 24 hrs a day 
banking convenience to its customers. This is one of the largest ATM networks in the 
country
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Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
 Figure 3.21 shows the ownership pattern of Axis Bank. Being a private sector 
bank, the maximum portion is with the promoters of the bank and second highest 
portion is with the FIIs. Remaining three categories of investors – DIIs, Corporate and 
public have comparatively less portion.  
Figure 3.21: Ownership Pattern of Axis Bank  
 
 
Figure 3.22 shows the performance chart of Axis Bank. Performance of Axis 
Bank is very sound as its clear from the chart. Net sales of the bank is increased 
rapidly for the period and the same way, net profit also has grown rapidly. Market 
capitalization has reported fluctuations initially but after that it seems stable. 
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Figure 3.22: Performance Chart of Axis Bank 
 
 
3.2.2.2 Federal Bank 
 
Head Office: Secretarial Department, PB No. 103, Federal Towers, Aluva, Kerala 
683 101 
The history of Federal Bank dates back to the pre-independence era. Though 
initially it was known as the Travancore Federal Bank, it gradually transformed into a 
full-fledged bank under the able leadership of its Founder, Mr. K P Hormis. The name 
Federal Bank Limited was officially announced in the year 1947 with its headquarters 
nestled on the banks on the river Periyar. Since then there has been no looking back 
and the bank has become one of the strongest and most stable banks in the country. 
Today, the Bank is the fourth largest bank in the India
LXXXIX
. 
Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
 Being an old private sector bank of India, as per the figure 3.23, maximum 
portion of ownership is with the FIIs. Second highest share is with the public, but it is 
gradually decreasing. DIIs also have considerable share. Portion of corporate is very 
low in beginning but after that it is increasing. 
Analysis & Interpretation of Corporate Governance Disclosure Index Chapter 3 
 
An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector 86 
 
Figure 3.23: Ownership Pattern of Federal Bank 
 
Figure 3.24: Performance Chart of Federal Bank 
 
 Figure 3.24 shows the performance of Federal Bank for the period of five 
year. The performance of bank seems sound on the basis of net sales as it is 
continuously increasing. But there are vast fluctuations are reported in net profit and 
is below the line of net sales. Market capitalization of the bank is also seems 
fluctuating in initial period but after that it is stable. 
3.2.2.3 HDFC Bank 
 
Head Office: HDFC Bank House, Senapati Bapat Marg, Lower Parle (W), Mumbai 
400013 
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The Housing Development Finance Corporation Limited (HDFC) was 
amongst the first to receive an 'in principle' approval from the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI) to set up a bank in the private sector, as part of the RBI's liberalisation of the 
Indian Banking Industry in 1994. The bank was incorporated in August 1994 in the 
name of 'HDFC Bank Limited', with its registered office in Mumbai, India. HDFC 
Bank commenced operations as a Scheduled Commercial Bank in January 1995. 
HDFC Bank is headquartered in Mumbai. The Bank at present has an enviable 
network of 2,201 branches spread in 1,174 cities across India. All branches are linked 
on an online real-time basis. Customers in over 800 locations are also serviced 
through Telephone Banking. The Bank also has 7,346 networked ATMs across these 
cities
XC
. 
Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
Figure 3.25: Ownership Pattern of HDFC Bank 
 
 Figure 3.25 shows the ownership pattern of HDFC Bank. The maximum 
ownership of the bank is with the FIIs followed by the promoters of the bank. 
Remaining three categories of investors – DIIs, Corporate and Public have 
comparatively less portion. The least portion is wit the DIIs. 
Performance of the HDFC Bank is growing stable and gradually. Net sales and 
net profit lines are almost growing together with slight fluctuations. Whereas market 
capitalization seems fluctuating initially and then it is stable. 
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Figure 3.26: Performance Chart of HDFC Bank 
 
 . 
3.2.2.4 ICICI Bank 
 
Head Office: ICICI Bank Towers, Bandra-Kurla Complex, Mumbai 400051. 
ICICI Bank started as a wholly owned subsidiary of ICICI Limited, an Indian 
financial institution, in 1994. With a change in the corporate structure and the budding 
competition in the Indian Banking industry, the management of both ICICI and ICICI 
Bank were of the opinion that a merger between the two entities would prove to be an 
essential step. It was in 2001 that the Boards of Directors of ICICI and ICICI Bank 
sanctioned the amalgamation of ICICI and two of its wholly-owned retail finance 
subsidiaries, ICICI Personal Financial Services Limited and ICICI Capital Services 
Limited, with ICICI Bank. In the following year, the merger was approved by its 
shareholders, the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad as well as the High Court of 
Judicature at Mumbai and the Reserve Bank of India.  
Today, ICICI Bank is India's second-largest bank with total assets of Rs. 
4,062.34 billion (US$ 91 billion) at March 31, 2011 and profit after tax Rs. 51.51 
billion (US$ 1,155 million) for the year ended March 31, 2011. The Bank has a 
network of 2,586 branches and about 8,003 ATMs in India, and has a presence in 19 
countries, including India
XCI
. 
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Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
Figure 3.27: Ownership Pattern of ICICI Bank 
 
 Figure 3.27 shows the ownership pattern of ICICI Bank. The maximum 
ownership of the bank is with FIIs followed by DIIs. Public and corporate have 
comparatively lower portion of ownership. The least portion of ownership is with the 
corporate which is fluctuating also. 
Figure 3.28: Performance Chart of ICICI Bank 
 
 Performance chart of ICICI Bank is highly fluctuating like roller costar. Net 
sales and net profit lines seem together but there are vast fluctuations for each year. 
Though line of net profit is above the net sales which show the good profitability of 
bank. Whereas in market capitalization, fluctuations are there in initial stage but after 
that it looks stable. 
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3.2.2.5 IndusInd Bank 
 
Head Office: 8
th
 Floor, Tower 1, One Indiabulls Centre, 841,  Senapati Bapat Marg, 
Elphinstone Road (W), Mumbai 400013 
IndusInd Bank derives its name and inspiration from the Indus Valley 
civilization -a culture described by National Geographic as 'one of the greatest of the 
ancient world' combining a spirit of innovation with sound business and trade 
practices. Mr. Srichand P. Hinduja, a leading Non-Resident Indian businessman and 
head of the Hinduja Group, conceived the vision of IndusInd Bank -the first of the 
new-generation private banks in India -and through collective contributions from the 
NRI community towards India's economic and social development, brought our Bank 
into being. 
The Bank, formally inaugurated in April 1994 by Dr. Manmohan Singh, 
Honourable Prime Minister of India who was then the country’s Finance Minister, 
started with a capital base of Rs.1,000 million (USD 32 million at the prevailing 
exchange rate), of which Rs.600 million was raised through private placement from 
Indian Residents while the balance Rs.400 million (USD 13 million) was contributed 
by Non-Resident Indians
XCII
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Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
 
Figure 3.29: Ownership Pattern of IndusInd Bank 
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 Figure 3.29 shows the ownership pattern of IndusInd Bank. As per the chart, 
the portion of promoters was highest initially but it is falling gradually and it goes to 
FIIs, which has fewer shares initially and is now increasing rapidly with the highest 
share. Portion of public is also reduced considerably. Corporate have maintained their 
portion with slight fluctuations. The least share is with the DIIs which have increased 
in last years. 
Figure 3.30: Performance Chart of IndusInd Bank 
 
 Figure 3.30 shows the performance chart of IndusInd Bank. As per the chart, 
net sales of the company is growing slightly but company has increased net profit 
vary rapidly with compare to net sales. Market capitalization reported slight 
fluctuations initially but after that it looks stable. 
3.2.2.6 Karnataka Bank 
 
Head Office: Mahaveera Circle, Mangalore. 
Karnataka Bank Limited, a leading 'A' Class Scheduled Commercial Bank in 
India, was incorporated on February 18th, 1924 at Mangalore, a coastal town of 
Dakshina Kannada district in Karnataka State. The bank took shape in the aftermath 
of patriotic zeal that engulfed the nation during the freedom movement of 20th 
Century India. Over the years the Bank grew with the merger of Sringeri Sharada 
Bank Ltd., Chitradurga Bank Ltd. and Bank of Karnataka. 
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With over 87 years experience at the forefront of providing professional 
banking services and quality customer service, the Bank have a national presence with 
a network of 490 branches spread across 20 states and 2 Union Territories, 
and over 5,844 employees, 86,868 shareholders and over 4.84 million customers
XCIII
. 
Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
Figure 3.31: Ownership Pattern of Karnataka Bank 
 
Figure 3.31 shows the ownership pattern of Karnataka Bank. Among the entire 
selected bank, this is the only bank in which public have the maximum ownership. 
Second place goes to FIIs followed by corporate. DIIs also have their portion but very 
less with compare to other investors. 
Figure 3.32: Performance Chart of Karnataka Bank 
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Figure 3.32 shows the performance chart of Karnataka Bank. The bank has 
increased its net sales with stable growth rate. But the net profit line of the bank is 
highly fluctuating for throughout the period. Vast fluctuations can seen every year in 
the net profit of the bank, but it is growing. Market capitalization of the bank is 
fluctuating initially but after that it seems stable. 
3.2.2.7 Kotak Mahindra Bank 
 
Head Office: 36-38A, Nariman Bhawan, 227 Nariman Point, Mumbai 400021 
The journey of Kotak Mahindra Bank begins with Kotak Mahindra Finance 
Ltd. in 1985. After a successful journey of one and half decade, in 2003, the Kotak 
Mahindra Finance Ltd. converted into a commercial bank. In 2009, the Bank opened a 
representative office at Dubai. Today The Bank is one of the leading private sectors 
Indian Bank
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. 
Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
 Figure 3.33 shows the ownership pattern of Kotak Mahindra Bank. The 
promoters of the bank possess maximum ownership of the bank, followed by FIIs. 
Public also has the considerable portion in bank. Very less potion is available to DIIs 
and corporate. Though the portion of corporate is increasing which is very least in 
earlier period. 
Figure 3.33: Ownership Pattern of Kotak Mahindra Bank 
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Figure 3.34: Performance Chart of Kotak Mahindra Bank 
 
 Figure 3.34 shows the performance chart of Kotak Mahindra Bank. As per the 
chart, performance of the bank is very good as the net sales line has grown very 
rapidly. But the net profit line of the bank is very fluctuating. Initially it is lower but 
finally it has crossed the net sales line. Market capitalization also looks very 
fluctuating initially but after that it is stable. 
3.2.2.8 Yes Bank 
 
Head Office: Nehru Centre, 9
th
 Floor, Discovery of India, Dr. A.B. Road, Worli, 
Mumbai 400018 
 Yes Bank was incorporated as a Public Limited Company on November 21, 
2003. Yes Bank is one of the top most private Indian banks. Awarded by the only 
Greenfield license award by RBI in last 14 years, this bank is established and run by 
Rana Kapoor and Ashok Kapur with the financial support of Rabobank Nederland, 
the world's single AAA rated private Bank. Three respected global institutional 
private equity investors, CVC Citigroup, AIF Capital and Chrys Capital are also 
associated with this bank. The Yes Bank was established with the motto of providing 
Indian customers with a motive to provide Indian customers with a spirit of 
professional entrepreneurship blended with a premium quality, technologically savvy 
banking trends
XCV
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Ownership Pattern and Performance Chart: 
 Figure 3.35 shows the ownership pattern of yes Bank. The maximum 
ownership of the bank is possessed by FIIs, which was lower initially but after that it 
has increased drastically. On the other hand, promoters of the bank were having the 
highest portion initially which is not reduced. The same proportion can seen in the 
portion of corporate. They have now least share. Public also have considerable share 
in the bank. Share of DIIs is also increased rapidly. 
Figure 3.35: Ownership Pattern of Yes Bank 
 
 Figure 3.36 shows the performance chart of Yes Bank. Performance of the 
bank is very stable and growing in uniform way which clears from the net sales line 
and net profit lines. Both have increased simultaneously. Whereas market 
capitalization of the bank is slightly fluctuating initially that is stable afterwards.  
Figure 3.36: Performance Chart of Yes Bank 
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3.3 Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure 
The issue of corporate governance continues to receive a high level of 
attention. Valuable lessons have been learned from the series of corporate collapses 
that occurred in different parts of the world in the early part of this decade. Since 
then, UN member States have undertaken various actions to strengthen their 
regulatory frameworks in this area in order to restore investor confidence, and 
enhance corporate transparency and accountability. At UNCTAD's 10th quadrennial 
conference, which was held in Bangkok in February 2000, member States requested it 
to promote increased transparency and improved corporate governance. In response, 
the Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of 
Accounting and Reporting (ISAR) at UNCTAD conducted a series of consultations 
and deliberations on corporate governance disclosure during its annual sessions with a 
view to assisting developing countries and countries with economies in transition in 
identifying and implementing good corporate governance practices. This was 
undertaken as part of the larger goal of achieving better corporate transparency and 
accountability in order to facilitate investment flows and mobilize financial resources 
for economic development.  
At its 21st session in 2004, the Group of Experts agreed to consider further 
developments in the area of disclosures and to update its earlier work as needed. 
Accordingly, the updating work was conducted and reviewed at the 22nd session of 
the Group of Experts in 2005, where it was decided to prepare this guidance for 
publication and disseminate it as widely as possible. ISAR's decision was welcomed 
by delegates during the 10th session of the Commission on Investment, Technology 
and Related Financial Issues in 2006, where delegates commended the report for its 
usefulness and recognized the need for tools to promote good practices in corporate 
transparency and reporting. These guidelines, therefore expected to serve as a useful 
tool for drawing attention to good corporate governance disclosure practices that 
enterprises in different parts of the world might wish to emulate. 
Researcher has used these guidelines to decide the score of corporate 
governance in selected banks of India to disclose their corporate governance practices. 
As per these guidelines, corporate governance disclosure can divide in two parts: 
Financial Disclosures 
Non Financial Disclosures 
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As the parts itself shows, the financial disclosures deals with the financial 
documentation and disclosure practices of the firms and non financial disclosures 
deals with the other than financial documentation and disclosures by the firm. The 
each part is explained in detail as under: 
3.3.1 Financial Disclosures: 
 Enterprises should disclose their financial and operating results. 
One of the major responsibilities of the board of directors is to ensure that 
shareholders and other stakeholders are provided with high-quality disclosures on the 
financial and operating results of the entity that the board of directors have been 
entrusted with governing. Almost all corporate governance codes around the world, 
including the OECD and the ICGN Principles, the CACG Guidelines, the Cadbury 
Report, and the King II, specifically require the board of directors to provide 
shareholders and other stakeholders with information on the financial and operating 
results of a company to enable them to properly understand the nature of its business, 
its current state of affairs and how it is being developed for the future. 
The quality of financial disclosure depends significantly on the robustness of 
the financial reporting standards on the basis of which the financial information is 
prepared and reported. In most circumstances, the financial reporting standards 
required for corporate reporting are contained in the generally accepted accounting 
principles recognized in the country where the entity is domiciled. Over the last few 
decades, there has been increasing convergence towards a set of non-jurisdiction 
specific, widely recognized financial reporting-standards. The International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs) issued by the International Accounting Standards Board 
provide a widely recognized benchmark in this respect. 
Furthermore, the board of directors could enrich the usefulness of the 
disclosures on the financial and operating results of a company by providing further 
explanation, for example in the Management's Discussion and Analysis section of the 
annual report, on critical accounting estimates1 of the company in addition to the 
disclosure required by the applicable financial reporting standards. 
The board could clearly identify inherent risks and estimates used in the 
preparation and reporting of the financial and operational results of the company in 
order to give investors a better understanding of the risks they are taking in relying on 
the judgement of management. For example, in some cases, financial reporting 
measurement requirements call for the valuation of certain assets on a fair value basis. 
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However, while for certain assets deep markets might exist and fair value could be 
obtained with reasonable objectivity that might not be the case for others. Situations 
of the latter kind may invite management to exercise great latitude and influence the 
direction of earnings in its favour by resorting to less objective estimates based on 
modelling hypothetical markets. In addition to the disclosure required by the 
applicable financial reporting standards, the board of directors may provide further 
comfort to shareholders and other stakeholders by disclosing that the board or its audit 
committee has reviewed fair value computations, if any, and that the computations 
were conducted in an objective manner. 
 The board’s responsibilities regarding financial communications should be 
disclosed. 
A description of the board’s duties in overseeing the process of producing the 
financial statements should be provided. This is useful for supporting the notion that 
the board is responsible for creating an overall context of transparency. It is generally 
accepted that the board has responsibility for reporting on the financial and operating 
results of the corporation. Almost all corporate governance codes describe the basic 
responsibility of the board for reviewing financial statements, approving them, and 
then submitting them to shareholders. When the duties of the board in this area are 
clearly disclosed, shareholders and other stakeholders could find it useful in providing 
an additional level of comfort regarding the fact that the financial statements 
accurately represent the situation of the company. 
The quality of financial disclosure could be undermined when consolidation 
requirements on financial reporting are not followed appropriately. In this respect, the 
board of directors could provide additional comfort to users of its financial reports. 
For example, the board of directors could state that it had ascertained that all 
subsidiaries and affiliated entities, including special-purpose ones, which are subject 
to consolidation as per the financial reporting standards applicable to the entity, have 
been properly consolidated and presented. 
 Enterprises should fully disclose significant transactions with related parties. 
Many shareholders and stakeholders would be interested in information that 
would help them determine that management is running the enterprise with the best 
interest of all shareholders and stakeholders in mind and not to unduly benefit any 
related parties (see also section II.E.6 below on conflict of interest). Most national 
financial reporting standards, and IFRS, require extensive disclosure on this matter. 
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However, in circumstances where the financial reporting requirements are less 
stringent, as a minimum, the board of directors should provide the following 
disclosures that are generally considered best-practice: significant related-party 
transactions and any related-party relationships where control exists; disclosure of the 
nature, type and elements of the related-party transactions; and related-party 
relationships where control exists (irrespective of whether there have been 
transactions with parties under common control). The decision making process for 
approving related-party transactions should also be disclosed. Members of the board 
and managers should disclose any material interests in transactions or other matters 
affecting the company. 
 
Table 3.4: Financial Disclosures as per Guidelines for Good Governance 
Practices 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Financial Disclosures 
1 Directors' Report 
2 Auditors Report 
3 P & L Account & Balance Sheet & Cash Flow Statement 
4 Schedules forming part of B/s & P & L Account 
5 Statement pursuant to Sec. 212 of Co. Act 1956 
6 Consolidated Financial Statements 
7 Notes to account 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 
9 Related Party Transactions 
10 Corporate Reporting Framework 
11 
Risk & Estimates in Preparing & Presenting Financial 
Statements 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 
13 Dividend [Dividend History/ Details] 
14 
Other Financial Performances  
[Ratios/Charts/Graphs] 
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3.3.2 Non Financial Disclosures: 
3.3.2.1 Company Objectives 
 The objectives of the enterprise should be disclosed. 
There are two general categories of company objectives: the first is commercial 
objectives, such as increasing productivity or identifying a sector focus; the second is 
much more fundamental and relates to governance objectives: it seeks to answer the 
basic question, "why does the company exist?" This section refers to these governance 
objectives. The objectives of enterprises may vary according to the values of society. 
In many countries, but by no means all, the primary corporate objective is to 
maximize the long-term return to shareholders (shareholder value). This objective 
appears in many codes throughout the world. 
However, despite an increasing awareness throughout the world that shareholder 
requirements must be met in order to attract and retain long-term, low-cost capital, the 
emphasis on shareholder value maximization has not precluded a growing emphasis 
on other corporate objectives. Many codes now include social, environmental and 
economic objectives as part of the fundamental objectives of an enterprise. In 
particular, the codes emphasize the need for enterprises to address the interests of a 
range of stakeholders in order to promote the long-term sustainability of the 
enterprise. If an enterprise knowingly damages the interests of its stakeholders, it can 
risk negatively affecting its own ability to produce long term shareholder value. This 
suggests that rather than viewing shareholder value and stakeholder value as mutually 
exclusive objectives, there are indications that the opposite is true, and that the two 
objectives are probably interdependent in the long run. This emphasis on a broader set 
of objectives can be found in the Revised OECD Guidelines on Multinational 
Enterprises, the 2004 edition of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 
proposed revisions of the UK Companies Act, and the King II Report. 
3.3.2.2 Ownership and Shareholders Rights 
 The beneficiary ownership structure should be fully disclosed to all interested 
parties. Changes in the shareholdings of substantial investors should be 
disclosed to the market as soon as a company becomes aware of them. 
The beneficiary ownership structure of an enterprise is of great importance in an 
investment decision, especially with regard to the equitable treatment of shareholders. 
In order to make an informed decision about the company, investors need access to 
information regarding its ownership structure. 
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It is recommended that this disclosure includes the concentration of shareholdings, 
for example the holdings of the top twenty largest shareholders. This information is of 
particular interest to minority shareholders. In some countries (e.g. Germany) 
disclosure is required when certain thresholds of ownership are passed. 
 Disclosure should be made of the control structure and of how shareholders 
or other members of the organisation can exercise their control rights 
through voting or other means. Any arrangement under which some 
shareholders may have a degree of control disproportionate to their equity 
ownership, whether through differential voting rights, appointment of 
directors or other mechanisms, should be disclosed. Any specific structures 
or procedures which are in place to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders should be disclosed. 
In certain cases, control is exercised indirectly via the ownership of one or several 
entities that in turn (collectively) control a corporation (i.e. a pyramid structure). In 
such cases, the disclosure of ultimate control is considered best practice. As noted in 
the OECD Principles, information about record ownership may need to be 
complemented with information about beneficial ownership, in order to identify 
potential conflicts of interest, related-party transactions and insider trading. In 
disclosing beneficial (or ultimate) ownership, information should also be provided 
about shareholder agreements, voting caps and cross-shareholdings, as well as the 
rights of different classes of shares that the company may have issued. 
A company might have a single shareholder or group of shareholders with 
majority control of the company, either through holding the majority of the 
company’s outstanding equity or through holding shares with superior voting rights. 
In this situation, without safeguards for minority shareholders, the latter group may be 
adversely affected. This issue is emphasized by a number of codes, including the 
OECD Principles. 
A number of international statements advocate a “one share one vote” approach. 
Although the OECD Principles do not advocate any particular view on the "one share 
one vote" approach, the Principles include examples of other international statements 
that do advocate a "one share one vote" approach. The International Corporate 
Governance Network, among others, is a strong supporter of this approach. 
Advocates of the "one share one vote" approach view any deviation from this 
approach as an undesirable distortion of the connection between investment risk and 
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the decision-making process. However, actual practice might be different. For 
example, in the European Union, many member States do allow shares with multiple 
or no voting rights. While this practice remains controversial, it may be tolerated by 
investors as long as differentials in voting rights are disclosed. The European 
Association of Securities Dealers does not support such differentials but allows 
flexibility, noting that if they cannot be avoided they should at least be indicated by a 
different share class (EASD Principles, Recommendation II.2). 
 
3.3.2.3 Changes in Control and Transactions Involving Significant Assets 
 Rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate control in the 
capital markets and extraordinary transactions such as mergers and sales of 
substantial portions of corporate assets should be disclosed. 
Best practice suggests a substantial amount of pre control transaction disclosure, 
including the disclosure of the intention to acquire control, and to take the company 
private, and of associated squeeze-out/sell-out rights relevant for minority 
shareholders. Other typical disclosures include the identity of the bidder, past 
contacts, transactions and agreements between the merging entities (or acquirer and 
target, as the case may be), and a discussion of the consequences of the control 
transaction for the shareholders of the companies involved, as well as disclosure of 
the financial situation of the bidder and its source of funds for the control transaction. 
This disclosure should include any anti-takeover measures established by the 
enterprise. It should also cover the compensation policy for senior executives leaving 
the firm as a result of a merger or acquisition. 
Best practice disclosure for sales of substantial portions of corporate assets 
include a notice to all shareholders (usually at the annual general meeting), 
accompanied by an independent evaluation report. In the Republic of Korea, for 
example, the Corporations Code requires a special resolution for a transaction that 
may result in the sale of a substantial part of the enterprise. For such transactions 
involving listed companies, additional disclosure and substantive requirements are 
imposed. In South Africa, the Companies Act requires approval of the shareholder 
meeting for sales of the whole or the greater part of the company's assets, and for 
listed companies such approval is required for any transaction over 30% of assets. In 
most governance systems, it is generally considered good practice to submit questions 
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of extraordinary transactions (including mergers, acquisitions and takeovers) to a 
general meeting for shareholder approval. 
 In the interest of protecting minority shareholders, the principle of "equality 
of disclosure" should be practised, such that all shareholders receive 
information equally. 
Any information disclosed to one shareholder should also be equally available to 
all shareholders (FEE, 2003a). This reflects the view that all shareholders should have 
a right to be equally informed, and complements the issue of simultaneous disclosure 
of information discussed in section IV below. Major shareholders such as institutional 
investors should not have privileged access to information that is unavailable to 
minority shareholders. 
 
3.3.2.4 Governance Structures and Policies: 
 The structure, role and functions of the board 
The term "board" has different meanings in unitary and two-tier systems. A 
unitary board is composed of executive and non-executive directors. In a two-tier 
system the term “board” is distinguished between the management board, whose 
members have executive responsibilities, and the supervisory board, responsible for 
the monitoring and supervision of the company’s management. Variations exist 
among the two-tier systems, and the responsibilities of the supervisory board could in 
some countries include responsibilities for the strategic direction of the company. 
 While the two-tier system is not as widely utilized as the one-tier system, it is 
nevertheless prevalent in several large economies such as Austria, Germany and the 
Netherlands. In this document, the term "board" is used to refer to the highest 
governing and monitoring body or bodies of an enterprise on which executive and 
non-executive or supervisory board members sit. The recommendations contained 
herein typically apply to both one-tier and two-tier systems. 
 The composition of the board should be disclosed, in particular the balance of 
executives and non-executive directors, and whether any of the non-
executives have any affiliations (direct or indirect) with the company. Where 
there might be issues that stakeholders might perceive as challenging the 
independence of non-executive directors, companies should disclose why 
those issues do not impinge on the governance role of the non-executive 
directors as a group. 
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One of the main issues in relation to the board structure and its disclosure is that, 
regardless of which structure exists in the company, independent leadership within the 
board is ensured. Some countries would give more emphasis to the need for a clear 
division of responsibilities between the chairman and the chief executive officer 
(CEO) (Cadbury Report, para. 4.9). Increasingly, codes mention that while a 
combined CEO/Chair is tolerable (in a one-tier system), the separation of the two is 
desirable and considered best practice, as it helps to promote a balance of power 
within the leadership structure. There is also increasing debate on the need for an 
independent Chair of the board. Even within economies where a combined role is still 
common, the accepted view is that measures are called for to balance the power at the 
head of the corporation such that no single individual has unfettered control of the 
company (FEE, 2003a). 
If the roles of chairman and CEO are combined, the proportion of independent 
directors within the board structure assumes greater importance. For example, the 
Cadbury Report recommended that where the roles were combined, there should be a 
strong independent element on the board and that there should be a lead non-
executive director to whom issues regarding the executive management could be 
addressed. This idea is followed by the Indian code and was also addressed in the 
2002 Report of the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee on Corporate Governance. 
The idea is also expressed in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2000). 
However, the definition of an independent director varies in different countries. 
Therefore, a reference to a particular approach used in defining director independence 
might be useful in disclosing and discussing the board structure. FEE (2003a), for 
example, recommends that a principles-based approach used for assessing the 
independence of external auditors (see section H below) can also be usefully applied 
to the assessment of independence among non-executive (supervisory) directors. A 
crucial general principle in this respect is the principle of self interest threat; a self-
interest threat occurs when a director could benefit from a financial or other interest in 
the enterprise, as a result of unethical behaviour or lack of independence (FEE, 
2003b). FEE further recommends that the board should disclose its reasons for 
considering a non-executive (or supervisory) director to be independent. 
It is recognized that not all non-executive directors can be considered independent 
directors. The Narayan Murty Committee Report in India, for instance, makes a clear 
distinction between non-executive and independent directors. 
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For example, non-executive directors who are employees of banks and other 
financial institutions with which the enterprise has a business relationship cannot be 
considered independent. Similarly, for the boards of subsidiary companies, it is not 
uncommon for non-executive directors to be employees of the parent firm or some 
other subsidiary related to the parent firm. 
Any relationship of directors to the parent firm or its subsidiaries should therefore 
be disclosed. Such a relationship could be considered in assessing the ability of the 
nonexecutive director to fulfil his or her duties. 
 The board’s role and functions must be fully disclosed. 
Most guidelines and codes of best practice emphasize the stewardship and 
supervision functions of the board and distinguish its responsibilities from those of 
management. It is important that directors disclose what their functions and retained 
powers are, otherwise they may be considered accountable for all matters connected 
with the enterprise. In many Commonwealth countries, for example, the Companies 
Act makes the directors accountable for the "management" of the company, but also 
allows them to delegate; hence the importance of recording and disclosing the 
retained powers of the directors, along with a clear statement about which powers are 
delegated to the CEO. However, there are differences in the specificity with which the 
board’s role is explained. For example, the Dey Report (Canada), the Vienot Report 
(France), the Korean Stock Exchange Code, Malaysia’s Report on Corporate 
Governance, Mexico’s Code of Corporate Governance and the King II Report (South 
Africa) specify board functions as strategic planning, risk identification and 
management selection, oversight and compensation of senior management, succession 
planning, communications with shareholders, integrity of financial controls and 
general legal compliance. In India, for example, a director's responsibility statement 
outlining the board's responsibilities on compliance with standards, internal controls, 
risk management, fraud detection and other matters, is a disclosure requirement under 
both the law and stock exchange rules. The degree of differences between codes may 
reflect the degree to which company law or listing standards specify board 
responsibilities. 
 Board committees 
It has become a common practice for boards to establish board committees to 
facilitate fulfilment of certain of the board’s functions and address some potential 
conflicts of interest. The use of board committees is, among other things, intended to 
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enhance independent judgement on matters in which there is potential for conflict of 
interest, and to bring special expertise in areas such as audit, risk management, 
election of board members and executive remuneration. While it may be advisable for 
the preparatory work of certain key board functions to be assigned to separate 
committees, there is an international consensus that the full board holds collective and 
final responsibility (FEE, 2003a). 
 Governance structures should be disclosed. In particular, the board should 
disclose structures put in place to prevent conflicts between the interests of 
the directors and management on the one side, and those of shareholders and 
other stakeholders on the other. 
These structures may include committees or groups to which the board has 
assigned duties regarding the oversight of executive remuneration, audit matters, 
appointments to the board, and the evaluation of management performance. 
 The composition and functions of any such groups or committees should be 
fully disclosed. Committee charters, terms of reference or other company 
documents outlining the duties and powers of the committee or its members 
should also be disclosed, including whether or not the committee is 
empowered to make decisions which bind the board, or whether the 
committee can only make recommendations to the board. Where any director 
has taken on a specific role for the board or within one of these structures, 
this should be disclosed. 
Internationally, there has been consensus that although a board has collective and 
final responsibility, the use of committees for the preparatory work of certain key 
board functions is advisable. This is especially true where executives may find 
themselves facing conflicts of interest, for example in the areas of audits, 
remuneration and director nomination. A number of codes address this issue, also 
outlining the need for clear terms of reference for such committees (e.g. Australia, 
India, Malaysia, South Africa). 
As a general rule, codes have recommended, and in some cases stock exchange 
regulations require, that some board committees be substantially or exclusively 
staffed by non-executive or outside directors, particularly independent directors, and 
especially with regard to the committee chairpersons. Disclosures that are becoming 
increasingly common include the disclosure of committee charters or terms of 
reference, committee chairs, reports on activities (in particular those of the audit 
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committee), composition, nominations committee disclosure on whether use is made 
of external advisers/advertising to find new directors (as opposed to potentially 
conflicting informal connections), and the effectiveness of executive remuneration in 
providing incentives for executives. 
Ethics policy and support structure 
 The existence of an enterprise code of ethics and any governance structure 
put in place to support that code of ethics should be disclosed. Any waivers to 
the code of ethics or the rules governing ethics procedures should also be 
disclosed. 
Ethics management is important for the promotion of good business practices, 
transparency and risk reduction. As ethics management becomes more common in 
enterprises, the existence of its key structural features is an important area of 
disclosure. It is noted that, with the exception of some countries such as the United 
States, no general or international best practice has yet been established in this area. 
Nevertheless, some possible features subject to disclosure might include: the 
existence of a senior ethics officer and that person’s responsibilities; the existence of 
an ethics committee and its relationship to the board; policies for breaches of the 
ethics code, including reporting mechanisms and "whistleblower" protection 
mechanisms; and policies on the dissemination and promotion of the ethics code. 
 
3.3.2.5 Member of the Board and Key Executives 
 Duties and Qualifications 
The number, type and duties of board positions held by an individual 
director should be disclosed. An enterprise should also disclose the actual board 
positions held, and whether or not the enterprise has a policy limiting the 
number of board positions any one director can hold. 
Shareholders need to be aware of the number, type and duties of outside board and 
management positions that any individual director holds. Information on outside 
board and management positions should be disclosed for key executives as well. The 
purpose of this information is to make a judgement on the ability of directors and key 
executives to meet all of their commitments; thus the number as well as the type and 
duties of the position (which gives some indication of the commitment involved) 
should be disclosed. 
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Many codes and institutional investors have specified disclosure requirements 
(and/or actual limitations) on the number and type of positions held by directors. 
Among others, such disclosure requirements can be found in the positions of the FEE 
and the Winter Group Report, the Dey Report, the Indian Code, the Malaysian Code, 
the King II Report and the National Association of Pension Funds in the UK. Some 
guidance, such as the report of the FEE, also recommends disclosure of positions held 
in public or not-for-profit organisations. 
 There should be sufficient disclosure of the qualifications and biographical 
information of all board members to assure shareholders and other 
stakeholders that the members can effectively fulfil their responsibilities. 
There should also be disclosure of the mechanisms which are in place to act 
as “checks and balances” on key individuals in the enterprise. 
Most governance guidelines and codes of best practice address topics related to 
directors’ qualifications and board membership criteria. These may include 
experience, personal characteristics, core competencies, availability, diversity, age, 
specific skills (e.g. the understanding of particular technologies), international 
background, and so on. The CACG, for example, indicates that the director has to 
have integrity, common sense, business acumen and leadership. 
Some codes specifically require financial literacy (e.g. the National Association of 
Corporate Directors in the United States) or knowledge of business and financial 
technology (e.g. the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance). 
 There should be disclosure of the types of development and training that 
directors undergo at induction as well as the actual training directors 
received during the reporting period. 
Recently, some countries have started to require specific training for directors. For 
example, in India, the Companies (Amendment) Bill 2003 makes director training 
mandatory. The Naresh Chandra Committee on Corporate Audit and Governance, 
also of India, recommends training for independent directors and disclosure thereof. 
 The board should disclose facilities which may exist to provide members with 
professional advice. The board should also disclose whether that facility has 
been used during the reporting period. 
On certain legal and financial matters, directors might discharge their duties more 
effectively if allowed access to independent external advisers, for example legal and 
financial experts. If used correctly, access to external expertise can enhance the ability 
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of directors to fulfil their duties properly. In New Zealand, for example, it is 
considered vital for directors to have access to independent advice, and therefore this 
principle is stated in that country's Companies Act. The Merged Code in Belgium also 
points out the need for an agreed procedure for using external expertise, a point also 
mentioned in the Dey Report (Canada), and the Vienot (France), Mertanzis (Greece) 
and Olivencia (Spain) reports. Best practice suggests that whatever approach is used, 
the approach should be disclosed. 
 Evaluation Mechanism 
The board should disclose whether it has a performance evaluation 
process in place, either for the board as a whole or for individual members. 
Disclosure should be made of how the board has evaluated its performance and 
how the results of the appraisal are being used. 
Along with the duties and responsibilities of directors, shareholders will need 
to know how directors were evaluated, what criteria were used and how they were 
applied in practice, particularly with reference to remuneration. CACG Guidelines 
stress that evaluations should be based on objective criteria. The IAIM Guidelines 
(Ireland) and Preda Code (Italy) leave to the remuneration committee the selection of 
appropriate criteria and the establishment of whether these criteria have been met. 
An important aspect of performance is the attendance of directors at board and 
committee meetings. Specific requirements regarding disclosure of the frequency and 
procedures of board meetings can be found, for example, in the Indian Code, the King 
II Report and the Combined Code of the United Kingdom. 
 Director’s Remuneration 
Directors should disclose the mechanism for setting directors’ 
remuneration and its structure. A clear distinction should be made between 
remuneration mechanisms for executive directors and non-executive directors. 
Disclosure should be comprehensive to demonstrate to shareholders and other 
stakeholders whether remuneration is tied to the company’s long-term 
performance as measured by recognized criteria. Information regarding 
compensation packages should include salary, bonuses, pensions, share payments 
and all other benefits, financial or otherwise, as well as reimbursed expenses. 
Where share options for directors are used as incentives but are not disclosed as 
disaggregated expenses in the accounts, their cost should be fully disclosed using 
a widely accepted pricing model. 
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The current level of disclosure relating to directors’ remuneration varies 
widely. However, the trend appears to be towards greater levels of disclosure in this 
area, especially in Europe: France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom have all introduced laws to enforce the 
disclosure of directors' individual remuneration. 
In the United Kingdom, for example, the report of the company’s 
remuneration committee must identify each director and specify his or her total 
compensation package, including share options. Recently added regulations also 
require companies to put their remuneration report to a shareholder vote at each 
annual general meeting. Elsewhere in the world there are other examples of this 
practice. The Indian Code, for instance, requires disclosure about remuneration in a 
section of the annual report on corporate governance, in addition to suitable disclosure 
on directors' remuneration in the profit and loss statement. 
 The length of directors’ contracts and the termination of service notice 
requirements, as well as the nature of compensation payable to any director 
for cancellation of service contract, should be disclosed. A specific reference 
should be made to any special arrangement relating to severance payments to 
directors in the event of a takeover. 
 Succession Planning 
The board should disclose whether it has established a succession plan for 
key executives and other board members to ensure that there is a strategy for 
continuity of operations. 
OECD Principle IV.D.2 stresses that overseeing succession planning is a key 
function of the board, while the Dey Report (Canada) considers it an important 
stewardship duty of the company and the Vienot Report I (France) recommends that 
the selection committee be prepared to propose successors at short notice. While 
specific details regarding potential successors might be the subject of confidentiality, 
the existence of a procedure and a preparedness to appoint successors as necessary is 
not confidential, and should be the subject of disclosure. 
 Conflict of Interest 
Conflicts of interest affecting members of the board should, if they are not 
avoidable, at least be disclosed. The board of directors should disclose whether it 
has a formal procedure for addressing such situations, as well as the hierarchy of 
obligations to which directors are subject. 
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Conflicts of interest are required to be disclosed by law in many countries. The 
critical issue is that all conflicts of interest should be disclosed, along with what the 
board decided to do regarding the specific situation and the relevant director involved. 
 
3.3.2.6 Material Issued Regarding Stakeholders and Environmental and Social 
Stewardship 
 The board should disclose whether there is a mechanism protecting the rights 
of other stakeholders in a business. 
OECD Principle IV concerns itself with ensuring that the rights of 
stakeholders protected by law are respected. Even where no legislation exists, it is 
considered good practice to make additional commitments, as corporate reputation 
and performance may require recognition of broader interests. For example, the 
CACG Guidelines require that a board identify the corporation’s internal and external 
stakeholders and agree on a policy for how the corporation should relate to them. 
 The role of employees in corporate governance should be disclosed. 
Among member States of the European Union, for example, various practices 
exist where employees elect some of the supervisory directors, can be given a right to 
nominate one or more directors or can have an advisory voice on certain issues 
discussed by the board. This practice is considered by some to dilute the influence of 
shareholders, and to be a distortion of the connection between investment risk and the 
decision-making process. Others consider the strong interest of employees in the 
enterprise to warrant their special status in the governance process, and view 
employee involvement as having a beneficial effect on the overall sustainability of the 
firm. Regardless of one's views, any mechanisms for employee involvement in the 
governance of the enterprise should be clearly disclosed. 
 The board should disclose its policy and performance in connection with 
environmental and social responsibility and the impact of this policy and 
performance on the firm’s sustainability. 
The environmental dimension of this issue was addressed by ISAR in its 
agreed conclusions on Accounting and Financial Reporting for Environmental Costs 
and Liabilities. ISAR noted that an enterprise’s environmental performance could 
affect its financial health and hence its sustainability. At its twentieth session, ISAR 
concluded that the pressure for better reporting on social issues was increasing and 
that enterprises were producing more information on this topic. Among others, the 
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King II Report (South Africa), the Association of British Insurers (UK) in its 
Disclosure Guidelines on Socially Responsible Investment and the guidelines of the 
Global Reporting Initiative encourage disclosure of governance mechanisms in place 
to support improvement of social and environmental performance. Such governance 
disclosure is also relevant for creators of "socially responsible investing" indexes, 
such as the Domini 400 Social Index produced by KLD Research & Analystics in the 
United States, the FTSE4GOOD produced by FTSE in the United Kingdom, or the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Worlds Indexes (DJSI) produced by the SAM Group of 
Switzerland in conjunction with Dow Jones Ltd and STOXXX Ltd. 
 
3.3.2.7 Material Foreseeable Risk Factors 
 The board should give appropriate disclosures and assurance regarding its 
risk management objectives, systems and activities. The board should 
disclose existing provisions for identifying and managing the effects of risk 
bearing activities. The board should report on internal control systems 
designed to mitigate risks. Such reporting should include risk identification 
mechanisms. 
In recent years, much attention has been paid to the role of the board in risk 
assessment or management and internal controls designed to mitigate risk. This issue 
is emphasized in most codes and principles, including the OECD Principles, the 
CACG Guidelines, King II and the United Kingdom's Combined Code. 
Users of financial information and participants in the marketplace need 
information on foreseeable material risks, including risks specific to industries or 
geographical areas, dependence on certain commodities, financial market risk and 
derivative risks. The corporate governance structures in place to assess, manage and 
report on these types of risks should be the subject of corporate governance 
disclosure. 
 
3.3.2.8 Independence of External Auditors 
 The board should disclose that it has confidence that the external auditors 
are independent and their competency and integrity have not been 
compromised in any way. The process for the appointment of and interaction 
with external auditors should be disclosed. 
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Independent external audits should provide an objective assurance that the 
financial statements present a true and fair view (or are presented fairly in all material 
respects) of the financial condition and performance of the audited entity. Therefore, 
most governance codes and guidelines define procedures for enhancing the 
independence, objectivity and professionalism of the external audit. A number of 
approaches regarding the external audit, such as the need for audit partner rotation and 
the avoidance of possible conflicts of interest involved in providing non-audit 
services, can be considered to ensure that external audits serve shareholder and other 
stakeholder interests in the intended manner. 
Auditor independence is a prerequisite for the reliability and credibility of the 
audit of financial statements. Adopting a principles-based approach to auditor 
independence (as set out in the EC’s 2002 recommendation on auditor independence 
and in the IFAC Code of Ethics) is valued for its adaptability to new practices. The 
principles-based approach sets out the fundamental principles which must always be 
observed by the auditor and considers the threats and safeguards (including 
restrictions and prohibitions) to be in place to ensure the auditors’ independence and 
objectivity. However, it could be useful for enterprises to disclose a substantial 
definition of those activities that would be regarded as non-audit-related, especially in 
those cases where audit and non-audit-related fees are not subject to mandatory 
disclosure. 
 Disclosures should cover the selection and approval process for the external 
auditor, any prescriptive requirements of audit partner rotation, the 
duration of the current auditor (e.g. whether the same auditor has been 
engaged for more than five years and whether there is a rotation of audit 
partners), who governs the relationship with the auditor, whether auditors do 
any non-audit work and what percentage of the total fees paid to the auditor 
involves non-audit work. 
The audit committee should play a role in establishing a policy on purchasing 
non-audit services from the external auditor; this policy should be disclosed along 
with an explanation or assessment of how this policy sufficiently ensures the 
independence of the external auditor (FEE, 2003a). 
 Internal Audit Function 
Enterprises should disclose the scope of work and responsibilities of the 
internal audit function and the highest level within the leadership of the 
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enterprise to which the internal audit function reports. Enterprises with no 
internal audit function should disclose the reasons for its absence. 
An effective internal audit function plays a significant role within the 
corporate governance framework of a company. The scope of work and 
responsibilities of an internal audit function are often determined by the board (or 
management board in a two-tier system), typically in conjunction with the audit 
committee, and can vary significantly depending on the size, structure and complexity 
of the company and the resources allocated. Given the potential variation in the 
internal audit function among enterprises, it is recommended that details of this 
function be disclosed. 
 
3.3.2.9 General Meetings 
 Disclosure should be made of the process for holding and voting at annual 
general meetings and extraordinary general meetings, as well as all other 
information necessary for shareholders to participate effectively in such 
meetings. Notification of the agenda and proposed resolutions should be 
made in a timely fashion, and be made available in the national language (or 
one of the official languages) of the enterprise as well as, if appropriate, an 
internationally used business language. The results of a general meeting 
should be communicated to all shareholders as soon as possible. 
The OECD Principles outline a general consensus as to the nature of 
shareholder meetings and the requirement to make shareholder participation as simple 
and effective as possible and ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders. The 
Principles state that shareholders should be informed of the rules and be furnished 
with information regarding the date, location and agenda of the meeting as well as the 
issues to be decided. Sufficient information should be provided so that shareholders 
can make fully informed decisions. Enterprises should do everything possible to 
facilitate the effective participation of all (including foreign) shareholders in general 
meetings. 
In most governance systems, it is either required or considered good practice 
to put certain issues to shareholder approval at a general meeting. Best practice in this 
area entails that issues subject to shareholder approval be presented individually and 
unbundled, allowing shareholders to accurately exercise their voting rights. These 
rules can vary across different countries, and therefore disclosing information on the 
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subject would be useful, especially for foreign investors. In some countries, for some 
enterprises, new types of voting technology are being employed, for example Internet 
voting. The enterprise should, when issuing notice of the meeting, disclose the 
relevant details of voting technologies employed. 
 The enterprise should disclose all relevant information on the process by 
which shareholders can submit agenda items, and should disclose which 
shareholder proposals (if any) were excluded from the agenda and why. 
It is considered good practice in most governance systems to allow 
shareholders to include items on the agenda of a general meeting. 
 
3.3.2.10 TIMING AND MEANS OF DISCLOSURE 
 All material issues relating to corporate governance of the enterprise should 
be disclosed in a timely fashion. The disclosure should be clear, concise, 
precise and governed by the “substance over form” principle. 
Some issues may require continuous disclosure. Relevant information should 
be available for users in a cost effective way, preferably through the websites of the 
relevant government authority, the stock exchange on which the enterprise is listed (if 
applicable) and the enterprise itself. The location of corporate governance disclosures 
within the annual report is not generally defined and can vary substantially in practice. 
Some degree of harmonization of the location of corporate governance disclosures 
would be desirable to make the relevant data more accessible. Two possible 
approaches include putting all corporate governance disclosures in a separate section 
of the annual report, or in a stand-alone corporate governance report. Examples of the 
former approach are found in the recommendations of the Hong Kong Society of 
Accountants and the listing requirements in India and Switzerland, which provide for 
corporate governance disclosures to appear in a separate section of the annual report 
and in a prescribed format. Where corporate governance disclosures are not 
consolidated, there should be sufficient cross-referencing to different disclosures to 
improve access to the information. 
Some information related to corporate governance may require immediate 
disclosure, and some codes and listing requirements address this issue. For example, 
in Malaysia listing requirements call for immediate disclosure of a change in the 
management, external auditor or board structure. 
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 Traditional channels of communication with stakeholders, such as annual 
reports, should be supported by other channels of communication, taking 
into account the complexity and globalization of financial markets and the 
impact of technology. 
The OECD Principles state that the Internet and other information 
technologies provide the opportunity for improving information dissemination. In 
some countries (e.g. the United States), Internet disclosure is now accepted as legal 
disclosure and annual reports must indicate where company information can be found 
on the Internet. The King II Report also emphasizes the need for critical financial 
information to be made available to shareholders simultaneously and supports the idea 
that traditional channels of communication be complemented by new means, such as 
the Internet.  
Whatever disclosures are made and whatever channels used, a clear distinction 
should be made between audited and unaudited financial information, and means of 
validation of other non-financial information should be provided. 
 
3.3.2.11 GOOD PRACTICES FOR COMPLIANCE 
 Where there is a local code on corporate governance, enterprises should 
follow a “comply or explain” rule whereby they disclose the extent to which 
they followed the local code’s recommendations and explain any deviations. 
Where there is no local code on corporate governance, companies should 
follow recognized international good practices. 
The use of “comply or explain” mechanisms in many countries allows 
investors and other stakeholders greater access to information about the corporation 
and is to be encouraged. In relation to this “comply or explain” rule, some countries 
now require companies with foreign listings to disclose the extent to which the local 
governance practices differ from the foreign listing standards. 
 The enterprise should disclose awards or accolades for its good corporate 
governance practices. 
It is recognized that there is an increase in the number of corporate governance 
accolades, awards, ratings, rankings and even corporate governance stock market 
indexes where constituents are selected on the basis of exhibiting good practices in 
corporate governance. Especially where such awards or recognitions come from 
major rating agencies, stock exchanges or other significant financial institutions, 
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disclosure would prove useful since it provides independent evidence of the state of a 
company's corporate governance. 
 
Table 3.5: Non Financial Disclosures as per Guidelines for Good Governance 
Practices 
 
Sr. No. Disclosure Item 
                  Non Financial Disclosure 
  Company Objectives 
1 Message from the Chairman 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 
  Ownership & Shareholders' Rights 
4 Ownership/ Shareholding  Structure/ Pattern 
5 Shareholders' Rights 
  Governance Structure & Policies 
6 Statutory Details of the company 
7 
Size of the Board  
[Minimum 10 members] 
8 Composition of Board  
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 
10 Information about independent Directors 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 
13 
Audit Committee  
[Minimum 5 members, one of them must be CA] 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 
15 Investors' Grievance Redressal Committee 
16 Other Committees 
17 Composition of the Committees 
18 Functioning of the Committees 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 
  Member of the Board & Key Executives 
20 Biography of the Board Members 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 
22 
Number of Board Meetings  
[At least 3 in a year] 
23 
Attendance in Board Meetings 
[Minimum 80%] 
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24 Director's Stock Ownership 
25 Director Remuneration 
  
Material Issues Regarding Employees, Environmental & Social 
Stewardship 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 
28 Environmental Responsibility 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  
  Material Foreseeable Risk Factors 
30 Internal Control System 
  Independence of Auditors 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 
32 Auditor Fees 
  Annual General Meeting 
33 Notice & Agenda of the AGM 
  Timings & Means of Disclosure 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 
35 Annual Report through Internet 
36 
Green Initiative Practices  
[for 2010-11 only] 
  Best Practices for Compliance with CG 
37 
Compliance Certificate for CG  
[Clause 49] 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 
 
3.4 Analysis of Financial Disclosure Index of Selected Banks 
As researcher has discussed earlier, the corporate governance index is based on 
the financial and non financial disclosures as per the guidelines on good governance 
practices issued by the UNATD. With this reference, the researcher has developed the 
financial disclosure index of each selected bank given as in Table 3.4 for five year 
from 2006-07 to 2010-11. Financial discloser index contains total 14 items and each 
has allocated the score of 1 for each year, and so 5 for five years. In this way, the 
maximum score of the financial index is 70. For the purpose of bank wise analysis of 
financial disclosure index, researcher has divided the banks in two groups. Group I – 
Public Sector Banks and Group II – Private Sector Banks.  
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3.4.1 Analysis of Financial Disclosure of Group I Banks: 
 Analysis of financial disclosure of ten public sector banks under Group I is as 
under: 
Table 3.6: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of Allahabad Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Allahabad Bank 
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of  
financial statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of subsidiaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 11 11 11 11 11 55 
 
From the above table 3.6, shows the analyse of the financial disclosure of 
Allahabad Bank. First bank of Group I Banks. Out of total score of 70, the bank has 
obtained 55. So the level of completion of financial disclosure of the bank is 78.57%. 
Lacking factors in the financial disclosure of the Bank are details of subsidiaries, risk 
management and other financial performances in form of ratios/charts/graphs. With 
compare to other banks, the overall look of the financial statements of the Allahabad 
Bank did not so attractive. Though, the financial statements of the Bank had prepared 
in two languages – English and Hindi. 
Table 3.7 indicates the financial disclosures of Bank of Baroda. The bank has 
obtained total score of 65 out of 70. So the percentage of completion of financial 
disclosures of the bank is 92.86%. The Bank lacking only in details of subsidiaries in 
financial disclosures for all five years. 
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Table 3.7: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of Bank of Baroda 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Bank of Baroda 
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of 
Financial Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of Subsidiaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting  1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 13 13 13 13 13 65 
 
Table 3.8: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of Bank of India 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Bank of India 
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of 
Financial Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of Subsidiaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting  1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 13 13 13 13 13 65 
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Table 3.8 shows the financial disclosures of the Bank of India. The Bank got 
the total score of 65 out of 70. So the percentage of completion of financial 
disclosures of the bank is 98.86%. The Bank was lacking the details of subsidiaries 
for all the five years. 
Table 3.9: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of Canara Bank. 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Canara Bank 
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of 
Financial Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of Subsidiaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 Related Party Disclosures  0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Segment Reporting  0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 10 10 10 10 10 50 
 
Table 3.9 indicates the financial disclosures of Canara Bank. With compare to 
other banks, the annual reports of the Canara Bank were not formatted properly, and 
that is the reason, the bank has lower score among all the banks of Group I as well as 
Group II. As per the analysis, the bank was lacking in many areas like the details of 
subsidiaries, significant accounting policies, related party disclosures and segment 
reporting. The score of the Canara Bank is 50 out of 70. So the level of compliance is 
71.43%. 
Table 3.10 shows the analysis of financial disclosures of IDBI Bank. The IDBI 
Bank fulfilled all the criteria of the financial disclosures and it has a good score of 70 
out of 70, with 100% compliance of financial disclosures. That shows the good 
governance practices of the bank. The IDBI Bank had also followed good reporting 
practices with attractive and detailed annual reports.  
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Table 3.10: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of IDBI Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
IDBI Bank 
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of 
Financial Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of Subsidiaries 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting  1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 14 14 14 14 14 70 
 
Table 3.11: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of Indian Overseas Bank. 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Indian Overseas Bank 
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of 
Financial Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of Subsidiaries 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting  1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 4 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 14 14 14 14 14 70 
 
Analysis & Interpretation of Corporate Governance Disclosure Index Chapter 3 
 
An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector 123 
 
Table 3.11 shows the analysis of financial disclosures of Indian Overseas 
Bank. The financial disclosure score of Indian Overseas Bank is 70 out of 70; with 
compliance of financial disclosures by 100%. The bank did not have any subsidiary 
companies so criteria details of subsidiaries and consolidated financial statements 
were not applicable, though researcher has allotted full score for ease in calculation. 
Table 3.12: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of Oriental Bank of Commerce. 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Oriental Bank of Commerce             
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of 
Financial Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of Subsidiaries 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting  1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 4 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 14 14 14 14 14 70 
 
Table 3.12 shows the analysis of financial disclosures of Oriental Bank of 
Commerce. The financial disclosure score of Oriental Bank of Commerce is 70 out of 
70; with compliance of financial disclosures by 100%. The bank did not have any 
subsidiary companies so criteria details of subsidiaries and consolidated financial 
statements were not applicable, though researcher has allotted full score for ease in 
calculation. 
Table 3.13 shows the analysis of financial disclosures of Punjab National 
Bank. The Punjab National Bank had financial disclosure score of 65 out of 70. The 
only lacking information was details of subsidiaries. The Punjab National Bank had 
compliance of financial disclosures by 92.86%.  
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Table 3.13: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of Punjab National Bank. 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Punjab National Bank             
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of 
Financial Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of Subsidiaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting  1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 4 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 13 13 13 13 13 65 
 
Table 3.14: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of State Bank of India. 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
State Bank of India 
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of 
Financial Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of Subsidiaries 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting  1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 1 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 14 14 14 14 14 70 
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Table 3.14 shows the financial disclosures of State Bank of India. The State 
Bank of India had got the score of 70 out of 70; with 100% compliance of financial 
disclosures. It shows the sound practice of financial disclosures by the Bank. 
Table 3.15 shows the analysis of financial disclosure of the last bank of Group 
I banks – Union Bank of India. The score of financial disclosure of the Bank is 70 out 
of 70, which shows the 100% compliance with financial disclosures.  
Table 3.15: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of Union Bank of India. 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Union Bank of India            
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of 
Financial Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of Subsidiaries 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting  1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 14 14 14 14 14 70 
 
3.4.2 Analysis of Financial Disclosure of Group II Banks: 
Analysis of financial disclosure of eight private sector banks under Group II is 
as under: 
Table 3.16 below, shows the analysis of financial disclosure of Axis Bank. The 
Bank has got score of 70 out of 70, with 100% compliance in financial disclosures. 
The annual reports of the bank for all five years were very attractive and presented in 
reader friendly way. In 2006-07 the bank had its old identity, UTI Bank, and from 
2007-08, it became the Axis Bank.  
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Table 3.16: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of Axis Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Axis Bank 
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of  
financial statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of subsidiaries 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 14 14 14 14 14 70 
 
Table 3.17: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of Federal Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Federal Bank 
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of  
financial statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of subsidiaries 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 14 14 14 14 14 70 
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Table 3.17 shows the financial disclosures of Federal Bank. The Federal Bank 
has fulfilled all the financial disclosures as per the requirements for all the years. So 
the score of the bank is 70 out of 70, with 100% compliance level. 
 
Table 3.18: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of HDFC Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
HDFC Bank 
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of  
financial statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of subsidiaries 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 14 14 14 14 14 70 
 
 Table 3.18 shows the financial disclosures of HDFC Bank. The HDFC 
Bank has fulfilled all the financial disclosures as per the requirements for all the 
years. So the score of the bank is 70 out of 70, with 100% compliance level. The bank 
has shown many other financial details, which are not shown in the list of financial 
disclosures. Annual reports of the HDFC Bank were very attractive and reader 
friendly. 
Table 3.19 shows the financial disclosures of the ICICI Bank. Being the 
largest private sector bank of the India, the financial disclosures of the bank are 
appropriate for all the five years. So, the ICICI Bank has got score of 70 out of 70. 
And the level of compliance with financial disclosures is 100%. The ICICI Bank has 
given many useful details in annual reports, other than shown in the list of financial 
disclosures. Thus,  the annual reports of the bank are efficient and reader friendly. 
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Table 3.19: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of ICICI Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
ICICI Bank 
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of  
financial statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of subsidiaries 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 14 14 14 14 14 70 
 
Table 3.20: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of IndusInd Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
IndusInd Bank 
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of  
financial statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of subsidiaries 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 14 14 14 14 14 70 
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Table 3.20 shows the financial disclosures of IndusInd Bank. The IndusInd 
Bank has fulfilled all the financial disclosures as per the requirements for all the 
years. So the score of the bank is 70 out of 70, with 100% compliance level. The 
annual reports of the Bank were as per the best norms of industry. 
Table 3.21: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of Karnataka Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Karnataka Bank 
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of  
financial statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of subsidiaries 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 14 14 14 14 14 70 
 
Table 3.21 shows the financial disclosures of Karnataka Bank. The Karnataka 
Bank has fulfilled all the financial disclosures as per the requirements for all the 
years. So the score of the bank is 70 out of 70, with 100% compliance level.  Though, 
the Karnataka Bank did not have any subsidiary companies, so details of subsidiaries 
and consolidated financial statements are not applicable. Researcher has given the full 
score for ease of calculation. 
Table 3.22 below, shows the financial disclosures of Kotak Mahindra Bank for 
five years. The Kotak Mahindra Banks has got score of 70 out of 70; with 100% 
compliance in financial disclosures. The annual reports of the bank are as per the 
standards of the industry.  
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Table 3.22: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of Kotak Mahindra Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Kotak Mahindra Bank 
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of  
financial statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of subsidiaries 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 14 14 14 14 14 70 
 
Table 3.23: Analysis of Financial Disclosures of Yes Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Yes Bank 
Score 
06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 
1 Directors' Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Auditors Report 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Financial Statements 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 
Schedules forming part of  
financial statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Details of subsidiaries 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 
Consolidated Financial 
Statements 
1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Notes on account 1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Related Party Disclosures  1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Segment Reporting 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Risk Management 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Dividend Details 1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Other Financial Performances  1 1 1 1 1 5 
TOTAL 13 13 13 13 13 65 
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Table 3.23 shows the financial disclosures of Yes Bank for five years. The 
Yes Bank is the only bank on Group II banks, which has got fewer score of 65 out of 
70; with 92.86% compliance in financial disclosures. The only missing disclosure was 
risk management policy of the Yes Bank which was not available in the reports. 
Thus, after analyzing financial disclosures of the Group I and Group II banks, 
researcher has summarized the score of banks of each group in Table 3.24 below.  
Table 3.24: Financial Disclosure Score of selected banks 
Sr. 
No. 
Banks 
Score  
[out of 70] 
Level of Compliance 
[%] 
Group I Banks [Public Sector Banks] 
1 Allahabad Bank 55 78.57 
2 Bank of Baroda 65 92.86 
3 Bank of India 65 92.86 
4 Canara Bank 50 71.43 
5 IDBI Bank 70 100.00 
6 Indian Overseas Bank 70 100.00 
7 Oriental Bank of Commerce 70 100.00 
8 Punjab National Bank 65 92.86 
9 State Bank of India 70 100.00 
10 Union Bank of India 70 100.00 
TOTAL 650/700 92.86 
Group II Banks [Private Sector Banks] 
1 Axis Bank 70 100.00 
2 Federal Bank 70 100.00 
3 HDFC Bank 70 100.00 
4 ICICI Bank 70 100.00 
5 IndusInd Bank 70 100.00 
6 Karnataka Bank 70 100.00 
7 Kotak Mahindra Bank 70 100.00 
8 Yes Bank 65 92.86 
TOTAL 555/560 99.11 
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Table 3.24 shows that out of ten public sector banks under Group I, five banks 
have full compliance with the financial disclosures, which are IDBI Bank, Indian 
Overseas Bank, Oriental Bank of Commerce, State Bank of India and Union Bank of 
India. Whereas three banks are at similar position with 92.86% compliance, these are 
Bank of Baroda, Bank of India and Punjab National Bank. Allahabad Bank has score 
of 55 with 78.57% of compliance and the bank with the least compliance is Canara 
Bank with 71.43% level of compliance. Whereas in private sector banks under Group 
II, out of eight banks, seven banks have fully compliance with the financial 
disclosures and only one bank is there with the less disclosure which is Yes Bank 
[92.86%]. Again, among all the selected banks, the Canara Bank has the least 
compliance [71.43%]. Group wise score shows the 92.86% compliance in Group I 
banks and highest 99.11% compliance in private sector banks. 
3.5 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures Index of the Selected Banks 
After analyzing the financial disclosure index of selected bank, researcher has 
analysed the non financial disclosure index of selected banks[as shown in Table 3.5]. 
In non financial disclosure, total items are 39 and the maximum score is 195. Here 
again, the methodology is same. Means, analysis is presented group wise, starting 
with Group I banks. 
3.5.1 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosure Index of Group I Banks: 
Table 3.25 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of Allahabad Bank. 
The bank has got the score of 149 from total score of 195. So the level of compliance 
of non financial disclosures of the bank is 76.41%. The non financial disclosures 
where the Allahabad Bank is lacking are many. Like the bank did not disclose its 
vision and mission statement anywhere. Bank had not shown the shareholders rights 
also. There was a duality of chairman and CEO, so bank also lose its score. Further, 
the bank had not disclose the organizational code of ethics, stock ownership by 
directors, internal control system, auditors’ appointment and rotation and green 
initiative practices. Even bank had not get any awards or recognitions for corporate 
governance so also lose that score and finally, the annual report of the bank was not 
available online for 2006-07, so that is also one lacking point. Thus out of total 39 
criteria, the Allahabad Bank had fulfilled the 30, and remaining were incomplete. 
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Table 3.25 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of Allahabad Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Allahabad Bank 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 1 1 1 1 1 5 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 0 1 1 1 1 4 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 0 0 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 29 30 30 30 30 149 
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Table 3.26 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of Bank of Baroda 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Bank of Baroda 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 1 1 1 1 1 5 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 1 1 1 1 1 5 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 0 1 1 1 1 4 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 5 5 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 29 30 30 30 35 154 
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Table 3.26 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of Bank of Baroda. 
Out of 195, the Bank of Baroda has got the score of 154. So the level of completion of 
non financial disclosures of the bank is 78.97%. The non financial disclosures where 
the Bank of Baroda is lacking are its vision and mission statement the shareholders 
rights and duality of chairman and CEO, so bank also lose its score. Further, the bank 
had not disclosed the stockownership by directors, industrial/employee relation, 
auditors’ appointment and rotation and environmental responsibility. Even bank had 
not got any awards or recognitions for corporate governance so also lose that score. 
Thus out of total 39 criteria, the Bank of Baroda had fulfilled the 31, and remaining 
were incomplete. 
Table 3.27 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of Bank of India. 
Out of 195, the Bank of India has got the score of 160. So the level of completion of 
non financial disclosures of the bank is 82.05%. The non financial disclosures where 
the Bank of India is lacking are many. Like the bank has not disclosed its vision and 
mission statement anywhere. Bank has not shown the shareholders rights also. There 
was a duality of chairman and CEO, so bank also lose its score. Further, the bank had 
not disclosed the organizational code of ethics, internal control system, auditors’ 
appointment and rotation and green initiative practices. Even bank had not got any 
awards or recognitions for corporate governance so also lose that score. Thus out of 
total 39 criteria, the Bank of India had fulfilled the 32, and remaining were 
incomplete. 
Table 3.28 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of Canara Bank. 
Out of 195, the Canara Bank has got the score of 138 and level of completion of non 
financial disclosures of the bank is 70.77%. The non financial disclosures where the 
Bank is lacking are message from the chairman, its vision and mission statement, 
duality of chairman and CEO, the organizational code of ethics, stock ownership by 
directors, employee/ industrial relation, environmental responsibility, internal control 
system, auditors’ appointment and rotation and green initiative practices. Even bank 
had not got any awards or recognitions for corporate governance and previous annual 
reports were not available online, so also lose that score. Thus out of total 39 criteria, 
the Canara Bank had fulfilled the 27, and remaining were incomplete. 
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Table 3.27 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of Bank of India 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Bank of India 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 1 1 1 1 1 5 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 1 1 1 1 1 5 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 1 1 1 1 1 5 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 0 0 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 32 32 32 32 32 160 
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Table 3.28 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of Canara Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Canara Bank 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 0 0 1 1 1 3 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 0 0 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 27 27 28 28 28 138 
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Table 3.29 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of IDBI Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
IDBI Bank 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 1 1 1 1 1 5 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 1 1 1 1 1 5 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 1 1 1 1 1 5 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 1 1 1 1 1 5 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 1 1 1 1 1 5 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 5 5 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 33 33 33 33 38 170 
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Table 3.29 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of IDBI Bank. Out 
of 195, the IDBI Bank has got the score of 170. The Bank has good scoring, so the 
level of completion of non financial disclosures of the bank is 87.18%. The non 
financial disclosures where the IDBI Bank is lacking are its vision and mission 
statement, shareholders rights and duality of chairman and CEO, so bank also lose its 
score. Further, the bank had not disclosed the stockownership by directors, had not 
got any awards or recognitions for corporate governance so also lose that score. Thus 
out of total 39 criteria, the IDBI Bank had fulfilled the 34, and remaining were 
incomplete. 
Table 3.30 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of Indian Overseas 
Bank. Out of 195, the Indian Overseas Bank has got the score of 160. So the level of 
completion of non financial disclosures of the bank is 82.05%. The non financial 
disclosures where the Indian Overseas Bank is lacking are duality of chairman and 
CEO, so bank also lose its score. Further, the bank had not disclosed the 
organizational code of ethics, environmental responsibility, internal control system, 
auditors’ appointment and rotation and green initiative practices. Even bank had not 
got any awards or recognitions for corporate governance so also lose that score. Thus 
out of total 39 criteria, the Indian Overseas Bank had fulfilled the 32, and remaining 
were incomplete. 
Table 3.31 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of Oriental Bank of 
Commerce. Out of 195, the Oriental Bank of Commerce has got the score of 152 and 
level of completion of non financial disclosures of the bank is 77.95%. The non 
financial disclosures where the Bank is lacking are its vision and mission statement, 
shareholders rights, duality of chairman and CEO, the organizational code of ethics, 
environmental responsibility, auditors’ appointment and rotation and green initiative 
practices. Even bank had not got any awards or recognitions for corporate governance 
and previous annual reports were not available online, so also lose that score. Thus 
out of total 39 criteria, the Oriental Bank of Commerce had fulfilled the 31, and 
remaining were incomplete. 
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Table 3.30 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of Indian Overseas Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Indian Overseas Bank 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 1 1 1 1 1 5 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 1 1 1 1 1 5 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 1 1 1 1 1 5 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 0 0 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 32 32 32 32 32 160 
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Table 3.31 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of Oriental Bank of Commerce 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
OBC 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 1 1 1 1 1 5 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 1 1 1 1 1 5 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 1 1 1 1 1 5 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 0 0 0 1 1 2 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 0 0 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 30 30 30 31 31 152 
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Table 3.32 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of Punjab National Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Punjab National Bank 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 1 1 1 1 1 5 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 1 1 1 1 1 5 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 1 1 1 1 1 5 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 1 1 1 1 1 5 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 5 5 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 33 33 33 33 38 170 
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Table 3.32 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of Punjab National 
Bank. Out of 195, the Bank of Baroda has got the score of 170. So the level of 
completion of non financial disclosures of the bank is 87.18%. The non financial 
disclosures where the Punjab National Bank is lacking are its vision and mission 
statement duality of chairman and CEO, so bank also lose its score. Further, the bank 
had not disclosed the organizational code of ethics and auditors’ appointment and 
rotation. Even bank had not got any awards or recognitions for corporate governance 
so also lose that score. Thus out of total 39 criteria, the Punjab National Bank had 
fulfilled the 34, and remaining were incomplete. 
Table 3.33 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of State Bank of 
India. Out of 195, the State Bank of India has got the score of 157. So the level of 
completion of non financial disclosures of the bank is 80.51%. The non financial 
disclosures where the Bank of India is lacking are many. Like the bank has not 
disclose its vision and mission statement anywhere. Bank had not shown the 
shareholders rights also. There was a duality of chairman and CEO, so bank also lose 
its score. Further, the bank had not disclosed the organizational code of ethics, 
auditors’ appointment and rotation and annual reports for previous years were not 
available online. Even bank had not got any awards or recognitions for corporate 
governance so also lose that score. Thus out of total 39 criteria, the State Bank of 
India had fulfilled the 32, and remaining were incomplete. 
Table 3.34 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of Union Bank of 
India. Out of 195, the Union Bank of India has got the score of 168 and level of 
completion of non financial disclosures of the bank is 86.15%. The non financial 
disclosures where the Bank is lacking are its vision and mission statement, duality of 
chairman and CEO, the organizational code of ethics and auditors’ appointment and 
rotation. The bank had got awards for corporate governance in 2009-10, but no such 
awards for remaining years. Previous annual reports were not available online, so also 
lose that score. Thus out of total 39 criteria, the Union Bank of India had fulfilled the 
34, and remaining were incomplete. 
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Table 3.33 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of State Bank of India 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
State Bank of India 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 1 1 1 1 1 5 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 1 1 1 1 1 5 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 0 0 0 1 1 2 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 5 5 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 30 30 30 31 36 157 
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Table 3.34 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of Union Bank of India 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Union Bank of India 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 1 1 1 1 1 5 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 1 1 1 1 1 5 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 1 1 1 1 1 5 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 0 0 0 1 1 2 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 5 5 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 1 0 1 
TOTAL 32 32 32 34 38 168 
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Table 3.35 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of Axis Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Axis Bank 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 1 1 1 1 1 5 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 1 1 1 1 1 5 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 1 1 1 1 1 5 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 1 1 1 1 1 5 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 0 0 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 33 33 33 33 33 165 
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Table 3.35 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of Axis Bank. Out 
of 195, the Bank of Baroda has got the score of 165. So the level of completion of non 
financial disclosures of the bank is 84.62%. The non financial disclosures where the 
Axis Bank is lacking are its vision and mission statement the shareholders rights and 
organizational code of ethics, so bank also lose its score. Further, the bank had not 
disclosed the auditors’ appointment and green initiative practices. Even bank had not 
got any awards or recognitions for corporate governance so also lose that score. Thus 
out of total 39 criteria, the Bank of Baroda had fulfilled the 33, and remaining were 
incomplete. 
Table 3.36 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of Federal Bank. 
Out of 195, the Bank of India has got the score of 164. So the level of completion of 
non financial disclosures of the bank is 84.10%. The non financial disclosures where 
the Federal Bank is lacking are many. Like the bank has not disclose its vision and 
mission statement anywhere. Bank had not shown the shareholders rights also. 
Further, the bank had not disclosed the environmental responsibility, auditors’ 
appointment and rotation and green initiative practices. Even bank had not got any 
awards or recognitions for corporate governance so also lose that score and online 
annual reports were also not available. Thus out of total 39 criteria, the Bank of India 
had fulfilled the 33, and remaining were incomplete. 
Table 3.37 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of HDFC Bank. Out 
of 195, the HDFC Bank has got the score of 170 and level of completion of non 
financial disclosures of the bank is 87.18%. The non financial disclosures where the 
Bank is lacking are the organizational code of ethics, stock ownership by directors, 
internal control system and auditors’ appointment and rotation. Even bank had not got 
any awards or recognitions for corporate governance. Thus out of total 39 criteria, the 
HDFC Bank had fulfilled the 34, and remaining were incomplete. Though with 
compare to other banks, the level of compliance of non financial disclosers of HDFC 
Bank is very good. 
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Table 3.36 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of Federal Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Federal Bank 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 1 1 1 1 1 5 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 1 1 1 1 1 5 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 1 1 1 1 1 5 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 1 1 1 1 1 5 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 0 1 1 1 1 4 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 0 0 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 32 33 33 33 33 164 
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Table 3.37 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of HDFC Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
HDFC Bank 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 1 1 1 1 1 5 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 1 1 1 1 1 5 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 5 5 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 33 33 33 33 38 170 
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Table 3.38 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of ICICI Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
ICICI Bank 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 1 1 1 1 1 5 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 1 1 1 1 1 5 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 1 1 1 1 1 5 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 1 1 1 1 1 5 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 1 1 1 1 1 5 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 5 5 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 32 32 32 32 37 165 
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Table 3.38 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of ICICI Bank. Out 
of 195, the ICICI Bank has got the score of 165. So the level of completion of non 
financial disclosures of the bank is 84.61%. The non financial disclosures where the 
ICICI Bank is lacking are its vision and mission statement and the shareholders rights 
and so bank also lose its score. Further, the bank had not disclosed the 
industrial/employee relation, auditors’ appointment and rotation and environmental 
responsibility. Even bank had not got any awards or recognitions for corporate 
governance so also lose that score. Thus out of total 39 criteria, the ICICI Bank had 
fulfilled the 33, and remaining were incomplete. 
Table 3.39 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of IndusInd Bank. 
Out of 195, the IndusInd Bank has got the score of 149. So the level of completion of 
non financial disclosures of the bank is 76.41%. The non financial disclosures where 
the IndusInd Bank is lacking are many. Like the bank has not disclose message from 
the chairman and its vision and mission statement anywhere. There was a duality of 
chairman and CEO, so bank also lose its score. Further, the bank had not disclosed the 
organizational code of ethics, Employee/Industrial relation, financial inclusion norms 
or policy, internal control system, auditors’ appointment and rotation and green 
initiative practices. Even bank had not got any awards or recognitions for corporate 
governance so also lose that score. Thus out of total 39 criteria, the IndusInd Bank 
had fulfilled the 31, and remaining were incomplete. 
Table 3.40 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of Karnataka Bank. 
Out of 195, the Karnataka Bank has got the score of 149 and level of completion of 
non financial disclosures of the bank is 76.41%. The non financial disclosures where 
the Bank is lacking are letter from the MD & CEO, its vision and mission statement, 
shareholders rights, duality of chairman and CEO, the organizational code of ethics, 
employee/ industrial relation, environmental responsibility, auditors’ appointment and 
rotation and green initiative practices. Even bank had not got any awards or 
recognitions for corporate governance and previous annual reports were not available 
online, so also lose that score. Thus out of total 39 criteria, the Karnataka Bank had 
fulfilled the 30, and remaining were incomplete. 
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Table 3.39 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of IndusInd Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
IndusInd Bank 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 1 1 1 1 1 5 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 Internal Control System 0 0 1 1 1 3 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 1 1 1 1 1 5 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 0 0 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 29 29 31 30 30 149 
Analysis & Interpretation of Corporate Governance Disclosure Index Chapter 3 
 
An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector 153 
 
Table 3.40 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of Karnataka Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Karnataka Bank 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 1 1 1 1 1 5 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 0 0 1 1 1 3 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 1 1 1 1 1 5 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 1 1 1 1 1 5 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 0 0 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 29 29 30 30 30 148 
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Table 3.41 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of Kotak Mahindra Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Kotak Mahindra Bank 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 1 1 1 1 1 5 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 0 4 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 1 1 1 1 1 5 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 1 1 1 1 1 5 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 0 1 1 1 0 3 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 0 0 3 
28 Environmental Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 0 1 1 1 1 4 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 1 1 1 1 1 5 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 5 5 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 31 33 33 32 35 164 
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Table 3.42 Analysis of Non Financial Disclosures of Yes Bank 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Yes Bank 
Score 06-
07 
07-
08 
08-
09 
09-
10 
10-
11 
1 Message from the Chairman 1 1 1 0 0 3 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 1 1 1 1 1 5 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 1 1 1 1 1 5 
4 Ownership/ shareholding Structure/ Pattern 1 1 1 1 1 5 
5 Shareholders' Rights 0 0 0 1 1 2 
6 Statutory Details of the company 1 1 1 1 1 5 
7 Size of the Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
8 Composition of Board  1 1 1 1 1 5 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Information about independent Directors 1 1 1 1 1 5 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 1 1 1 1 1 5 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 1 1 1 1 1 5 
13 Audit Committee  1 1 1 1 1 5 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
15 Investors’ Grievance Redressal Committee 1 1 1 1 1 5 
16 Other Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
17 Composition of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
18 Functioning of the Committees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 Biography of the Board Members 1 1 1 1 1 5 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 1 1 1 1 1 5 
22 Number of Board Meetings  1 1 1 1 1 5 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings 1 1 1 1 1 5 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 0 1 1 1 1 4 
25 Director Remuneration 1 1 1 1 1 5 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 0 0 0 1 1 2 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
28 Environmental Responsibility 1 1 1 1 1 5 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  1 1 1 1 1 5 
30 Internal Control System 0 0 0 1 1 2 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Auditor Fees 1 1 1 1 1 5 
33 Notice and Agenda of the AGM 1 1 1 1 1 5 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 1 1 1 1 1 5 
35 Annual Report through Internet 1 1 1 1 1 5 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 5 5 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG  1 1 1 1 1 5 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 1 1 1 1 1 5 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 30 31 31 33 38 163 
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Table 3.41 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of Kotak Mahindra 
Bank. Out of 195, the Kotak Mahindra Bank has got the score of 164. So the level of 
completion of non financial disclosures of the bank is 84.10%. The non financial 
disclosures where the Kotak Mahindra Bank is lacking are its vision and mission 
statement and duality of chairman and CEO, so bank also lose its score. Further, the 
bank had not disclosed the organizational code of ethics, industrial/employee relation, 
internal control systems and auditors’ appointment and rotation. Even bank had not 
got any awards or recognitions for corporate governance so also lose that score. Thus 
out of total 39 criteria, the Kotak Mahindra Bank had fulfilled the 34, and remaining 
were incomplete. 
Table 3.42 shows the analysis of non financial disclosures of Yes Bank. Out of 
195, the Bank of India has got the score of 163. So the level of completion of non 
financial disclosures of the Yes Bank is 83.59%. The non financial disclosures where 
the Yes Bank is lacking are many. Like the bank has not disclosed message from the 
chairman, shareholders rights and there were duality of chairman and CEO, so bank 
also lose its score. Further, the bank had not disclosed the organizational code of 
ethics, directors’ stock ownership for one year, employee/industrial relation, internal 
control system and auditors’ appointment and rotation. Even bank had not got any 
awards or recognitions for corporate governance so also lose that score. Thus out of 
total 39 criteria, the Bank of India had fulfilled the 34, and remaining were 
incomplete. 
Thus from the above analysis of non financial disclosures for the banks of 
each group, the overall idea of each banks group wise can be clear. This is shown in 
Table 3.43. It shows that the highest level of compliance [87.18%] with the score of 
170 out of 195 is followed by three banks, two from Group I banks – IDBI Bank and 
Punjab National Bank - and one from Group II banks – HDFC Bank. The bank with 
the least compliance level [70.77%] is from the Group I bank and that is Canara Bank 
with score of only 138 from 195. Whereas in Group II banks, the Karnataka Bank has 
the least level of compliance [75.90%] with the score of 148 out of 195. Group wise 
compliance shows the 80.72% in Group I and highest 82.56% in Group II. So in 
financial as well as in non financial disclosures, private sector banks are leading. 
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Table 3.43: Non Financial Disclosure Score of Selected Banks 
Sr. No. Banks Score [out of 195] Level of Compliance [%] 
Group I Banks [Public Sector Banks] 
1 Allahabad Bank 145 74.36 
2 BOB 154 78.97 
3 BOI 160 82.05 
4 Canara Bank 138 70.77 
5 IDBI Bank 170 87.18 
6 IOB 160 82.05 
7 OBC 152 77.95 
8 PNB 170 87.18 
9 SBI 157 80.51 
10 UBI 168 86.15 
TOTAL 1574/1950 80.72 
Group II Banks [Private Sector Banks] 
1 Axis Bank 165 84.61 
2 Federal Bank 164 84.10 
3 HDFC Bank 170 87.18 
4 ICICI Bank 165 84.61 
5 IndusInd Bank 149 76.41 
6 Karnataka Bank 148 75.90 
7 K M Bank 164 84.10 
8 Yes Bank 163 83.59 
TOTAL 1288/1560 82.56 
 
 If financial and non financial disclosures combined, the result will show the 
overall picture of each bank in each group. Table 3.44 shows the total score of 
selected banks for corporate governance disclosure index. As per the table overall 
level of compliance of Group I banks is 83.92% with the score of 2224 out of 2650 
and for Group II banks is 86.93% with the score of 1843 out of 2120. So it shows that 
private sector banks have fulfilled more criteria of corporate governance than public 
sector banks 
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Table 3.44: Total score of Selected Banks for Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Index 
Sr. 
No. 
Banks 
Financial 
Disclosure 
Score 
[out of 70] 
Non Financial 
Disclosure 
Score 
[out of 195] 
Total Score 
[out of 265] 
Level of 
Compli-
ance [%] 
Group I Banks [Public Sector Banks] 
1 Allahabad Bank 55 145 200 75.47 
2 BOB 65 154 219 82.64 
3 BOI 65 160 225 84.90 
4 Canara Bank 50 138 188 70.94 
5 IDBI Bank 70 170 240 90.57 
6 IOB 70 160 230 86.79 
7 OBC 70 152 222 83.77 
8 PNB 65 170 235 88.68 
9 SBI 70 157 227 85.66 
10 UBI 70 168 238 89.81 
TOTAL 650/700 1574/1950 2224/2650 83.92 
Group II Banks [Private Sector Banks] 
1 Axis Bank 70 165 235 88.68 
2 Federal Bank 70 164 234 88.30 
3 HDFC Bank 70 170 240 90.57 
4 ICICI Bank 70 165 235 88.68 
5 IndusInd Bank 70 149 219 82.64 
6 Karnataka Bank 70 148 218 82.26 
7 K M Bank 70 164 234 88.30 
8 Yes Bank 65 163 228 86.04 
TOTAL 555/560 1288/1560 1843/2120 86.93 
 
Based on the total score and level of compliance given in Table 3.44, ranks 
can be given to the bank group wise. Table 3.45 shows the ranking given to banks. In 
public sector banks [Group I] the IDBI Bank is leading with the highest score of 240 
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and 90.57% level of compliance. This shows the good corporate governance practices 
of the company. The IDBI Bank is followed by the Union Bank of India at second 
position which has the score of 138 with 89.91% level of compliance. The third rank 
goes to Punjab National Bank with score of 235 and 88.68% level of compliance. 
Next to the Punjab National Bank is Indian Overseas Bank at fourth position with the 
score of 230 and 86.79% level of compliance. One of the largest banks State Bank of 
India is at fifth position with 227 points and 85.66% compliance level. The next is 
Bank of India with 225 points and 84.90% compliance. Oriental Bank of Commerce 
is at seventh position with the score of 222 and 83.77%. 
Table 3.45: Ranking of Banks for Corporate Governance Disclosure Index 
Sr. 
No. 
Banks 
Total Score 
[out of 265] 
CGDI [%] Ranking 
Group I Banks [Public Sector Banks] 
1 IDBI Bank 240 90.57 1 
2 UBI 238 89.81 2 
3 PNB 235 88.68 3 
4 IOB 230 86.79 4 
5 SBI 227 85.66 5 
6 BOI 225 84.90 6 
7 OBC 222 83.77 7 
8 BOB 219 82.64 8 
9 Allahabad Bank 200 75.47 9 
10 Canara Bank 188 70.94 10 
Group II Banks [Private Sector Banks] 
1 HDFC Bank 240 90.57 1 
2 Axis Bank 235 88.68 
2 
3 ICICI Bank 235 88.68 
4 Federal Bank 234 88.30 
3 
5 K M Bank 234 88.30 
6 Yes Bank 228 86.04 4 
7 IndusInd Bank 219 82.64 5 
8 Karnataka Bank 218 82.26 6 
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 Bank of Baroda is stood at eighth position with the score of 219 and 82.64% 
compliance. The bank with exact score of 200 is Allahabad Bank with 75.47% 
compliance and the only bank with the score less than 200, and the least score is 
Canara Bank which scored only 188 with 70.94% level of compliance. 
 The performance of Group II – Private Sector Banks shows that the first place 
is secured by the HDFC Bank with the score of 240 and 90.57% level of compliance. 
Banks stood at the first place under each group have got the similar score. At second 
place, two banks stood at similar score, the Axis Bank and ICICI Bank with the score 
of 235 and 88.68% compliance level. Third position is also secured by the two banks 
together, Federal Bank and Kotak Mahindra Bank with the score of 234, just one 
point less than second position banks, and 88.30% compliance. Yes Bank has secured 
the next position by scoring 228 points and 86.04% level of compliance. At fifth 
position, IndusInd Bank stands with 219 points and 82.64% compliance and in this 
group; the last rank has gone to the Karnataka Bank with the score of 218 points and 
82.26% level of compliance. 
3.6 Corporate Governance Disclosure Index items and their rankings: 
Table 3.46 below shows the corporate governance disclosure index items and 
their rankings. The table starts with financial disclosures. As per the analysis, out of 
total 14 items of financial disclosures, 11 items had disclosed by all the sample banks, 
so it shows the 100% level of compliance. Remaining are only three items which were 
not disclosed by some of the banks, which are, details of subsidiaries, risk 
management and presentation of other financial performances like charts, graphs etc. 
The banks lacking details of subsidiaries were 5, details of risk management were 2 
and presentations of other financial performances were only 1. Level of compliance 
with financial disclosures of all the banks is satisfactory with 78.57% [11/14*100]. 
The banks, which are lacking in some issues, they should modify it and disclose in the 
annual reports from the next financial year. 
Whereas the second part of the same table shows the non financial items and 
their ranking. Out of total 39 items of non financial disclosures, 23 were fully 
complied by all the banks and remaining 16 were partially complied. Overall 
compliance ration of non financial disclosure is this 58.97% [23/39*100]. With 
compare to compliance of financial disclosers, the ratio is very less. 
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Table 3.46: Disclosure Items and their Rankings 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Number 
of Banks 
Percentage 
I - Financial Disclosures 
1 Directors' Report 18.0 100.00 
2 Auditors Report 18.0 100.00 
3 Financial Statements 18.0 100.00 
4 Schedules forming part of Financial Statements 18.0 100.00 
5 Details of subsidiaries 13.0 72.22 
6 Consolidated Financial Statements 18.0 100.00 
7 Notes on account 18.0 100.00 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 18.0 100.00 
9 Related Party Disclosures 18.0 100.00 
10 Segment Reporting 18.0 100.00 
11 Risk Management 16.0 88.89 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 18.0 100.00 
13 Dividend Details 18.0 100.00 
14 Other Financial Performance [Ratios/Charts/Graphs] 17.0 94.44 
II - Non Financial Disclosure 
Company Objectives 
1 Message from the Chairman 15.8 87.78 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 16.8 93.33 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 04.0 22.22 
Ownership & Shareholders' Rights 
4 Ownership/ Shareholding  Structure/ Pattern 18.0 100.00 
5 Shareholders' Rights 07.4 41.11 
Governance Structure & Policies 
6 Statutory Details of the company 18.0 100.00 
7 Size of the Board [Minimum 10 members] 18.0 100.00 
8 Composition of Board  18.0 100.00 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 04 .0 22.22 
10 Information about independent Directors 18.0 100.00 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 18.0 100.00 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 18.0 100.00 
13 Audit Committee  18.0 100.00 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 18.0 100.00 
15 Investors' Grievance Redressal Committee 18.0 100.00 
16 Other Committees 18.0 100.00 
17 Composition of the Committees 18.0 100.00 
18 Functioning of the Committees 18.0 100.00 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 04.0 22.22 
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Member of the Board & Key Executives 
20 Biography of the Board Members 18.0 100.00 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 18.0 100.00 
22 Number of Board Meetings [At least 3 in a year] 18.0 100.00 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings [Minimum 80%] 18.0 100.00 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 11.8 65.56 
25 Director Remuneration 18.0 100.00 
Material Issues Regarding Employees, Environmental & Social Stewardship 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 12.6 70.00 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 17.6 97.78 
28 Environmental Responsibility 11.0 61.11 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  17.0 94.44 
Material Foreseeable Risk Factors 
30 Internal Control System 11.8 65.56 
Independence of Auditors 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 01.0 05.56 
32 Auditor Fees 18.0 100.00 
 Annual General Meeting 
33 Notice & Agenda of the AGM 18.0 100.00 
Timings & Means of Disclosure 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 18.0 100.00 
35 Annual Report through Internet 15.2 84.44 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 10.0 55.56 
Best Practices for Compliance with CG 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG [Clause 49] 18.0 100.00 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 18.0 100.00 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 00.2 01.11 
 
Among the items which are partially complied, the least is award for best 
practices in corporate governance; only one bank had got only once. The next item 
was auditors’ appointment and rotation, only one bank had shown it. After that 
maximum bank had duality of chairman and CEO and at the same rank, same number 
of banks was lacking organizational code of ethics and mission and vision statement. 
In remaining items, where the banks were lacking were message from the chairman, 
letter from MD & CEO, shareholders’ rights, directors’ stock ownership, employee/ 
industrial relations, corporate social responsibility, environmental responsibility, 
financial inclusion norms/policy, internal control systems and annual report through 
internet. Green initiative in corporate governance, which was recently introduced as a 
good governance practice; was followed by the 10 banks only.   
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Lacking of all these points shows the weak practices of corporate governance 
and there is a need to follow the same on urgent basis. Combine, financial and non 
financial disclosures, out of total 53 items, 100% compliance was there only in 34 
items, so the level of compliance was 64.15%. This level of compliance triggers many 
questions, at international level, it is not acceptable. Being a banking organization, the 
responsibility of management is increased for its stakeholders, so banks should focus 
on this issue seriously. 
3.7 Analysis of Data: 
Table 3.47 below shows the descriptive statistics. That includes sample size, 
minimum, maximum, range, mean, median, mode, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis. The descriptive statistics is divided in three categories for better 
understanding. First part shows for Group I banks, Public Sector banks, second part is 
for Group II – Private Sector Banks and third part is combine, showing statistics for 
all selected banks. This descriptive statistics is further used by the researcher for 
testing of hypothesis. Researcher has applied multiple regression, run test, f test, z test 
and coefficient correlation techniques as per the requirement and based on the 
collected data. 
Table 3.47: Descriptive Statistics 
Statistics Total Score CGDI 
Financial 
Disclosure Score 
Non financial 
Disclosure Score 
Group I Banks 
N 10 10 10 10 
Minimum 188 70.94 50 138 
Maximum 240 90.57 70 170 
Range 52 19.63 20 32 
Mean 222.4 83.92 65 157.4 
Median 226 85.3 67.5 159 
Mode - - 70 160 
Std Dev 16.65 6.28 7.07 10.62 
Skewness -1.21 -1.21 -1.47 -0.48 
Kurtosis 0.88 0.88 1.23 -0.40 
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Group II Banks 
N 8 8 8 8 
Minimum 218 82.26 65 148 
Maximum 240 90.57 70 170 
Range 22 8.31 5 22 
Mean 230.4 86.93 69.38 161 
Median 234 88.3 70 164 
Mode 235 88.68 70 165 
Std Dev 8.02 3.03 1.77 8 
Skewness -0.81 -0.81 -2.83 -1.12 
Kurtosis -0.74 -0.74 8 -0.17 
Combine 
N 18 18 18 18 
Minimum 188 70.94 50 138 
Maximum 240 90.57 70 170 
Range 52 19.63 20 32 
Mean 225.9 85.26 66.94 159 
Median 229 86.4 70 162 
Mode 235 88.68 70 170 
Std Dev 13.78 5.2 5.72 9.46 
Skewness -1.59 -1.59 -2.21 -0.73 
Kurtosis 2.58 2.58 4.5 -0.31 
 
 To provide primary evidence of the impact of corporate attitudes on corporate 
governance disclosures of different banks, the researcher has used the following 
multiple regression technique. 
CGDI = C + β1 INC + β2 LOCALt + β3 INTt + β4 BODt + β5 INDPt + β6 FINt + et 
For the purpose of multiple regression technique, researcher has takes six 
different variables to show the effect of each on corporate governance disclosure 
index. Thus CGDI is the dependent variable and remaining six are the independent 
variables. Details about each variable are given in table 3.48 
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Table 3.48: Operationalisation of the Research Variables 
Variable Acronym Operationalisation 
Expected 
Sign 
Dependent Variable 
Corporate Governance 
Disclosure Index 
CGDI   
Independent Variables 
Total Income  
(Proxy for size) 
INC 
Natural log of the income of 
the company 
+ 
Local Ownership LOCAL 
The proportion of general 
ownership [summation of 
public, institutional and 
government ownership] in the 
banks 
+ 
International Presence 
[Dummy Variable] 
INT 
Dichotomous with 1 if the 
bank has branch abroad and 0 
otherwise 
+ 
Board Size BOD 
Number of directors in the 
board 
+ 
Independent Directors INDP 
Number of independent 
directors in the board 
+ 
Financial Performance FIN 
Financial performance of the 
bank through return on assets 
+ 
 
Size: The size of the reporting bank has been a major variable in most studies 
examining disclosure variability and several measures of size may be annual sales, 
total income, total assets, fixed assets, paid up capital, shareholders equity, capital 
employed and the market value of the firm
XCVI
. In this study, natural log of total 
income has been used as the proxy for the size of the company. 
Ownership Pattern: Ownership pattern of Indian banks include sponsor ownership, 
institutional ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership and public 
ownership. In this study local ownership [which includes public ownership, 
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institutional ownership and government ownership] has been used with the 
expectation to find any relationship with corporate governance disclosures. 
International Presence: Many Indian banks have overseas branches. Detailed list is 
given in the Table 1. 4. Because of their operation in other countries of the world, it is 
expected that banks with international presence will make more corporate governance 
disclosure than the banks those have not. So a dummy variable has been taken where 
1 for the overseas branch and 0 for the banks did not have overseas branch. 
Board size: Large boards are usually more powerful than small boards and hence 
considered necessary for organizational effectiveness
XCVII
. For instance, as Pearce and 
Zahra (1991) pointed, large powerful boards help in strengthening the link between 
corporations and their environments provide counsel and advice regarding strategic 
options for the firm and play crucial role in creating corporate identity. So the board 
size has been considered in the multiple regression models by the researcher. 
Independent Directors: Another important factor for the study of corporate 
governance is the number of independent directors in the board. In India, it is 
mandatory to keep total independent directors one half of the total board members 
when the chairman is executive director and when the chairman is non executive, the 
number of independent directors must be one third of the total board size. Thus 
researcher has considered this for multiple regressions. 
Financial Performance: Generally sound financial performance of the organization 
shows the better management and vice versa. So the researcher has considered the 
return on assets as indicator of financial performance for each selected banks. 
 Before going for testing of the hypothesis, a Run Test has been performed by 
the researcher for testing the randomness of the observed data. Following Table 3. 49 
show the outcomes from the Run Test. 
Table 3.49 Statistics of Test of Randomness (Run Test) of CGDI 
Test Value of 
CGDI 
Cases < 
Test Value 
Cases > 
Test Value 
Total 
Cases 
Number 
of Runs 
Z P - Value 
86.415 9 9 18 11 0.486 0.627 
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 Test of randomness – Run Test shows that the value of calculated score is less 
that the tabulate score i.e. 0.96, so the null hypothesis is failed to reject. So on the 
basis of Run Test; the score of CGDI is randomly distributed. 
 After testing the randomness of the CGDI, the technique of multiple 
regressions is applied to find out the relationship of CGDI with other factors. As 
shown in the formula of multiple regressions, the dependent variable is CGDI, which 
is shown in Table 3.45 for both groups of banks. Whereas for independent variables, 
researcher has taken the data as under. 
Table 3.50: Total Average Income of Group I and II Banks [Rs in crores] 
Banks 
Years Average 
Income 
Ranks 
2010-11 2009-10 2008-09 2007-08 2006-07 
Group I Banks [Public Sector Banks] 
SBI 96,329.45 85,962.07 76,479.78 58,348.74 46,937.79 72,811.57 1 
PNB 30,599.06 25,032.22 22,245.85 16,262.58 12,881.12 21,404.17 2 
Cnr Bank 25,890.99 21,752.78 19,546.15 16,509.05 12,876.36 19,315.07 3 
BOI 24,393.49 20,494.63 19,399.22 14,472.15 10,743.28 17,900.55 4 
BOB 24,695.11 19,504.70 17,849.24 13,864.52 10,594.43 17,301.60 5 
IDBI 
Bank 
20,704.38 17,614.59 13,107.35 9,772.10 7,392.16 13,718.12 6 
UBI 18,491.40 15,277.42 13,371.93 10,679.97 8,223.98 13,208.94 7 
IOB 13,379.49 11,442.36 11,354.47 9,043.71 6,694.83 10,382.97 8 
OBC 13,047.88 11,457.17 9,927.79 6,978.11 5,530.47 9,388.28 9 
Allah 
Bank 
12,386.34 9,885.10 8,620.30 7,244.43 5,365.81 8,700.40 10 
Group II Banks [Private Sector Banks] 
ICICI 
Bank 
33,082.96 32,999.36 39,210.31 39,667.19 29,957.24 34,983.41 1 
HDFC 
Bank 
24,361.72 19,983.52 19,802.89 12,320.38 8,399.26 16,973.55 2 
Axis 
Bank 
19,786.94 15,583.80 13,732.37 8,755.91 5,546.89 12,681.18 3 
Fed Bank 4,568.84 4,204.15 3,831.16 2,910.43 2,119.94 3,526.90 4 
KM Bank 4,811.12 3,676.59 3,222.70 2,845.84 1,641.93 3,239.64 5 
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Ind Bank 4,303.02 3,260.47 2,765.72 2,217.81 1,784.50 2,866.30 6 
Yes Bank 4,665.02 2,945.24 2,438.34 1,671.50 788.32 2,501.68 7 
Karn 
Bank 
2,662.61 2,354.68 2,270.55 1,808.25 1,441.24 2,107.47 8 
Combined [Group I and Group II Banks] 
SBI 96,329.45 85,962.07 76,479.78 58,348.74 46,937.79 72,811.57 1 
ICICI 
Bank 
33,082.96 32,999.36 39,210.31 39,667.19 29,957.24 34,983.41 2 
PNB 30,599.06 25,032.22 22,245.85 16,262.58 12,881.12 21,404.17 3 
Cnr Bank 25,890.99 21,752.78 19,546.15 16,509.05 12,876.36 19,315.07 4 
BOI 24,393.49 20,494.63 19,399.22 14,472.15 10,743.28 17,900.55 5 
BOB 24,695.11 19,504.70 17,849.24 13,864.52 10,594.43 17,301.60 6 
HDFC 
Bank 
24,361.72 19,983.52 19,802.89 12,320.38 8,399.26 16,973.55 7 
IDBI 
Bank 
20,704.38 17,614.59 13,107.35 9,772.10 7,392.16 13,718.12 8 
UBI 18,491.40 15,277.42 13,371.93 10,679.97 8,223.98 13,208.94 9 
Axis 
Bank 
19,786.94 15,583.80 13,732.37 8,755.91 5,546.89 12,681.18 10 
IOB 13,379.49 11,442.36 11,354.47 9,043.71 6,694.83 10,382.97 11 
OBC 13,047.88 11,457.17 9,927.79 6,978.11 5,530.47 9,388.28 12 
Allah 
Bank 
12,386.34 9,885.10 8,620.30 7,244.43 5,365.81 8,700.40 13 
Fed Bank 4,568.84 4,204.15 3,831.16 2,910.43 2,119.94 3,526.90 14 
KBM 4,811.12 3,676.59 3,222.70 2,845.84 1,641.93 3,239.64 15 
Ind Bank 4,303.02 3,260.47 2,765.72 2,217.81 1,784.50 2,866.30 16 
Yes Bank 4,665.02 2,945.24 2,438.34 1,671.50 788.32 2,501.68 17 
Karn 
Bank 
2,662.61 2,354.68 2,270.55 1,808.25 1,441.24 2,107.47 18 
 
Table 3.50 shows the total average income of the selected banks group wise 
and combined. If analysed group wise, in Group I banks, State Bank of India enjoys 
the first position followed by the Punjab National Bank and Canara Bank. The public 
sector bank with the least average total income is Allahabad Bank. In Group II banks, 
ICICI Bank is at the top position which is followed by HDFC Bank and Axis Bank. If 
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analysed the average total income combine, the bank with highest average total 
income is State Bank of India followed by ICICI Bank. But the difference of average 
income between first two banks is more than double. It gives the idea of turnover and 
branch network of State Bank of India. Last position goes to Karnataka Bank. If 
compared both groups, the average total income of Group I banks [Public Sector 
Banks] much higher than of Group II [Private Sector Banks]. That also shows the 
popularity and market share of Public Sector Banks in India. 
Table 3.51 shows the local ownership pattern of each selected bank. Here local 
ownership includes the shareholding pattern explained in Table 3.48. In the banks of 
Group I, the IDBI Bank is on the top with local ownership of 93.59%, followed by the 
SBI [88.79%] and Indian Overseas Bank [87.67%]. The bank with the least local 
ownership is Punjab National Bank with 81.29%. Group II banks have less local 
ownership with compare to Group I banks, as they are private, foreign institutional 
and retail investors more interested. So the private sector bank with the maximum 
local ownership is Kotak Mahindra Bank with 71.71%, followed by HDFC Bank 
[70.90%] and Karnataka Bank [68.82%]. The bank at last is Yes Bank with only 
46.73% local ownership. It should be noted that in combine ranking, all the public 
sector banks are above the private sector banks in local ownership 
Table 3.51: Local Ownership Pattern of Group I and II Banks [%] 
Banks 
Years 
Average  Ranks 
2010-11 2009-10 2008-09 2007-08 2006-07 
Group I Banks [Public Sector Banks] 
IDBI Bank 95.53 92.49 95.40 94.83 89.71 93.59 1 
SBI 87.08 89.77 91.95 87.12 88.05 88.79 2 
IOB 93.16 90.72 91.48 81.04 81.97 87.67 3 
Cnr Bank 84.99 88.33 88.69 86.00 82.79 86.16 4 
OBC 86.16 84.81 90.33 81.86 80.92 84.82 5 
Allah Bank 84.87 86.89 89.65 81.40 80.45 84.65 6 
BOI 85.27 84.44 85.10 84.23 83.79 84.57 7 
UBI 84.92 82.54 85.88 80.48 80.33 82.83 8 
BOB 82.91 82.88 85.83 79.59 79.15 82.07 9 
PNB 80.65 80.87 85.11 79.93 79.91 81.29 10 
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Group II Banks [Private Sector Banks] 
KM Bank 68.93 70.16 70.27 73.16 76.01 71.71 1 
HDFC Bank 70.25 72.16 72.31 72.34 67.43 70.90 2 
Karn Bank 74.77 73.15 66.70 59.95 69.53 68.82 3 
Axis Bank 62.12 66.32 74.88 64.55 62.36 66.05 4 
ICICI Bank 60.52 62.22 63.36 59.23 54.95 60.06 5 
Fed Bank 58.87 59.96 55.57 52.47 57.73 56.92 6 
Ind Bank 43.26 47.25 52.19 47.20 50.04 47.99 7 
Yes Bank 48.86 41.95 49.47 44.15 49.20 46.73 8 
Combined [Group I and Group II Banks] 
IDBI Bank 95.53 92.49 95.40 94.83 89.71 93.59 1 
SBI 87.08 89.77 91.95 87.12 88.05 88.79 2 
IOB 93.16 90.72 91.48 81.04 81.97 87.67 3 
Cnr Bank 84.99 88.33 88.69 86.00 82.79 86.16 4 
OBC 86.16 84.81 90.33 81.86 80.92 84.82 5 
Allah Bank 84.87 86.89 89.65 81.40 80.45 84.65 6 
BOI 85.27 84.44 85.10 84.23 83.79 84.57 7 
UBI 84.92 82.54 85.88 80.48 80.33 82.83 8 
BOB 82.91 82.88 85.83 79.59 79.15 82.07 9 
PNB 80.65 80.87 85.11 79.93 79.91 81.29 10 
KM Bank 68.93 70.16 70.27 73.16 76.01 71.71 11 
HDFC Bank 70.25 72.16 72.31 72.34 67.43 70.90 12 
Karn Bank 74.77 73.15 66.70 59.95 69.53 68.82 13 
Axis Bank 62.12 66.32 74.88 64.55 62.36 66.05 14 
ICICI Bank 60.52 62.22 63.36 59.23 54.95 60.06 15 
Fed Bank 58.87 59.96 55.57 52.47 57.73 56.92 16 
Ind Bank 43.26 47.25 52.19 47.20 50.04 47.99 17 
Yes Bank 48.86 41.95 49.47 44.15 49.20 46.73 18 
 
Table 3.52 shows the presence of selected banks in abroad. International 
presence is taken as dummy variable by the researcher. So 1 is denoted for 
international presence of the bank and 0 is denoted otherwise. If analysed the table, 
Group I banks have the maximum presence overseas. 
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Table 3.52: International Presence of Group I and II Banks 
Banks Overseas Branches Score for Regression 
Group I Banks 
Bank of Baroda 47 1 
State Bank of India 45 1 
Bank of India 24 1 
Indian Overseas Bank 06 1 
Canara Bank 04 1 
Punjab National Bank 04 1 
IDBI Bank 01 1 
Allahabad Bank 01 1 
Union Bank of India 01 1 
Oriental Bank of 
Commerce 
00 0 
Group II Banks 
ICICI Bank 08 1 
Axis Bank 03 1 
HDFC Bank 02 1 
Federal Bank 00 0 
IndusInd Bank 00 0 
Karnataka Bank 00 0 
Kotak Mahindra Bank 00 0 
Yes Bank 00 0 
          Source: RBI Statistics Hand Book, 2010-11 
Out of total ten banks, nine public sector banks have overseas branches. Bank 
of Baroda was on top with total 47 branches followed by State Bank of India with 45 
branches and Bank of India with 24 branches. Only one bank – Oriental Bank of 
Commerce did not have any overseas branches. On the other hand, from Group II 
banks, only three banks, each possessed one overseas branch. Remaining five banks 
did not have any branches overseas. 
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Table 3.53: Average Board Size of Group I and II Banks 
Banks 
Years Average  
Board Size 
Ranks 
2010-11 2009-10 2008-09 2007-08 2006-07 
Group I Banks [Public Sector Banks] 
Cnr Bank 12 11 13 14 14 12.8 
1 
SBI 14 13 12 12 13 12.8 
UBI 12 12 14 13 11 12.4 2 
BOB 12 12 12 14 11 12.2 
3 IOB 12 12 12 13 12 12.2 
OBC 11 14 13 13 10 12.2 
BOI 11 12 12 14 11 12.0 
4 
PNB 11 13 13 12 11 12.0 
Allah Bank 12 11 13 13 10 11.8 5 
IDBI Bank 10 10 11 11 12 10.8 6 
Group II Banks [Private Sector Banks] 
ICICI Bank 12 17 16 16 17 15.6 1 
Axis Bank 14 12 10 11 11 11.6 2 
HDFC Bank 10 11 11 12 9 10.6 3 
Ind Bank 9 10 10 10 13 10.4 4 
Karn Bank 11 11 10 10 9 10.2 5 
K M Bank 9 9 10 10 9 9.4 6 
Fed Bank 8 9 9 9 10 9.0 7 
Yes Bank 7 9 9 9 9 8.6 8 
Combined [Group I and Group II Banks] 
ICICI Bank 12 17 16 16 17 15.6 1 
Cnr Bank 12 11 13 14 14 12.8 2 
SBI 14 13 12 12 13 12.8 2 
UBI 12 12 14 13 11 12.4 3 
BOB 12 12 12 14 11 12.2 4 
IOB 12 12 12 13 12 12.2 4 
OBC 11 14 13 13 10 12.2 4 
BOI 11 12 12 14 11 12.0 5 
PNB 11 13 13 12 11 12.0 5 
Allah Bank 12 11 13 13 10 11.8 6 
Axis Bank 14 12 10 11 11 11.6 7 
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IDBI Bank 10 10 11 11 12 10.8 8 
HDFC Bank 10 11 11 12 9 10.6 9 
Ind Bank 9 10 10 10 13 10.4 10 
Karn Bank 11 11 10 10 9 10.2 11 
K M Bank 9 9 10 10 9 9.4 12 
Fed Bank 8 9 9 9 10 9.0 13 
Yes Bank 7 9 9 9 9 8.6 14 
 
Table 3.53 shows the number of board members in each selected banks for 
five years and its average. In Group I banks, Canara Bank and State Bank of India are 
leading with average board size of 12.8 members followed by Union Bank of India 
[12.4 members] and Bank of Baroda and Indian Overseas Bank jointly at third place 
with average 12.2 members. IDBI Bank had the least board size, average 6 members 
only. Whereas in Group II banks, ICICI Bank is on top with the highest number of 
board size of 15.6 members average followed by Axis Bank [11.6 members] and 
HDFC Bank [10.6 members]. If both groups compared, again the ICICI Bank is on 
top followed by Canara Banks and State Bank of India jointly at second position and 
Union Bank of India at third position. With compare to private sector banks, public 
sector bank had the appropriate board members. 
Table 3.54 below shows the percentage of independent directors in the boards 
of the selected banks for five years and also shows the average percentage of 
independent directors. in Group I banks, Bank of Baroda is on the top with 70.71% 
directors as non executive [independent] directors followed by IDBI Bank and Punjab 
National Bank. Public Sector Bank with the least non executive directors is Canara 
Bank, which had only 37.58% of total board as independent directors. Whereas in 
Group II – Private sector banks, Karnataka Bank is leading with highest portion of 
independent directors in the board with 84.73% followed by Federal Bank and 
IndusInd Bank. In private sector banks, bank with the least number of independent 
directors was HDFC Bank with 45.18% only. Though with compare to public sector 
banks, boards of private sector banks were having more portions of independent 
directors that show the good sign of corporate governance practices. As per the norms 
given in the Clause 49 of Listing Agreement, the ideal ratio of independent directors 
is 50%. 
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Table 3.54: Independent Directors in Group I and II Banks [% of total board size] 
Banks 
Years Average 
[%] 
Ranks 
2010-11 2009-10 2008-09 2007-08 2006-07 
Group I Banks [Public Sector Banks]  
BOB 75.00 75.00 75.00 64.29 64.29 70.71 1 
IDBI Bank 60.00 60.00 54.55 54.55 63.64 58.55 2 
PNB 54.55 53.85 53.85 50.00 50.00 52.45 3 
IOB 50.00 50.00 50.00 53.85 53.85 51.54 4 
SBI 50.00 53.85 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.77 5 
OBC 54.55 50.00 53.85 53.85 38.46 50.14 6 
UBI 50.00 50.00 50.00 46.15 38.46 46.92 7 
BOI 45.45 41.67 41.67 35.71 35.71 40.04 8 
Allah Bank 41.67 36.36 38.46 38.46 38.46 38.68 9 
Cnr Bank 41.67 36.36 38.46 35.71 35.71 37.58 10 
Group II Banks [Private Sector Banks] 
Karn Bank 81.82 81.82 90.00 90.00 80.00 84.73 1 
Fed Bank 75.00 66.67 66.67 77.78 88.89 75.00 2 
Ind Bank 55.56 60.00 70.00 70.00 90.00 69.11 3 
ICICI Bank 58.33 64.71 75.00 75.00 50.00 64.61 4 
Yes Bank 71.43 66.67 66.67 44.44 55.56 60.95 5 
Axis Bank 57.14 58.33 60.00 63.64 63.64 60.55 6 
KM Bank 66.67 55.56 60.00 60.00 50.00 58.44 7 
HDFC Bank 60.00 45.45 45.45 41.67 33.33 45.18 8 
Combined [Group I and Group II Banks] 
Karn Bank 81.82 81.82 90.00 90.00 80.00 84.73 1 
Fed Bank 75.00 66.67 66.67 77.78 88.89 75.00 2 
BOB 75.00 75.00 75.00 64.29 64.29 70.71 1 
Ind Bank 55.56 60.00 70.00 70.00 90.00 69.11 3 
ICICI Bank 58.33 64.71 75.00 75.00 50.00 64.61 4 
Yes Bank 71.43 66.67 66.67 44.44 55.56 60.95 5 
Axis Bank 57.14 58.33 60.00 63.64 63.64 60.55 6 
IDBI Bank 60.00 60.00 54.55 54.55 63.64 58.55 2 
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KM Bank 66.67 55.56 60.00 60.00 50.00 58.44 7 
PNB 54.55 53.85 53.85 50.00 50.00 52.45 3 
IOB 50.00 50.00 50.00 53.85 53.85 51.54 4 
SBI 50.00 53.85 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.77 5 
OBC 54.55 50.00 53.85 53.85 38.46 50.14 6 
UBI 50.00 50.00 50.00 46.15 38.46 46.92 7 
HDFC Bank 60.00 45.45 45.45 41.67 33.33 45.18 8 
BOI 45.45 41.67 41.67 35.71 35.71 40.04 8 
Allah Bank 41.67 36.36 38.46 38.46 38.46 38.68 9 
Cnr Bank 41.67 36.36 38.46 35.71 35.71 37.58 10 
 
Table 3.55 shows the financial performance of each selected banks in terms of 
return on assets. In this table, return on assets for each bank group wise and combine 
is shown. In Group I banks, the State Bank of India is on the top with the highest 
return of Rs. 869.212 crores, followed by the Punjab National Bank [Rs. 445.524 
crores]  and Bank of Baroda [Rs. 368.776 crores]. The public sector bank with the 
least return on assets is Indian Overseas Bank with average Rs. 103.138 crores only.  
Table 3.55: Financial Performance of Group I and II Banks [Return on Assets] 
Banks 
Years Average 
RoA [%] 
Ran
ks 2010-11 2009-10 2008-09 2007-08 2006-07 
Group I Banks [Public Sector Banks]  
SBI 1,023.40 1,038.76 912.73 776.48 594.69 869.212 1 
PNB 632.48 514.77 416.74 341.98 321.65 445.524 2 
BOB 536.16 414.71 352.37 303.18 237.46 368.776 3 
Cnr Bank 405.00 305.83 244.87 202.33 197.83 271.172 4 
OBC 349.97 292.19 257.54 230.54 223.53 270.754 5 
BOI 292.26 243.75 224.39 168.06 117.89 209.270 6 
UBI 211.31 174.37 139.66 111.33 93.71 146.076 7 
Allah Bank 160.50 131.73 111.45 117.47 100.22 124.274 8 
IDBI Bank 128.69 113.50 102.71 93.82 86.09 104.962 9 
IOB 131.96 116.54 109.06 87.05 71.08 103.138 10 
Analysis & Interpretation of Corporate Governance Disclosure Index Chapter 3 
 
An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector 176 
 
Group II Banks [Private Sector Banks] 
ICICI Bank 478.31 463.01 444.94 417.64 270.37 414.854 1 
HDFC Bank 545.53 470.19 344.44 324.38 201.42 377.192 2 
Axis Bank 462.77 395.99 284.50 245.13 120.80 301.838 3 
Fed Bank 298.34 273.90 252.57 229.16 174.71 245.736 4 
Karn Bank 129.08 136.80 128.89 113.69 102.08 122.108 5 
KM Bank 92.74 130.40 112.98 104.26 50.95 98.266 6 
Yes Bank 109.29 90.96 54.69 44.59 28.11 65.528 7 
Ind Bank 81.95 52.71 40.21 34.69 33.04 48.520 8 
Combined [Group I and Group II Banks] 
SBI 1,023.40 1,038.76 912.73 776.48 594.69 869.212 1 
PNB 632.48 514.77 416.74 341.98 321.65 445.524 2 
ICICI Bank 478.31 463.01 444.94 417.64 270.37 414.854 3 
HDFC Bank 545.53 470.19 344.44 324.38 201.42 377.192 4 
BOB 536.16 414.71 352.37 303.18 237.46 368.776 5 
Axis Bank 462.77 395.99 284.50 245.13 120.80 301.838 6 
Cnr Bank 405.00 305.83 244.87 202.33 197.83 271.172 7 
OBC 349.97 292.19 257.54 230.54 223.53 270.754 8 
Fed Bank 298.34 273.90 252.57 229.16 174.71 245.736 9 
BOI 292.26 243.75 224.39 168.06 117.89 209.270 10 
UBI 211.31 174.37 139.66 111.33 93.71 146.076 11 
Allah Bank 160.50 131.73 111.45 117.47 100.22 124.274 12 
Karn Bank 129.08 136.80 128.89 113.69 102.08 122.108 13 
IDBI Bank 128.69 113.50 102.71 93.82 86.09 104.962 14 
IOB 131.96 116.54 109.06 87.05 71.08 103.138 15 
KM Bank 92.74 130.40 112.98 104.26 50.95 98.266 16 
Yes Bank 109.29 90.96 54.69 44.59 28.11 65.528 17 
Ind Bank 81.95 52.71 40.21 34.69 33.04 48.520 18 
 
In Group II of public sector bank, the bank which is leading was ICICI Bank 
with average return of Rs. 414.854 crores, followed by HDFC Bank [Rs. 377.192 
crores] and Axis Bank [Rs. 301.838 crores]. The private bank with the least return on 
assets employed was IndusInd Bank with average of Rs. 48.520 crores only. If all 
selected banks jointly compared, the first two positions are secured by Public Sector 
Banks – State Bank of India and Punjab National Bank, ICICI Bank has got the third 
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position. Further, the average return on assets of State Bank of India is very high, as 
bank at position of number two has almost half of that. So from this analysis it is clear 
that the performance of Indian Public Sector banks is very sound and public sector 
banks have considerable market share, even after the entry of many private sector as 
well as foreign banks.  
Table 3.56 above shows the final combined data of Group I banks and Group 
II banks for dependent variable and all six independent variables for the purpose of 
multiple regression and correlation analysis for testing of hypothesis. The detailed 
meaning of all the variables is given in the Table 3.48. Followings are the results of 
multiple regression analysis which is performed by using SPSS. 
Table 3.56: Data for Regression & Correlation Analysis of Group I and II Banks 
Banks CGDI INC LOCAL INT BOD INDP FIN 
Group I Banks 
Allah Bank 75.47 8,700.40 84.65 1 11.80 38.68 124.274 
BOB 82.64 17,301.60 82.07 1 12.20 70.71 368.776 
BOI 84.90 17,900.55 84.57 1 12.00 40.04 209.270 
Cnr Bank 70.94 19,315.07 86.16 1 12.80 37.58 271.172 
IDBI Bank 90.57 13,718.12 93.59 1 10.80 58.55 104.962 
IOB 86.79 10,382.97 87.67 1 12.20 51.54 103.138 
OBC 83.77 9,388.28 84.82 0 12.20 50.14 270.754 
PNB 88.68 21,404.17 81.29 1 12.00 52.45 445.524 
SBI 85.66 72,811.57 88.79 1 12.80 50.77 869.212 
UBI 89.81 13,208.94 82.83 1 12.40 46.92 146.076 
Group II Banks 
Axis Bank 88.68 12,681.18 66.05 1 11.60 60.55 301.838 
Fed Bank 88.30 3,526.90 56.92 0 9.00 75.00 245.736 
HDFC Bank 90.57 16,973.55 70.90 1 10.60 45.18 377.192 
ICICI Bank 88.68 34,983.41 60.06 1 15.60 64.61 414.854 
Ind Bank 82.64 2,866.30 47.99 0 10.40 69.11 48.520 
Karn Bank 82.26 2,107.47 68.82 0 10.20 84.73 122.108 
KM Bank 88.30 3,239.64 71.71 0 9.40 58.44 98.266 
Yes Bank 86.04 2,501.68 46.73 0 8.60 60.95 65.528 
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Table 3.57: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std Deviation N 
CGDI* 85.2611 5.20046 18  
Average Total Income 15722.8778 16541.67375 18 
Local Ownership 74.7567 14.30037 18 
International Presence .6667 .48507 18 
Size of the Board 11.4778 1.65087 18 
Independent Directors 56.4417 13.03989 18 
Financial Performance 254.8444 198.10046 18 
* Dependent Variable 
Table 3.57 shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables. Here CGDI is 
dependent variable and all remaining six variables are independent variables as shown 
in first column. The second column shows the mean of each variables, standard 
deviation is given in the third column and the last column shows the total number of 
samples, which are 18 – all the selected banks combine from Group I and Group II 
banks. 
Table 3.58: Correlation Matrix 
Variables CGDI INC LOCAL INT BOD INDP FIN 
CGDI 1.000 .032 -.311 -.091 -.161 .458 .096 
INC .032 1.000 .358 .518 .597 -.258 .909 
LOCAL -.311 .358 1.000 .607 .427 -.568 .263 
INT -.910 .518 .607 1.000 .666 -.555 .415 
BOD -.161 .597 .427 .666 1.000 -.343 .485 
INDP .458 -.258 -.568 -.555 -.343 1.000 -.138 
FIN .096 .909 .263 .415 .485 -.138 1.000 
 
 Table 3.58 shows the correlation matrix. It shows the correlation between each 
pair of dependent and independent variables. Here dependent variable is CGDI and all 
remaining six variables are independent. From the above result of correlation matrix, 
following results have been derived by the researcher: 
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 CGDI being the dependent variable is negatively related with three of the 
independent variables which are local ownership, international presence and size 
of the board respectively. Whereas remaining three are positively related with the 
same which are income, independent directors and financial performance. 
 The second variable is income, which is the proxy variable for size. The 
correlation matrix shows that income is negatively related with only one variable 
that is independent directors, and for remaining all variables, it is positively 
correlated. 
 The third variable is the portion of local ownership in total shareholding pattern of 
the bank. This variable is negatively correlated with two variables which are 
CGDI and independent directors. Other than that, it is positively correlated with 
remaining all variables. 
 Fourth variable is the international presence of the bank. This variable was taken 
as dummy variable. It is negatively correlated with the CGDI and independent 
directors. With remaining all variables, it is positively correlated. 
 Fifth variable is the size of the board. It denotes the total number of directors in 
each bank. This variable is also negatively related with the two variables which 
are CGDI and independent directors. With remaining all variables, it is positively 
correlated. 
 Sixth variable is independent directors. it shows the portion of independent 
directors in board of each banks. As per the correlation matrix, this variable is 
positively correlated only with CGDI, and with remaining all it is negatively 
correlated. 
 Seventh and last variable is financial performance of the company which is shown 
through return on assets. This variable is negatively correlated with only 
independent directors, and with remaining all variables, it is positively correlated. 
Table 3.59: Regression Model Summary 
R R
2 
Adjusted 
R
2 
Std 
Error 
Change Statistics 
R
2
 
Change
 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 
Sig F 
Change 
.567
 
.321 -.049 5.32756 .321 .866 6 11 .548 
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 Table 3.59 shows the summary of multiple regression model which is 
performed by the researcher through SPSS. The result shows the value of R is .567, 
and value of R
2
 is .321. This shows that 32.10% of the output variable’s variance is 
explained by the input variables i.e. dependent and independent variables. Whereas 
adjusted R
2
 stands at -.049, which shows that with putting the new variable in the 
equation, chances of improvement in the R square are very less.  
Table 3.60: ANOVA
a 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 147.550 6 24.592 .866 .548 
Residual 312.212 11 28.383   
Total 459.761 17    
a: Dependent Variable is CGDI 
Table 3.60 explains the results of analysis of variance. Here significance of f is 
.548 which shows that the regression output could have been obtained by chance at by 
that percentage. 
Table 3.61 shows the result of coefficients performed under the test of 
multiple regressions. Here researcher has considered the unstandardized coefficients 
as well as the standardized coefficients using beta version at 95% level of confidence. 
Standardized coefficient of CGDI shows that change in the independent variables will 
increase CGDI by 85.756% overall and for each independent separately is also given 
in the same column. Same way change in income will lead the change in CGDI by 
4.38%, change in local ownership may change CGDI negatively by -.079%, change in 
international presence may change CGDI with4.469%, change in size of the board 
may change the CGDI negatively by -.887%, change in independent directors may 
change in CGDI by .205% and last variable of financial performance may change the 
CGDI by .002%. The same way values at standardize coefficients are also provided in 
the table. 
Last two columns show the correlation and Collinearity statistics. The 
correlations are given for zero order, partial and part. As per that there are negative 
correlations founded in three variables – income, local ownership and international 
presence. 
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Table 3.62: Collinearity Diagnostics
a 
Dime
nsion 
Eigen
value 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
CGDI INC LOCAL INT BOD INDP FIN 
1 6.058 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 .616 3.135 .00 .05 .00 .01 .00 .01 .02 
3 .244 4.981 .00 .01 .00 .37 .00 .01 .03 
4 .038 12.627 .00 .53 .07 .27 .01 .06 .57 
5 .029 14.404 .00 .29 .21 .18 .00 .31 .35 
6 .011 23.670 .02 .05 .43 .07 .44 .37 .02 
7 .004 40.596 .97 .06 .29 .10 .55 .24 .01 
a: Dependent Variable is CGDI 
Table 3.62 shows the Collinearity diagnostics among the selected dependent 
and independent variables. The dependent variable which is CGDI has eigenvalu of 
6.058 with condition index of 1. CGDI has Collinearity with independent variable is 
almost negligible in four cases, only with independent directors it is .02 and with 
financial performance it is .97. Same way table shows the Collinearity of all variables 
with each other. In which, financial performance and international presence has the 
high Collinearity with six variable out of seven variables. In remaining all variables, 
the Collinearity level is mix. So overall outcome of Collinearity diagnostics is 
satisfactory and average. 
 After applying the regression and correlation analysis, the researcher has used 
the same data for the performance of ranking to each selected banks on the basis of 
their individual rank in each of the variables. For this purpose, researcher has 
developed following table 3.63 which shows the ranking of each bank in each 
individual variable. For example State Bank of India has got first rank in four 
variables, second rank in one variable and fifth rank in two variables out of total 
seven, so the total of rank is 16. After ranking, the total of ranks of all variable is 
calculated and on the basis of that, average is found. So here lower the average/score 
better it is. 
Table 3.63 shows the details of ranks given to each banks. Here researcher has 
given the ranks on the basis of performance/rank of each bank in individual variable. 
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For the purpose of analysis, individual rank got by the banks is allotted again and total 
of that score is calculated. After that average is calculated and on the basis of this 
average, overall ranks are given to the banks from smallest to largest, group wise and 
jointly. The bank with the least average ranked first. 
 As per the overall performance, in Group I banks, State Bank of India leads 
with average of 2.29, followed by the Punjab National Bank [3.57] and IDBI Bank 
[3.71]. The bank at last rank in public sector banks is Allahabad Bank with the 
average score of 6.86. 
Table 3.63: Overall Ranking of selected Banks 
Banks 
CG- 
DI 
IN
C 
LO-
CAL 
INT BOD 
IN- 
DP 
FIN 
Sc-
ore 
Ave-
rage 
Rank 
Group I Banks 
SBI 5 1 2 1 1 5 1 16 2.29 1 
PNB 3 2 10 1 4 3 2 25 3.57 2 
IDBI Bank 1 6 1 1 6 2 9 26 3.71 3 
BOB 8 5 9 1 3 1 3 30 4.29 4 
Cnr Bank 10 3 4 1 1 10 4 33 4.71 5 
IOB 4 8 3 1 3 4 10 33 4.71 6 
UBI 2 7 8 1 2 7 7 34 4.86 7 
OBC 7 9 5 0 3 6 5 35 5.00 8 
BOI 6 4 7 1 4 8 6 36 5.14 9 
Allah Bank 9 10 6 1 5 9 8 48 6.86 10 
Group II Banks 
ICICI Bank 2 1 5 1 1 4 1 15 2.14 1 
HDFC Bank 1 2 2 1 3 8 2 19 2.71 2 
Axis Bank 2 3 4 1 2 6 3 21 3.00 3 
Fed Bank 3 4 6 0 7 2 4 26 3.71 4 
Karn Bank 6 8 3 0 5 1 5 28 4.00 
5 
KM Bank 3 5 1 0 6 7 6 28 4.00 
Ind Bank 5 6 7 0 4 3 8 33 4.71 6 
Yes Bank 4 7 8 0 8 5 7 39 5.57 7 
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Combined [Group I and Group II Banks] 
ICICI Bank 2 1 5 1 1 4 1 15 2.14 1 
SBI 5 1 2 1 1 5 1 16 2.29 2 
HDFC Bank 1 2 2 1 3 8 2 19 2.71 3 
Axis Bank 2 3 4 1 2 6 3 21 3.00 4 
PNB 3 2 10 1 4 3 2 25 3.57 5 
IDBI Bank 1 6 1 1 6 2 9 26 3.71 
6 
Fed Bank 3 4 6 0 7 2 4 26 3.71 
Karn Bank 6 8 3 0 5 1 5 28 4.00 
7 
KM Bank 3 5 1 0 6 7 6 28 4.00 
BOB 8 5 9 1 3 1 3 30 4.29 8 
Cnr Bank 10 3 4 1 1 10 4 33 4.71 
9 IOB 4 8 3 1 3 4 10 33 4.71 
Ind Bank 5 6 7 0 4 3 8 33 4.71 
UBI 2 7 8 1 2 7 7 34 4.86 10 
OBC 7 9 5 0 3 6 5 35 5.00 11 
BOI 6 4 7 1 4 8 6 36 5.14 12 
Yes Bank 4 7 8 0 8 5 7 39 5.57 13 
Allah Bank 9 10 6 1 5 9 8 48 6.86 14 
 
  In Group II banks, ICICI Bank leads with the average of 2.14, 
followed by the HDFC Bank [2.71] and Axis Bank [3]. The bank at last position 
stands Yes Bank with the score of 5.57. Whereas in combine, the private sector bank 
ICICI is leading with the average of 2.14, followed by State Bank of India [2.29] and 
Axis Bank [2.71]. The bank stood at last is Allahabad Bank with the average of 6.86. 
Overall analysis shows that Group II banks have secured the better ranks with 
compare to public sector banks. 
After overall ranking of the selected banks, researcher has prepared the Table 
3.64 for frequency distribution of total score by individual banks. Table shows that in 
Group I banks, the banks under the score of 188 to 204 are 2, from 204 to 220 are 1, 
from 220 to 236 are 5 and from 236 to 252 are 2. Thus the maximum banks of Group 
I come under the frequency of 220 to 236. Whereas in Group II banks, no banks come 
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under the first frequency of 188 to 204. The banks under the second frequency 204 to 
220 are 2, from 220 to 236 are 5 and from 236 to 252 is only 1. So in Group II banks, 
the maximum number of banks comes under the frequency of 220 to 236. Again the 
combine effect shows that the maximum banks come under frequency of 220 to 236. 
Table 3.64: Frequency Distribution of Total Score of Individual Banks 
Total Score N Cumulative N Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
Group I Banks 
188-204 2 2 20.00 20.00 
204-220 1 3 10.00 30.00 
220-236 5 8 50.00 80.00 
236-252 2 10 20.00 100.00 
Group II Banks 
188-204 0 0 00.00 00.00 
204-220 2 2 25.00 25.00 
220-236 5 7 62.50 87.50 
236-252 1 8 12.50 100.00 
Combine 
188-204 2 2 11.11 11.11 
204-220 3 5 16.67 27.78 
220-236 10 15 55.56 83.33 
236-252 3 18 16.66 100.00 
 
Table 3.65 shows the frequency distribution of CGDI by individual banks. In 
Group I banks, banks under the frequency of 70 to 75 is 1, from 75 to 80 is 1, from 80 
to 85 are 3, from 85 to 90 are 4 and from 90 to 95 is 1. Thus maximum banks of 
Group I come under the frequency from 85 to 90. In Group II Banks, there are no 
banks under first two frequencies of 70 to 75 and 75 to 80. From 80 to 85 there are 2 
banks, from 85 to 90 there are 7 banks and from 90 to 95 there is only one bank. Thus 
maximum banks of Group II come under the frequency of 85 to 90. If the Group I and 
Group II banks compared jointly, maximum banks falls under the frequency of 85 to 
Analysis & Interpretation of Corporate Governance Disclosure Index Chapter 3 
 
An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector 186 
 
90, total 9 banks, then frequency from 80 to 85, total 5 banks, from 90 to 95, total 2 
banks and under remaining frequencies of 70 to 75 and 75 to 80, only one bank each.  
Table 3.65: Frequency Distribution of CGDI by Individual Banks 
CGDI N Cumulative N Percentage 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
Group I Banks 
70-75 1 1 10.00 10.00 
75-80 1 2 10.00 20.00 
80-85 3 5 30.00 50.00 
85-90 4 9 40.00 90.00 
90-95 1 10 10.00 100.00 
Group II Banks 
70-75 0 0 00.00 00.00 
75-80 0 0 00.00 00.00 
80-85 2 2 25.00 25.00 
85-90 5 7 62.50 87.50 
90-95 1 8 12.50 100.00 
Combine 
70-75 1 1 05.56 05.56 
75-80 1 2 05.56 11.11 
80-85 5 7 27.78 38.89 
85-90 9 16 50.00 88.89 
90-95 2 18 11.11 100.00 
 
3.8 Testing of Hypothesis: 
After analyzing the data and applying the multiple correlation and regression 
method, researcher has applied some other nonparametric tests for testing of 
hypothesis, like Levene’s Test for equality of variance [f test], t test for equality of 
means, Kolmogorov – Smirnov z and Wilkoxon Rank Sum W test of equality of 
means. 
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Hypothesis 1: 
H0: Banks do not differ significantly in average financial disclosure index. 
H1: Banks differs significantly in average financial disclosure index. 
 The result of testing of hypothesis one is given in the Table 3.66 and Table 
3.67 after applying the Levene’s Test for equality of variance [f test], t test for 
equality of means and Wilkoxon Rank Sum W test of equality of means. 
Table 3.66: Tests for equality of variances and equality of means 
Average Financial 
Disclosure Score 
Levene’s Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F t df     Sig. 
Equal variances assumed 16.012 -1.698 16 0.00 
Equal variances not assumed  -1.884 10 0.00 
 
 The results of both the tests above shows that the null hypothesis is failed to 
reject because the calculated value is less than tabulate value in case of f test and 
calculated value is less than the tabulate value in case of t test. Thus under the 
assumption of equal variance, the null hypothesis failed to reject. 
Table 3.67: Wilkoxon Rank Sum W test of equality of means 
Components of Hypothesis n1 n2 N1 N2 W α = 0.025 α = 0.050 
Financial Disclosure Index 10 8 107 60 60 54,98 57,95 
 
Further researcher has carried out the Wiloxon Rank Sum W test of equality of 
means. The test result shows the calculated value of W = 60, which falls between the 
tabulate values at 0.025 and 0.050 level of significance. Thus again the null 
hypothesis failed to reject. So it is proved that selected banks do not differ 
significantly in average financial disclosure index. 
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Hypothesis 2: 
H0: Banks do not differ significantly in average non financial disclosure index. 
H1: Banks differs significantly in average non financial disclosure index. 
 The result of testing of hypothesis two is given in the Table 3.68 and Table 
3.69 after applying the Levene’s Test for equality of variance [f test], t test for 
equality of means and Wilkoxon Rank Sum W test of equality of means. 
Table 3.68: Tests for Equality of Variances and Equality of Means 
Average Non Financial 
Disclosure Score 
Levene’s Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F T df     Sig. 
Equal variances assumed 1.762 -0.794 16 0.00 
Equal variances not assumed  -0.820 16 0.00 
 
 The results of both the tests above shows that the null hypothesis is failed to 
reject because the calculated value is less than tabulate value in case of f test and 
calculated value is less than the tabulate value in case of t test. Thus under the 
assumption of equal variance, the null hypothesis failed to reject. 
Table 3.69: Wilkoxon Rank Sum W test of equality of means 
Components of 
Hypothesis 
n1 n2 N1 N2 W α = 0.025 α = 0.050 
Non Financial 
Disclosure Index 
10 8 103 68 68 54,98 57,95 
 
Further researcher has carried out the Wiloxon Rank Sum W test of equality of 
means. The test result shows the calculated value of W = 68, which falls between the 
tabulate values at 0.025 and 0.050 level of significance. Thus again the null 
hypothesis failed to reject. So it is proved that selected banks do not differ 
significantly in average non financial disclosure index. 
Analysis & Interpretation of Corporate Governance Disclosure Index Chapter 3 
 
An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector 189 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
H0: There is no significant difference in the average financial disclosure index and 
non financial disclosure index among Group I Banks. 
H1: Significant difference exists in the average financial disclosure index and non 
financial disclosure index among Group I Banks. 
Table 3.70: ANOVA
 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 737.019 1 737.019 11.195 0.003598 4.413873 
Within Groups 1185.064 18 65.837    
Total 1922.084 19     
 
 Result of testing of hypothesis three is given in the table 3.70 after applying 
ANOVA test. The table shows that the calculated value of F is 11.195 which is more 
than the table value of 4.413873 at 5% level with df being V1=1 and V2=18 and has 
could have arisen due to chance. This analysis supports the alternative hypothesis and 
rejects the null hypothesis. So it is clear that there is significant difference exists in the 
average financial disclosure index and non financial disclosure index among Group I 
Banks. 
Hypothesis 4: 
H0: There is no significant difference in the average financial disclosure index and 
non financial disclosure index among Group II Banks. 
H1: Significant difference exists in the average financial disclosure index and non 
financial disclosure index among Group II Banks. 
Table 3.71: ANOVA
 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 1094.948 1 1094.948 94.428 1.33081 4.600110 
Within Groups 162.339 14 11.596    
Total 1257.287 15     
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Result of testing of hypothesis four is given in the table 3.71 after applying 
ANOVA test. The table shows that the calculated value of F is 94.428 which is more 
than the table value of 4.600110 at 5% level with df being V1=1 and V2=14 and has 
could have arisen due to chance. This analysis supports the alternative hypothesis and 
rejects the null hypothesis. So it is clear that there is significant difference exists in the 
average financial disclosure index and non financial disclosure index among Group II 
Banks. 
Hypothesis 5: 
H0: There is no significant difference between Group I and Group II banks average 
CGDI. 
H1: Significant difference exists between Group I and Group II average CGDI. 
Table 3.72: Tests for Equality of Variances and Equality of Means 
Average CGDI 
Levene’s Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality 
of Means 
F t df    Sig. 
Equal variances assumed 6.196 -1.683 16 0.00 
Equal variances not assumed  -1.832 12 0.00 
 
The results of both the tests above shows that the null hypothesis is failed to 
reject because the calculated value is less than tabulate value in case of f test and 
calculated value is less than the tabulate value in case of t test. Thus there is no 
significant difference between Group I and Group II banks average CGDI.  
 
Table 3.73: Wilkoxon Rank Sum W Test of Equality of Means 
Components of 
Hypothesis 
n1 n2 N1 N2 W α = 0.025 α = 0.050 
CGDI 10 8 109.5 61.5 61.5 54,98 57,95 
 
Analysis & Interpretation of Corporate Governance Disclosure Index Chapter 3 
 
An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector 191 
 
Further researcher has carried out the Wiloxon Rank Sum W test of equality of 
means. The test result shows the calculated value of W = 61.5, which falls between 
the tabulate values at 0.025 and 0.050 level of significance. Thus again the null 
hypothesis failed to reject. So it is proved that there is no significant difference 
between Group I and Group II banks average CGDI. 
On the basis of tested hypothesis, the summary of all tested hypothesis 
presented as under: 
Table 3.74: Summary of Tested Hypothesis 
Hypothesis Test(s) Applied Result 
H0: Banks do not differ 
significantly in average financial 
disclosure index. 
H1: Banks differs significantly in 
average financial disclosure 
index. 
 Levene’s Test for Equality 
of Variances 
 t test for equality of means 
 Wilkoxon Rank Sum W 
Test of equality of means 
H0 (Null 
hypothesis) 
failed to Reject 
H0: Banks do not differ 
significantly in average non 
financial disclosure index. 
H1: Banks differs significantly in 
average non financial disclosure 
index. 
 Levene’s Test for Equality 
of Variances 
 t test for equality of means 
 Wilkoxon Rank Sum W 
Test of equality of means 
H0 (Null 
hypothesis) 
failed to Reject 
H0: There is no significant 
difference in the average financial 
disclosure index and non financial 
disclosure index among Group I 
Banks. 
H1: Significant difference exists 
in the average financial disclosure 
index and non financial disclosure 
index among Group I Banks. 
 ANOVA 
Supports the 
H1 (alternative 
hypothesis), so 
H0 (Null 
hypothesis) 
rejected 
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H0: There is no significant 
difference in the average financial 
disclosure index and non financial 
disclosure index among Group II 
Banks. 
H1: Significant difference exists 
in the average financial disclosure 
index and non financial disclosure 
index among Group II Banks. 
 ANOVA 
Supports the 
H1 (alternative 
hypothesis), so 
H0 (Null 
hypothesis) 
rejected 
H0: There is no significant 
difference between Group I and 
Group II banks average CGDI. 
H1: Significant difference exists 
between Group I and Group II 
average CGDI. 
 Levene’s Test for Equality 
of Variances 
 t test for equality of means 
 Wilkoxon Rank Sum W 
Test of equality of means 
H0 (Null 
hypothesis) 
failed to Reject 
 
 Table 3.74 shows the summary of all tested hypothesis. As per the result, out 
of five hypotheses, null hypothesis failed to reject in three hypotheses and in 
remaining two, alternative hypothesis is accepted and the null hypothesis is rejected.  
 
 
 
 
. 
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4.1 Introduction: 
Alike most of the countries in world, banking sector is playing a significant 
role in India to transform the economy towards self sufficiency. Being the largest 
source of finance and promising industry for employment, banks assets contribution 
to GDP and market capitalisation is also high e.g. 5.1% of GDP and Rs. 613599.24 
crores [as on 16/04/2012] significantly. India’s banking sector is growing rapidly and 
is expected to enjoy even greater opportunities in the future. Several Indian banks are 
pursuing global strategies, as Indian companies globalise and people of Indian origin 
increase their investment in India. At the same time large number of global banks has 
stepped up their focus on India, keen to participate in the sector’s growth. Thus Indian 
banking sector is rapidly globalising, making it important for Indian banks to ensure 
their practices match those of the best banks in the world. Therefore the governance 
of the banking sector is significantly important compared to other industries. 
It is believed that the banking sector is relatively better regulated and governed 
than any industry in India but special attention needs to be taken from both the policy 
makers and banks itself to improve their governance practices, particularly if we 
revisit the lessons from the recent global financial crisis. Several legal and regulatory 
reforms have been initiated to improve the governance of the banking sector but the 
type and the pace of reforms and their effective implementation are not sufficient 
especially in comparison to the international development.  
In a good number of areas, banks in India are lacking international benchmark; 
for example, Awareness on the CG issues among the stakeholders specially the board 
members on business case of good CG, availability of bank level CG documents (i.e. 
CG code, code of ethics), Composition of the bank board with appropriate mix 
education, skills, competencies, and gender, Availability of different board level 
committees e.g. risk management committee, Interest to organize training programme 
on CG, Board performance evaluation, Clear segregation of responsibilities between 
internal audit and external audit, Inadequate disclosure on non-financial information, 
Disclosure of RTAs & conflict of Interest, Shareholders awareness and protection, 
and effective monitoring of bank client’s CG practices etc. In addition, role played by 
different bodies other than the banks' board, senior management, and shareholders 
also remain challenges for ensuring an effective CG framework in India. 
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Perception of the directors towards training on CG issues, prevailing 
unhealthy competition among the banks in declaring dividends, little pressure for 
market for control and an monitory and regulatory norms issued by the RBI, despite 
of having a large number of banks also limits the practices of good CG in India.  
Therefore, the challenges remain with both development of new policy 
framework on CG and proper implementation of the existing laws, regulations and 
guidelines. These can be done only through an all inclusive approach and 
participation of all relevant stakeholders to ensure good CG framework in India. 
4.2 Summary and Findings: 
Chapter 1: Overview of Corporate Governance and Conceptual Framework 
 Corporate governance is a wide subject and like any other field, definition and 
effective practices of good corporate governance is largely affected by the size of the 
economy, differences in the legal, regulatory, institutional, financial and political 
framework, status of the capital market and stakeholders’ perceptions etc. however, 
irrespective of the differences, the importance and the inherent meaning remains the 
same across the world. Organisations for Economic Cooperation and Development 
[OECD’s] definition and principles on corporate governance has been accepted by 
most of the countries in the world including the multilateral organisations like the 
World Bank Group, the United Natios, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, 
the International Organisation of Securities and Commission [IOSCO], the Asian 
Development Bank , Islamic Financial Services etc. 
 Like many other international researches, this study is also focused on 
OECD’s definition of CG “Corporate governance is defined as the system by which 
business corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure 
specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in 
the corporation, such as, the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, 
and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By 
doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives are set 
and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance", (OECD 
2004). 
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 A balanced board with proper educations, skills and competency, experiences, 
independent judgement and effective oversight Strong commitment from the board 
and the senior management, effective control environment and process, high level of 
transparency and disclosure of financial and non-financial information, well defined 
shareholders rights including the mechanism for the protection of shareholders rights, 
effective monitoring of the client’s corporate governance practices and long term 
commitment to good corporate governance practice rather than a single action or 
“box-ticking” exercises are some of the essential criteria against which we can judge 
the level of commitment to ensure good corporate governance in any of the company 
in the world.  
 Various research findings recommended that companies with good governance 
practices perform better in commercial terms across the world. Adopting corporate 
governances best practices improve access to external financing, lower the cost of 
capital, improve operational performance, increase firm valuation, improve share 
performance, and reduce the risk of corporate crises and scandals1. Good corporate 
governance will ensure the interest of every stakeholders including the investors by 
offering premium price, companies with higher access to finance and reduction of 
risks resulting improved profitability, the public sector through the development of 
stronger capital market, increased investment, and high economic growth, and a 
business relationship among the stakeholders which is based on the pillars of good 
corporate governance i.e. transparency, accountability, fairness and responsibility. 
 Banks are central to market development and socio-economic growth, 
regulatory and economic reforms including corporate governance practices. Like in 
many other parts of the world, bank also playing a critical role in the socio-economic 
development process in Asia. For example, banks are the dominant industry, 
important drivers for economic growth, most important sources of finance, and main 
depository for the economy’s savings. Corporate governance principles and practices 
are most significant in the banking industries compared to the other industries and 
arguably one of the most important discussions in this current financial crisis. Banks 
accept money largely in the form of deposits from the general public (i.e. depositors). 
Banks lend money that is in effect “borrowed: from these depositors, and the failure 
of banks could result in a monetary loss for the depositors with significant 
consequences for the economy. 
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology 
 The subject of the present study is “Empirical Study of Corporate Governance 
in Indian Banking Sector”, which covers the period of five years from 2006-07 to 
2010-11. Researcher has selected total eighteen banks listed in Bankex on January 
2010 for the purpose of the research. These selected banks include the ten banks of 
public sector and eight banks of private sector. For the purpose of analysis, researcher 
has divided all banks in two groups. Group I contains ten public sector banks and 
Group II contains eight private sector banks.  
 After a detailed survey of existing literature, the main objective of the current 
study is decided to determine the corporate governance practices in the Indian 
banking sector. The study aims to identify the practices in different CG issues with 
reference to corporate governance disclosure index based on the report entitled 
“Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure” issued by the UN 
Secretariat for the nineteenth session of ISAR (International Standards of Accounting 
and Reporting). 
 For analysis purpose, researcher has developed the CGDI and on the basis of 
that, financial and non financial disclosures are calculated for the banks of each 
group. After analysis of data, researcher has tried to find out the effect and relation of 
different variables on CGDI with the help of multiple regression and correlation 
analysis. Further researcher has developed the five hypothesis, which are being tested 
by applying different statistical tests like Run Test, Levene’s Test for Equality of 
Variances, t test for equality of means, Wilkoxon Rank Sum W test for equality of 
means and ANOVA. Finally researcher has also shows the limitations of the study 
and scope for the future research. 
Chapter 3: Analysis and Interpretation of Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Index 
 Starting with brief introduction of each selected banks and its ownership 
pattern and performance charts, researcher has collected important financial and non 
financial data of sample banks. As shows in second chapter of research methodology, 
the study is based on analysis of corporate governance on the basis of corporate 
governance disclosure index. For that purpose, corporate governance disclosures of all 
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banks are divided in two categories – financial disclosures and non financial 
disclosures. In financial disclosures, researcher has included total fourteen items, each 
scored 1 for five years, so total obtainable score becomes 70. And for non financial 
disclosures, researcher has included total thirty nine items each scored 1 for five 
years, so total obtainable score of non financial disclosures become 195. Thus total 
score of CGDI is 265. On the basis of this score, total score obtained by each bank is 
compared and this way CGDI is obtained.  
Researcher has also done other analysis of data of selected banks for the 
purpose of regression analysis and correlation analysis. In this analysis, researcher has 
tried to find out the relation among the CGDI and other various independent variables 
like size of the bank, local ownership, presence of bank at global level, number of 
board members, ratio of independent directors in board and financial performance of 
the bank. 
 Further researcher has analysed the data in different way like overall ranking 
of selected banks on the basis of variances considered for regression analysis, 
financial and non financial disclosure items and their rankings, frequency distribution 
of CGDI score and rate of each selected banks etc. finally researcher has tested the 
hypotheses for that purpose, different statistical tests are utilised which are Run Test, 
Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances, t test for equality of means, Wilkoxon Rank 
Sum W test for equality of means and ANOVA. 
Research Findings 
Commitment to Good CG Practices 
 Analysis of CGDI of all the selected 18 banks emphasized the importance of 
ensuring corporate governance among other priorities, such as operational, asset 
or human resource management of the banks; however, the understanding of CG 
is in many cases not in line with international best practices.   
 The results on the familiarity of international guidelines on CG among the sample 
banks for financial disclosures and non financial disclosures are shows the 
compliance with international guidelines on CG. As per that result, the 
compliance with financial disclosure was good with 95.63% and for non financial 
disclosures; it was only 81.54% that is relatively low.   
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 Further if we analyse the disclosure results group wise, for Group I banks [Public 
Sector Banks] financial disclosure score was 92.86% and non financial disclosure 
score was 80.72%. For Group II banks [Private Sector Banks], score of financial 
disclosures was 99.11% and score for non financial disclosures was 82.56%. Thus 
in both the cases, score of Public sector banks was less.  
 Financial disclosures as per international standards missing in most of the banks 
were details of subsidiaries [27.78%], details regarding risk management 
[11.11%] and other financial performance i.e. ratios, charts, graphs etc. [5.56%]. 
Thus the maximum financial disclosure item missing was the detail about the 
subsidiaries. Following table 4.1 shows the missing percentage of each item. 
Table 4.1: Financial Disclosure Missing in selected Banks 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Number 
of Banks 
Percentage 
I - Financial Disclosures 
1 Directors' Report 00 00 
2 Auditors Report 00 00 
3 Financial Statements 00 00 
4 Schedules forming part of Financial Statements 00 00 
5 Details of subsidiaries 05 27.78 
6 Consolidated Financial Statements 00 00 
7 Notes on account 00 00 
8 Significant Accounting Policies 00 00 
9 Related Party Disclosures 00 00 
10 Segment Reporting 00 00 
11 Risk Management 02 11.11 
12 BASEL - II Disclosures 00 00 
13 Dividend Details 00 00 
14 Other Financial Performance [Ratios/Charts/Graphs] 01 05.56% 
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 In non financial disclosures as per the international standards missing in most of 
the banks was many.  If we start with company objectives, not a single selected 
bank was complying fully. Banks missing message from the chairman were 
12.22%, letter from MD and CEO were 6.67% and banks without vision and 
mission statement were maximum 77.78%.  
Table 4.2: Non Financial Disclosure Missing in selected Banks 
Sr. 
No. 
Disclosure Item 
Number 
of Banks 
Percentage 
II - Non Financial Disclosure 
Company Objectives 
1 Message from the Chairman 02.20 12.22 
2 Letter from MD & CEO 01.20 06.67 
3 Vision & Mission Statement 14.00 77.78 
Ownership & Shareholders' Rights 
4 Ownership/ Shareholding  Structure/ Pattern 00 00 
5 Shareholders' Rights 07.40 41.10 
Governance Structure & Policies 
6 Statutory Details of the company 00 00 
7 Size of the Board [Minimum 10 members] 00 00 
8 Composition of Board  00 00 
9 Chairman & CEO Duality 14.00 77.78 
10 Information about independent Directors 00 00 
11 Role & Functions of the Board 00 00 
12 Changes in the Board Structure 00 00 
13 Audit Committee  00 00 
14 Remuneration & Nomination Committee 00 00 
15 Investors' Grievance Redressal Committee 00 00 
16 Other Committees 00 00 
17 Composition of the Committees 00 00 
18 Functioning of the Committees 00 00 
19 Organizational Code of Ethics 14.00 77.78 
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Member of the Board & Key Executives 
20 Biography of the Board Members 00 00 
21 Number of Directorship hold by each Member 00 00 
22 Number of Board Meetings [At least 3 in a year] 00 00 
23 Attendance in Board Meetings [Minimum 80%] 00 00 
24 Director's Stock Ownership 06.20 34.44 
25 Director Remuneration 00 00 
Material Issues Regarding Employees, Environmental & Social Stewardship 
26 Employee Relation/ Industrial Relation 05.40 30.00 
27 Corporate Social Responsibility 00.40 02.22 
28 Environmental Responsibility 07 38.89 
29 Financial Inclusion Norms/ Policy  01 05.56 
Material Foreseeable Risk Factors 
30 Internal Control System 06.20 34.44 
Independence of Auditors 
31 Auditor Appointment & Rotation 17.00 94.44 
32 Auditor Fees 00 00 
 Annual General Meeting 
33 Notice & Agenda of the AGM 00 00 
Timings & Means of Disclosure 
34 Separate CG Statement/ Section 00 00 
35 Annual Report through Internet 02.80 15.56 
36 Green Initiative Practices [for 2010-11 only] 08 44.44 
Best Practices for Compliance with CG 
37 Compliance Certificate for CG [Clause 49] 00 00 
38 Philosophy on Code of CG 00 00 
39 Best Practices Recognition/ Award for CG 17.80 98.89 
 
 Non financial disclosures related to ownership and shareholders’ rights were 
partly complied by the banks. Out of two items, shareholding pattern/ownership 
structure was fully complied by all the banks. But the second shareholders’ rights 
were not complied by 41.10% banks.  
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 Further in Governance structure and policies, out of fourteen items, only two were 
partially incomplete by the banks. The items that fully completed were statutory 
details of the company, size of the board, composition of the board, information 
about independent directors, role and functions of the board, changes in the board 
structure, audit committee, remuneration and nomination committee, investors’ 
grievance redressal committee, other committees, composition of the committees 
and functioning of the committees. The missing information in only two items 
which were Chairman and CEO duality [77.78%] and organizational code of 
ethics [77.78%]. 
 Non financial disclosures related to member of the board and key executives 
included total six disclosures. Out of six, only one was not complied the sample 
banks. The items which were fully complied include biography of the board 
members, number of directorship held by each member, number of board 
meetings, attendance in board meetings and director remuneration. The only 
missing information in this category was directors’ stock ownership which was 
not disclosed by 34.44% banks. 
 The next category of non financial disclosures includes material issued regarding 
employees, environmental and social stewardship. Four out of four items under 
this category were not complied fully. That includes employee/industrial relation 
[30%], corporate social responsibility [2.22%], environmental responsibility 
[38.89%] and financial inclusion norms/policy [5.56%]. Thus the item which was 
missed by most of the banks was environmental responsibility. 
 In next category of material foreseeable risk factors, there was only one item said 
internal control system, and 34.44% banks out of total banks, were missing in this 
disclosure. 
 Category related to independence of directors included two items namely auditors’ 
appointment and rotation and auditor fees. The later was fully complied whereas 
the first was complied by only 94.44% banks. 
 The category of annual general meeting was fully complied which included only 
one item there was notice and agenda of annual general meeting of the company. 
The notice of annual general meeting included the place of the annual general 
meeting along with the date, day and timings. 
Summary, Findings and Suggestions Chapter 4 
 
An Empirical Study of Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector 203 
 
 The next disclosure was timings and means of disclosures which had total three 
items out of that separate corporate governance statement/section was disclosed 
by all the selected banks. But remaining two was not complied fully, which were 
annual report through internet [15.56%] and green initiative practices [44.44%]. 
Thus majority of the banks were missing recently introduced environment friendly 
concept of green initiative. 
 The last category of non financial disclosures was best practices for compliance 
with corporate governance which had three items. All the banks had shown the 
compliance certificate for corporate governance as per Clause 49 of the Listing 
Agreement which is mandatory for all listed companies in India and philosophy 
on code of corporate governance. But only one bank had got the award for good 
corporate governance and again only for one year. So all remaining banks 
[98.89%] were failed to get any such award or recognition for corporate 
governance. 
Board Practices: 
 The function of the board of banks in India is in line with international best 
practices i.e. responsible in setting banks strategy, selecting, dismissing and 
setting remuneration for CEOs/MDs, approving annual budgets, and approving 
disclosure policies, among others. Areas where improvement is necessary is the 
function of the board in overseeing risk management, internal controls, and 
approving succession planning for both the directors and senior management. 
 Among the 18 surveyed banks, the study revealed that 15 bank boards consist of 
10 to 15 members and only 3 banks has a board comprising of 8 to 10 members. 
The study also revealed that large bank boards are relatively small compared to 
medium and small banks. 
 While female representation is seen in the boards, the number of independent 
directors in the boards as female director was low and overall banks having 
inclusion of female in board were also very few. 
 The study revealed that the position of the chairman of the board and the 
CEO/MD is filled by the same individuals in most of the 18 banks in India. 
 The frequency of board meeting among the surveyed banks are more than 16 
times (8 banks), 13 to 15 times (4 banks), 10 to 12 times (4 banks), and 6 to 9 
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times (2 banks). It was also revealed in the study that the frequency of board 
meeting is higher in large banks compared to medium and small banks in India.  
 It is observed by the researcher that in all the surveyed banks had a company 
secretary who assists the board and its chairman to properly prepare and conduct 
board meetings. It was also revealed that in major cases the secretary was an 
employee of the banks. 
 It is observed by the researcher that all the surveyed banks did not provide any 
training on CG for its board members or did not arrange any orientation 
programme for its new board members for Control Environment and Process. 
 The study revealed that all the surveyed banks in India had an external auditor, 
audit department and compliance department to ensure an effective control 
environment and processes. The majority of the banks (65.56%) had an internal 
control department and a risk management function or risk manager positions 
respectively. 
Transparency and Disclosure 
 Shareholders’ primary sources of information on financial, operational and 
governance issues regarding banks are the local media, Annual General Meetings 
(AGM) and official websites. 
 A majority of the surveyed banks disclose their financial information on their 
websites. For example, on average more than 84.44% of the surveyed banks 
disclose their annual reports, balance sheet, profit and loss account, cash flow 
statement, and notes to the financial statements on their websites. Only, 15.56% of 
the banks did not disclose any of the above mentioned information fully or 
partially into its websites. The survey also revealed that the level of disclosure on 
non-financial information on bank websites is relatively low compared to financial 
information. 
 The majority of the banks’ annual reports cover financial information and 
statements about the banks, reports of the chairman to the board, external auditor’s 
opinions, and ownership structure and dividend policies. A low majority of the 
surveyed banks also include CG policies and procedures, future plans, dividend 
history, environment, social and economic sustainability, market share, sales and 
marketing data in its annual report. 
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4.3 Suggestions: 
The following suggestions and recommendations targeting major stakeholders 
i.e. Individual Banks, Governments and Regulatory Bodies, Banking Associations, 
Institutional Investors, Shareholders, Audit Professionals, Stock Exchanges, Credit 
Rating Agencies and Media will facilitate in identifying the areas where improvement 
is necessary and accordingly, the stakeholders can initiate CG reforms in the banking 
sector of India. 
4.3.1 Individual Banks 
 Financial disclosure score of public sector banks and private sector banks 
shows that the overall score is good, but some banks did not disclosed certain 
information. Out of ten banks, Canara Bank had the highest missing 
information regarding the details of subsidiaries, significant accounting 
policies, related party disclosures and segment reporting, so Canara Bank 
should focus to shows these details in the annual reports in proper way.  
Allahabad Bank has also missed the details of subsidiaries, risk management 
and other financial performances. Bank of Baroda, Bank of India and Punjab 
National Bank should focus on providing the details of subsidiaries. The same 
scenario was there in the private bank – Yes Bank. The Yes Bank failed to 
provide information regarding the risk management, so to overcome this 
limitation, the bank should focus to comply with the missing information on 
emergency basis. 
 Whereas in non financial disclosures, not a single bank scored 100%. If 
analysed in detail, there were many points missing in each banks. Points which 
should be focused by public sector banks are company objectives related 
details, details regarding ownership and shareholders’ rights, governance 
structure and policies, material issued regarding employees, environment and 
social stewardship, material foreseeable risk factors, independence of auditors, 
annual general meetings, timings and means of disclosures and best practices 
for compliance with corporate governance. Non financial disclosures are more 
neglected with compare to financial disclosures. That may be harmful policy 
especially for stakeholders who want to obtain such information. So banks 
should focus on these missing points earliest. 
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4.3.2 Corporate Governance Function Wise: 
Improving Commitment to Good CG Practices: 
 Should initiate massive awareness campaign (e.g. seminar, workshops etc.) 
highlighting the meaning and the business case of good corporate governance. 
 Delegate or appoint someone with formal responsibility to ensure good 
corporate governance practices within the banks. 
 A bank should develop its own code of corporate governance to ensure that it 
is in line with international best practices. 
 Code of ethics and board charters serve as very important documents for 
ensuring good corporate governance, and banks in India can think of 
developing such documents in the long run. 
Ensuring Good Board Practices: 
 Although the functions of the board are, in most cases, in the line with best 
practices, certain areas need to be given special attention. For example, boards 
play a minor role in overseeing the risk management and internal audit 
function of the banks. Board members also should have proper information 
about how the banks manage risk and conduct the internal audit. 
 Boards should consider overseeing the risk management and internal audit 
functions of the banks to ensure the best interest of the stakeholders. 
 Board should develop succession plans to ensure the smooth operations of the 
banks. 
 Banks in India should constitute their board with an appropriate mix of skills 
and experience and should not be bias in regard of age and gender of the board 
members. 
 Awareness on the benefits of having an independent director on the board is of 
utmost importance and bank should recognise that appointment of independent 
director will certainly add value as they can protect the interest of its 
stakeholders. 
 Bank should encourage audit committee members to understand the role of the 
committees and should provide proper incentives. In addition, an independent 
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director should be appointed to lead the committees who can provide his or 
her independent judgement for the best interest of the bank’s shareholders. 
 Although, the frequency of board meetings in banks are in line with best 
practices, there are certain areas that need to be improved for an effective 
board meeting e.g. the timing and type of documents shared with board 
members before board meetings. Banks should also inform board members 
well in advance and circulate the agenda and the issues to be discussed at the 
meeting so that the members can prepare themselves to actively take part in 
the discussions. The role of the corporate secretary is of utmost importance 
and needs to be further enhanced. 
 Boards should place more emphasis on developing strategy and policy 
frameworks for the banks, and monitor the compliance of those policies and 
empower the day-to-day management decisions to the management. 
 Banks should initiate performance evaluation of the board to ensure that the 
board achieves its purposes and is best able to protect the interest of 
stakeholders. 
 Banks should consider organising seminars, workshops sessions on CG for its 
board members and also should arrange orientation sessions for new members. 
Strong Control Environment and Processes: 
 Although a large number of banks have risk management committees at 
management levels, board should establish its own risk management 
committee, develop risk management policy in consultation with management 
to oversee and guide the management for managing risks efficiently. The 
board should also give enough time to ensure proper alignment of banks 
strategy with risk-appetite and internal risk management structure. The risk 
management policy should also be publicly disclosed to ensure accountability 
and transparency. 
 Relations between risk management functions, internal control and audit 
functions of the banks should also be streamlined since some banks have 
multiple relationships which are sometimes not in line with best practices. 
 Banks are obliged to change audit firms in regular intervals and should 
consider the quality of the audit services while they are changing the audit 
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firms and should think of partnering with a firm with international audit 
experience. External auditors should not be given any opportunity to perform 
services other than audit. 
Strengthening Transparency and Disclosures: 
 Banks should disclose both their financial and relevant non financial 
information on their websites to enable stakeholders, e.g. supervisors, 
shareholders, media, researcher, to have access to information. 
 In addition to covering the financial information of the company, the annual 
report should also include relevant non financial information for example, 
dividend policy, remuneration policy, policy on corporate social responsibility 
and corporate social responsibility practices, risk management framework and 
policy, ownership structure, board charter and shareholders rights protection 
others. 
 Bank’s disclosure policy should be shared and approved by the shareholders in 
annual general meeting. 
 Banks should accelerate the pace of implementing international accounting 
standards i.e. IFRS. 
Protecting Shareholders Rights: 
 Shareholders have the rights to elect and dismiss directors of the banks but the 
nomination process is not very transparent. Before seeking approval from the 
shareholders, director’s skills, qualifications, and experience should be shared 
with the shareholders to ensure that they know the people who are running 
their banks. 
 Banks should develop a Shareholder Handbook highlighting the rights and 
responsibilities of the shareholders and share the book with each and every 
shareholder. 
 Banks should inform the shareholders through proper channels (e.g. both 
electronic and print media), giving enough time so that shareholders can attend 
the annual general meeting. In addition to confirming the attendance of the 
shareholders, they should also be given an opportunity to ask relevant 
questions at the annual general meeting. Types of documents shared with 
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shareholders before the annual general meeting should also include their 
policies on dividend, remuneration, and risk management framework of banks 
among others. Shareholders should also be allowed to vote electronically and 
in advance if they are unable to attend the annual general meeting in addition 
to existing voting practices by showing-of-hands or by proxy. 
 Banks can establish a shareholder desk at its own premises to receive 
feedback, suggestions or even grievances. 
 Banks should develop a dividend policy and a Related Party Transaction 
(RTPs) policy and, should share them with shareholders for approval. There 
should be provisions that related party transactions should be disclosed before 
they take place. Banks Governing document also should require that board 
members and management should disclose and abstain from voting when there 
is conflict of Interest. 
 To promote shareholder activism, an autonomous institute can be established. 
In this regard, experience and lessons from the Minority Shareholder 
Watchdog Group (MSWG) in Malaysia can serve as the feasible case study. 
Improving clients’ Corporate Governance Practices: 
 Banks should include client’s corporate governance assessment as key criteria 
when assessing proper weight for credit worthiness. 
 Banks should periodically review the corporate governance practices of its 
clients and should provide feedback to improvements in corporate governance 
practices. 
 Banks should arrange incentive programmes for the clients who have showed 
significant improvements in corporate governance practices. 
4.3.3 Government and Regulators [e.g. SEBI, RBI and relevant ministries] 
 Regulators should provide guidelines to individual banks to establish different 
committees to ensure transparency. SEBI should also develop a policy on fees 
paid to the banks directors for attending board meetings instead of just limiting 
a certain amount. 
 Should conduct regular revision of corporate governance guidelines if 
required, incorporating internationally acknowledged principles & guidelines. 
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 Rules regarding the size of the board and eligibility of directors should be 
revised and streamlined among key regulators. 
 Regulators should revise various regulations and acts i.e. Listing Agreement 
Clause 49, The Company Act 1956 and accelerate the process of establishing a 
Financial Reporting Council. 
 Regulators should organise a global conference on corporate governance in 
India with presence from global leaders on corporate governance to share 
international best practices and developments around the world. 
 The RBI should also collaborate with other central banks in the region to 
explore a certification programme for directors through which bank directors 
of one country are eligible sit on the boards of banks in other countries. This 
will motivate the directors towards corporate governance education. 
 RBI should initiate regular discussions with the banks on the business case of 
good corporate governance practices. They should also offer technical 
assistance. 
 SEBI or RBI can send representatives to oversee the AGM of banks.  
 The expertise of international credit rating agencies can strengthen the rating 
culture of India. Therefore, the rating of all banks should be mandatory that 
will add value to international investors’ community, resulting in greater 
access to capital.  
 Full autonomy to the important regulators, especially the RBI and the SEBI, 
should be given to set the tone at the policy level. 
4.3.4 Shareholders: 
 Dedicate enough time to learn the international corporate governance best 
practices and consider corporate governance for investment decisions. 
 Establish a platform where they can raise their voice in a coordinated way and 
should continue to pressurize the banks to disclose financial, operational and 
governance information 
 Institutional investors should act as a pressure group and should consider good 
corporate governance practices as investment decisions  
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4.3.5 Stock Exchange (i.e. NSE, BSE) 
 Form partnership with other regional and international stock exchanges to 
learn and share best corporate governance practices. 
 With recent growth in capital markets, stock exchanges should expand their 
operations and accelerate their investor’s awareness programmes on a wide 
scale 
 BSE has recently introduced the Greenex to give initiative to green practices/ 
environment friendly practices among listed companies. Same way it should 
think for a special index for the companies with best corporate governance 
practices. 
4.3.6 Chartered Accountants Bodies (e.g. ICAI & ICWAI) 
 Provide international training on the role of the auditor, ethics in auditing and 
due diligence, etc to ensure proper disclosure of both financial and non-
financial information of Banks. 
 Encourage Indian audit firms to form partnerships with international audit 
firms to ensure best practices. 
4.3.7 Credit Rating Agencies 
 Should consider going beyond quantitative numbers while rating the banks 
and incorporate the qualitative information on corporate governance as much 
as possible. 
4.3.8 Banking Associations 
 Should arrange regular dialogue with key stakeholders to share developments 
and challenges for ensuring corporate governance practices within the banking 
sector. 
 Should also engage in conducting comprehensive research and partnerships 
with other training institutes to provide training on corporate governance 
issues for both the members of the Board and senior management officials. 
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4.3.9 Researchers & Academics 
 Should continue to identify and explore the areas of improvements and 
provide priority based suggestions to improve corporate governance practices. 
4.3.10 Media 
 Should investigate financial, operational and governance practices and should 
report and publish the information to a wider group of stakeholders. 
4.3.11 International Organizations promoting Corporate Governance 
 Should provide technical assistance as well as share best practices with a cross 
range of stakeholders to promote CG practices. 
 Form partnerships with local institutes to provide training on various aspects 
of good corporate governance to board members, senior management and 
media people. 
4.4 Conclusions: 
This research undertakes the content analysis studies. It has been found that a 
good number of Indian banks listed in Bankex have chosen to disclose information 
regarding various issues of corporate governance with a view to ensure compliance 
with regulatory requirements and to increase the confidence of various constitutes of 
business as well as society. But only disclosers in the annual reports shall not be 
enough. Practice of good corporate governance and its appropriate disclosure can 
facilitate and stimulate the performance of banks, limit the insiders’ abuse of power 
over corporate resources and provide a means to monitor managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour. 
 This research findings show that corporate governance disclosures in Indian 
banks is significantly influenced by the size of the bank, independent directors and 
financial performance but belonging to local ownership, international presence and 
size of the board do not have significant impact on corporate governance disclosure. 
So steps should be taken for mandatory compliance of best corporate governance 
practices as per the Indian context as well as international context. Within the current 
type of analysis, scope may widened by covering the corporate governance disclosure 
Summary, Findings and Suggestions Chapter 4 
 
An Empirical Study of Corporate Governance in Indian Banking Sector 213 
 
practices by all Indian banks or all banks presents in India including the foreign banks 
as well as the non banking financial companies also over a number of years to find out 
the extent of importance the organisations are emphasizing on this issue. Moreover, in 
this research, all the disclosure items are given same weight. Although, this helps to 
reduce subjectivity, the market may place higher emphasis on certain elements of 
governance. Also, some aspect of governance may be considered to be a basic 
component or prerequisite to implementing others and thus should be given more 
weight. Further analysis may also include managerial perceptions studies and 
stakeholders’ perceptions studies. 
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